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ABSTRACT
“Benevolent Intentions: Hospitality, Ethics and the Eighteenth-Century Novel” describes
how representations of hospitality in British novels of the last half of the eighteenth century
engage new ethical questions raised by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers. The
novels explore a philosophical turn towards intention from the vulnerable position of the guest.
As opposed to traditional conceptions of hospitality that combined ideals of hospitality with
culturally specific actions, the new hospitality portrayed in the eighteenth century novel exhibits
suspicions about hospitable actions and seeks instead to establish benevolent intentions in both
host and guest. I argue that the host position is particularly mistrusted: benevolent hosts are
exposed to be weak and ineffective, while bad hosts are shown to be a greater threat to the guest
because of their ability to mask selfish designs under the outward signs of hospitality. I trace
how these exposures of the potential dangers in hospitality reveal the guest’s difficulty in making
accurate judgments about the host’s intentions, thereby creating anxiety in the guest. I examine
representations of hospitality in five novels: Henry Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling, Sarah
Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple, Tobias Smollett’s The Expedition of Humphry
Clinker, Charlotte Lennox’s Sophia, and Frances Burney’s Cecilia, or, The Memoirs of an
Heiress. The guests in these novels respond to the host’s weakness or corruption by seeking
hospitality in fellow guests; because the guest position requires a passive response to others’
needs and two guests approach the relationship as equals, the guest-guest exchange of hospitality
exemplifies the ideal of benevolent intentions in practice. This relationship imposes new
restrictions on the practice of hospitality, limiting its practice to like-minded individuals. These
new restrictions threaten the ideal of hospitality. In many of these novels, the imposed limits
cannot be enforced, and the hospitable company is forced to open its doors to hostile or selfseeking hosts. Ultimately, these novels reveal a tension in the ethics of hospitality: benevolence
and limitations to benevolence are necessary and at odds, leaving the guests in a quandary of
how to balance a necessary self-interest against an ideal of benevolent intention towards one’s
fellow man.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1787, Vicesimus Knox’s Essays Moral and Literary was published.1 Among his
reflections on the state of British literature and culture is this reflection on the moral state of
hospitality:
The days of Elizabeth have been extolled as the days of genuine hospitality. The doors
were thrown open, and, at the sound of the dinner-bell, all the neighbouring country
crowded to the smoking table. These were happy times, indeed, says the railer against
modern refinement. Yet it has been justly doubted, whether this indiscriminate hospitality
was laudable. There was something generous and magnificent in the idea, and it gave the
nobles of the land the influence of kings over their neighbourhood. Yet if its motive and
its moral effects are considered, it will appear to be justly exploded. It proceeded from
the love of power and from ostentation, and it produced gluttony, drunkenness, and all
their consequent vices. (315-316)
Here, Knox questions any nostalgia for an older country house ethic of hospitality. Interestingly,
Knox does not take issue with the act of hospitality itself, which, with its open doors and
crowded tables, was certainly “generous” and hospitable. Instead, Knox objects to the motivation
for such hospitality; because he finds such motivation springs “from the love of power and from
ostentation,” he no longer reads the act as generous or “magnificent” but as a producer of further
vices. Indeed, by connecting this hospitality to such inhospitable intentions, Knox no longer sees
such acts of welcome as emblematic of good hospitality but a sign of “indiscriminate” hosting.
For Knox, open doors and crowded tables are too open and crowded; a less “indiscriminate”
hospitality would be more virtuous.
In this passage, Knox identifies two large changes in the ideal of hospitality that took
place in the eighteenth century. First, intentions became markers of ideal, virtuous hospitality;
second, “indiscriminate” hospitality fell under a cloud of suspicion, thus generating a need to
impose limits and conditions on hosting. This project investigates how eighteenth-century
literature was instrumental in formulating these changing values. The novels of 1745-1780,
1

Knox was a minister and head of Tonbridge School. His Essays and Elegant Extracts were popular at the turn of
the century.

1

written a generation before Knox’s confident revision of Elizabethan hospitality, are preoccupied
with ethical questions raised by the exchange of hospitality. These novels explore the motives
behind hospitable and inhospitable actions and the limitations such motives depend on.
Throughout these works, hospitality is depicted as an anxious, uncomfortable and confusing
experience; rather than offering community and welcome, hospitality produces concern about
others’ intentions, one’s own intentions, and the nature of the pursued relationship. Now
suspicious of the country house idea of hospitality—with its “dinner-bell” and “smoking
table”—literary hosts and guests work to establish a new ethical standard, and new standards of
limitation, for the exchange of hospitality.
In so doing, these novels describe hospitality in its more modern form of practice, in
which the public house or inn aids the common traveler and private hospitality is offered in more
limited ways. At the same time, by placing these new standards and limitations in context, these
novels also question the nature of hospitality as an ethic: what are the host’s and guest’s
obligations if hospitality is determined by intention? New standards of disinterested motives
confuse the practice of hospitality because neither host nor guest can be assured of the other’s
intentions. New requirements for limitations impose regulation on an inherently uncontrollable
exchange that depends on a range of actors, conditions and cultural norms. In essence, these
novels introduce a new understanding of hospitality but, as they do so, they also undermine the
ethic they create by exposing its uncontrollable and unpredictable nature.
Two particular trends in these novels serve to create this paradox. First, eighteenth
century novels emphasize the guest rather than the host position. Guests, as recipients rather than
instigators of hospitality, have less control over limiting the exchange and less authority to judge
intentions. In such a position, the flaws of the new system are made apparent and visceral in the
guest’s discomfort. Second, though this new hospitality emphasizes judging and limiting,
hospitality remained a passive virtue of service to another. This passivity, because of the new
emphasis on intention, required more than just serving another’s physical needs but also made
emotional openness necessary. This very passivity, in fact, became a marker of the disinterested
intentions necessary to offer virtuous hospitality. At the same time, however, this passive nature
makes the demands to limit and judge before offering hospitality more difficult. Thus, I will
2

argue that the novels put forward a new system for hospitality, while simultaneously exposing its
weakness as an ethical standard.

The Nostalgic Past: Practice and Ideal
The problems of hospitality depicted in eighteenth-century novels are indicative of a
problem inherent in the hospitality system—namely that hospitality is both an ethical ideal and a
social practice. Though both forms of hospitality are designed to structure human behavior, their
approaches for doing so differ. The ethical ideal functions on a theoretical level and encourages
the greatest possible achievements in openness and service; the social practice of hospitality, on
the other hand, offers a logistics of action to determine normalized behaviors for inviting a guest
to one’s home and providing them comforts like food and shelter. Because of these different
approaches, ideal and practice rarely correspond. Indeed, Jacques Derrida and other recent critics
have pointed to the impossibility of putting hospitality’s ideal into practice.2 Derrida
distinguishes between the Law (ideal) and the laws (practice) of hospitality and argues that the
two are in essential contradiction. The Law requires one “to give the new arrival all of one’s
home and oneself…without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfillment of even the
smallest condition” (Of Hospitality 77). This giving of the self opposes the laws of hospitality,
which seek to preserve the authority of the host and provide “rights and duties that are always
conditioned and conditional” (Of Hospitality 77). While hospitality idealizes the host’s openness
and generosity, this ideal is difficult to put into practice because such complete generosity would
bankrupt the host emotionally and financially. Yet, any attempt to codify the ideal and protect
the host in practice will necessarily work against the ideal. This paradox is central to the
novelistic investigation of hospitality in the eighteenth century; while the novels propose an

2

Derrida’s theory of hospitality contends that hospitality is “the impossible,” a term that Derrida also uses to
describe gifts, forgiveness and mourning in his works. In their introduction to God, the Gift, and Postmodernism,
John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon define Derrida’s “the impossible” as “a dream and a desire for something
tout autre, of something that utterly shatters the present horizons of possibility, that confounds our expectations, that
leaves us gasping for air, trying to catch our breath” (3). They also investigate Jean Luc-Marion’s competing
definition, which emphasizes not the waiting or the desire but the actual experience of “what these prior constraints
declare impossible…what does not have to be…something whose givenness neither objectivity nor being can
contain” (6). For more on Derrida and Marion’s work and the appropriation of their definitions of the impossible by
postmodern critics, see Caputo and Scanlon, 1-19.

3

ethics of generosity and benevolence, the contexts and characters of the narrative reveal the
difficulty of putting such an ideal in practice.
Yet Knox’s quotation indicates an additional problem for the eighteenth century—
agreeing on an ideal of hospitality. Knox criticizes an ideal of hospitality wherein the host’s
duties are limited to the actions of providing literal openness of the home through food, drink
and lodging. By critiquing the motives for and consequences of these actions, Knox suggests that
ideal hospitality should not proceed “from the love of power and from ostentation” or lead to
“vices.” While the older practice Knox criticizes required only physical openness and not the
giving of oneself that Derrida defines, the new ideal that Knox implies does begin to incorporate
this moral denial of the self and the corresponding denial of the desire to gain power and
position. Thus, the eighteenth-century hosts and guests also faced a conflict of how to define the
ideal of hospitality: would it be judged by the actions of hospitality or the motivations that
spurred such action?
Studies of early modern hospitality suggest that this question was not as pressing in
England before the eighteenth century. Rather, the conflict between ideal and practice was
framed in terms of the extent of the physical offering of hospitality. Indeed, the loss of
Elizabethan hospitality Knox’s contemporaries mourned failed to fulfill its own ideals. When the
“neighbouring country crowded to the smoking table,” the list of guests remained limited and the
events themselves rarely occurred outside of the Christmas feast days. Felicity Heal’s history of
early modern hospitality finds that, for all the later nostalgia, hospitality was often lacking.3
Though highly spoken of, hospitality was rarely offered to those outside the host’s class or
family, and strangers were often treated with reserve (Heal 394). Any hospitality beyond the
simple duties of feeding and lodging one’s family and giving charity on holidays was often
politically motivated, and hosts expected a reimbursement in the form of social prestige or
political position (Heal 73). Hospitality beyond these limits was rarely offered in early modern
England despite society’s general praise of such acts.

3

Heal’s book-length work provides the most thorough and complete study of early modern hospitality. Other studies
that include discussions of hospitality in England tend to emphasize politics, economics, or social hierarchies and
thus fail to offer the level of detail about practice and rhetorical ideal found in Heal’s work. As such, much of the
following section draws more heavily from Heal’s work than other scholars.
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Even if the practice of hospitality was actually quite limited, there existed an ideal of
hospitality that valued openness and charity. Much like Knox’s contemporaries, “railers” against
eighteenth-century culture used the ideal of hospitality as a “rhetorical weapon” (Heal 403). This
early modern rhetoric, unlike Knox’s in his moral essay, showed less concern about motive and
consequence and instead emphasized action.4 More to the point, early modern constructions of
the Elizabethan ideal suggested that action and motive were inseparable and a courtier’s actions
directly displayed a generous interior.5 Though concerns of “dissimulation and hypocrisy” were
raised against specific men, the ideal supported the notion that public hospitality reflected a
moral interior (Heal 105). The act of openness, then, would suggest a corresponding openness in
the heart of the host. The ideal itself, however, began with action and was only radical in its call
for equal openness to “the neighbour and the stranger, the rich and the poor” (Heal 3). The acts
performed for the guests were what determined the moral integrity of the host.6 Though action
often failed to meet the ideal, the ethical standard measured actions and public behavior.
The separation between practice and ideal in early modern England was partly caused by
the ideal of hospitable openness competing against a tradition of hospitality that worked to
preserve social hierarchies. The exchange of hospitality itself presupposes a hierarchy because
the host enjoys authority and power in his ability to bestow or withhold the invitation of
welcome. This position of authority limits the ideal of hospitality as well; rather than relinquish
his power, the host offers hospitality “on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his
own home … and thereby affirms the law of hospitality as the law of the household” (Derrida,
“Hostipitality” 4). Derrida finds a radical ethics in the disruption of this authority, a disruption
that the ideal of hospitality seems to promote. Yet, hospitality has traditionally worked to support
4

Among these are James I and Charles I’s decrees to the nobility to return to their country estates to provide
hospitality to their surrounding communities and 1615 broadside listing “Certaine wholesome Observations and
Rules for Inne-keepers, and also for their Guests, meet to be fixed upon the wall of every Chamber in the house.”
(London: J. Beale, 1615. Early English Books Online. Web. 27 October 2011.) For more on the rhetoric of
hospitality, see Kari Boyd McBride’s Country House Discourse in Early Modern England: A Cultural Study of
Landscape and Legitimacy.
5
This belief was closely aligned to the Renaissance idea of “sprezzatura,” a means of hiding the training behind an
art or behavior so to present it as occurring naturally. The term was popularized by Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of
the Courtier.
6
Ben Jonson’s To Penshurst provides a literary example: the poem praises the acts of hospitality at the country
manor, such as providing food and wine, providing comfortable rooms and grounds, and establishing prosperity in
the neighborhood. Motives for providing this hospitable estate, and the host and hostess themselves, are noticeably
lacking.
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rather than disrupt hierarchies of class and authority. In her work on postcolonial hospitality,
Mireille Rosello notes that the ideal of hospitality often hides cultural systems’ support of
oppressive social structures. While the ideal of hospitality “blurs the distinction between a
discourse of rights and a discourse of generosity, the language of social contracts and the
language of excess and gift-giving,” the rhetoric surrounding the ideal can be used to “[mask]
ruthless forms of non-rights” (9).7 Hospitality was certainly used in the early modern period to
maintain social distinctions and confirm power structures. Rather than relinquish his authority,
the host used hospitality to display his superior wealth and position.
The rhetoric surrounding hospitality was in fact used to support and justify the host’s
superior position in the early modern period. Hospitality was used by the host to prove worth and
maintain separation from lower, more dependent, guests. Even for those guests of equal rank, the
host often used hospitality, and the rhetorical position it offered, as a political tool, displaying his
merit as a way to get preferment (Heal 6).8 The rhetoric surrounding hospitality in the early
modern period thus allows for motives of self-interest and even encourages them. In practice, it
was used as an exchange system whereby both host and guest could gain. In this economy of
hospitality, the host offers material comforts and social connections; the guest, in response, must
return the hospitality with some expression of gratitude often in the form of “prayers and praise”
(Heal 192). The host confirmed or added to his social prestige, and the guest entered this social
hierarchy with the hopes of using his skills of conversation and accommodation to gain further
favors from the host. Promoting the exchange of both tangible and intangible goods, early
modern hospitality embodied motives of self-interest that contradicted the larger ideal, even as
this ideal underlay the exchange.
By the eighteenth century, both the ideal and the hierarchy supported by hospitality had
been weakened. Indeed, the practice of hospitality lessened considerably for many reasons. First,
economic changes upset old hierarchies and simultaneously disturbed old methods of hospitality
7

In fact, Rosello is one of the few contemporary critics to think of hospitality as a practice in her study of
postcolonialism and hospitality. Studying the hospitality in its cultural and historical use, Rosello insists that
hospitality “exists through constantly reinvented practices of everyday life that individuals borrow from a variety of
traditions—from what their parents have taught them, from what they identify as their own traditional background—
and practices that are sometimes similar to, sometimes different from, a supposedly shared norm” (7).
8
Queen Elizabeth, for example, famously used the status of the guest to enact her political desires. For more on her
“progresses” or tours of the English countryside, see Archer, Goldring and Knight, 1-25.
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that depended on and supported those hierarchies. Among these economic changes was the
growth of a commercial hospitality industry that rendered hospitality from country estates largely
unnecessary.9 Moreover, political upheavals associated with civil war further disrupted the old
hierarchies on which hospitality depended; as sides were taken in the rebellion, strangers and
outsiders were targeted with suspicion and found less welcome in homes. More gradually
destabilizing to the hospitality exchange was the growth of the central state and the transition of
peers and gentry to a more urban life, where opportunities to gain influence and participate in
“the world of civility and fashion” were more easily pursued (Heal 402).10 Finally, a growing
secularism and Protestant emphasis on faith over works questioned the act of offering
hospitality.11 Taken together, these social changes all threatened traditional hospitable exchange
and so forced a redefinition of hospitality.
The eighteenth century, then, saw a period of flux in the system of hospitality. The ideal
of hospitality faced a debate of definitions: was hospitality to be defined by intentions or actions?
The answer, I will argue, became increasingly defined by an intentional ethic, an ethic that
determined morality based on the motives that inspired the action rather than on the
consequences of the action.12 Yet, at the same time, the old conflict of how to match practice and
ideal remained, even as this ideal was shifting definitions. To further complicate the debate, ideal
and practice are difficult—perhaps impossible—to separate. Derrida attempts to mediate this
problem through a paradox; he argues that “the unconditional law of hospitality needs the laws.”
Without them, The Law “would risk being abstract, utopian, illusory” and, as such, would never
enter the realm of practice. Though these laws “contradict The Law, or at any rate threaten it,
9

Heal finds that, by the end of the seventeenth century, the inn system was well established but points to evidence
that this system had made early progress in the medieval era as the alehouse culture expanded (395-396).
10
The gentry had been moving to the city throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, a practice which so
noticeably disrupted the hospitality exchange that Elizabeth I, James I and Charles I all issued decrees ordering the
nobility back to their estates in times of economic trouble. During and following the civil war, however, no such
decrees were issued.
11
Protestantism still highly valued charity, and John Calvin numbered it among the signs of a soul destined to be
saved. However, Calvinism and other Protestant sects encouraged the giving of charity and the building of
institutions rather than the offering of personal hospitality. Though Max Weber famously argued that Calvinist
ethics discouraged charity in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, this claim is too strong for the
eighteenth century. For more on the institutions of charity in the eighteenth century, see Hugh Cunningham and
Joanna Innes, eds. Charity, Philanthropy and Reform: from the 1690s to 1850. London and New York: Macmillan
Press, 1998.
12
By intentional ethic, I refer to what philosophers call “virtue ethics.” However, I chose to use the term intentional
ethics to underscore one of the primary tenants of virtue ethics—the agent’s motivations for acting.
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sometimes corrupt or pervert it,” the laws also give The Law a possibility of existing in the world
(Of Hospitality 79). Though dependent on one another, ideal and practice do not coincide and
often result in an abstract ideal disconnected from the public practice. To understand the
eighteenth-century debates over hospitality, then, I will turn to literature because it offers
perspectives on both ideal and practice. Since novelists depict both the public manifestations of
hospitality and the internal dispositions of the characters who offer, refuse or accept hospitality,
novels offer a view of the changes and debates hospitality faced in the eighteenth century.

The Philosophical Shift: From Action to Intention
The ideal of hospitality explored in eighteenth-century novels was a product of a larger
intellectual movement found in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. This philosophy
helped define and promote ethical ideals based on intention. This shift was a part of the larger
philosophical Enlightenment; as Cartesian ethics spread throughout Europe and the British Isles,
philosophers began to privilege the individual and explore the human psyche.13 An ethics of
personal motives became a part of this movement; rather than be defined by family, occupation,
or social position, an individual came to be identified by disposition and intention. At the same
time, personal and public morality were being defined by these personal intentions. My concern
here is not to paint a sweeping picture of Enlightenment philosophy but to show how—even in
texts from a variety of philosophical backgrounds—ethics was becoming more and more
concerned with intention rather than action.
In particular, my interest lies in the philosophies of the British Isles and those that
promote intentional ethics and influenced many of the novels of the second half of the century.14
I will draw from works by four philosophers: Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary on
These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14.23, “Compel Them to Come In, That my House May Be
Full”; Richard Cumberland’s Treatise of the Laws of Nature; Francis Hutcheson’s Inquiry into
13

For readings of this philosophical turn towards individuality, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 127-176 and
J.B. Scheewind, The Invention of Autonomy.
14
Scholars of eighteenth-century fiction have commonly made connections between the philosophical movements
and literary trends of the century. Sentimental novels in particular have garnered attention for their use of moral
sense theory derived from John Locke’s work and promoted by Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis
Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith. Modern critics, including Barbara Benedict, Liz Bellamy, Scott Paul
Gordon, Lori Branch, Wendy Motooka and Adela Pinch, among others, draw connections between the social work
of the eighteenth-century novel and philosophy.
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the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
These works were written across the Restoration and eighteenth century, with dates ranging from
the 1660s to the 1750s from various philosophical schools, yet all define disinterested intentions
as ethical. Bayle, a contemporary of John Locke, writes on tolerance from a less political and
more personal position than his peer to denounce religious persecution;15 Bayle contends that
moral behavior and religious belief depend on the motivations behind them. Cumberland, a
member of the Latitudinarians, offers this school’s most thorough response to Thomas Hobbes’
Leviathan;16 countering Hobbes’ view that all human action is motivated by self-interest,
Cumberland argues that moral action demands a disinterested intention. Hutcheson, a proponent
of the moral sense theory, responds to a later proposal of natural human selfishness put forth by
Bernard Mandeville;17 Hutcheson counters that humans instead respond to a moral sense that
guides actions towards disinterested ends. Finally, Smith, writing as a contemporary of the
novelists discussed in this project, proposes that disinterested intentions are the most ethical but
also the most difficult to consistently pursue.
Though these texts do not directly address hospitality, they do share hospitality’s chief
ethical concern—how to best treat one’s neighbor.18 This ethic certainly has Christian
connotations, most notably in the Love Commandment found in both Matthew and Luke’s
gospel which called for Christians to love their neighbor as they love themselves. Indeed, each of
the philosophical texts discussed here is influenced by Christianity and the Christian beliefs that
surrounded and defined each of the philosophers: Bayle reinterprets Biblical texts to convince
both Catholic and Protestant readers to be more tolerant, Cumberland finds God’s will in the
15

The two men’s works were published simultaneously but separately; there is no evidence that either man
influenced the other and it seems as though they never met, despite Locke’s travels in exile and Bayle’s later
friendship with Locke’s student, the Earl of Shaftesbury. For more on the relationship between Locke and Bayle’s
work on tolerance, see Alex Schulman, 328-60 and Perez Zagorin, 240-288.
16
On Cumberland’s education as a Latitudinarians and the importance of his response to Hobbes, see John Parkin’s
foreword to Cumberland’s treatise, pp.x-xvi. The Latitudinarians sought to prove the rationality of Christianity and
its contributions to a greater good. For a discussion of the impact one of its most popular members, George
Tillotson, had on English preaching, see James Downey, 6-29.
17
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Virtues was first published in 1705 as just the poem,
“The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn’d Honest” and then reissued with extensive prose additions to explain the
poem in 1714. Mandeville’s initial poem received little attention but his revised text was denounced b y a number of
contemporary thinkers as an attack on Christian values.
18
I share Nancy Snow’s sense of hospitality as an “application of the broader virtue of benevolence to the specific
relationship of host and guest.” Defining hospitality as “an expression of benevolence… [is]to imbue it with a depth
that the virtue would otherwise lack” (7).
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individual,19 Hutcheson concedes that God is the source of our moral sense,20 and Smith, perhaps
the least directly concerned with Christianity, rewrites the Love Commandment to illustrate his
theory of sympathy.21 Despite these Christian influences, these texts approach ethics from a
secular perspective; in fact, the earlier philosophers define their work as secular as a means to
validate their message.22 Without the aim of advancing any religious position, these texts
consider how ethical criteria outside of the Christian doctrine help guide interpersonal
interactions. Hospitality is essential to that goal because it is itself a secular ethic meant to
determine behavior in this world and to facilitate interactions between strangers—including
strangers in faith.23 These philosophies argue for the importance of good intentions in
determining the morality of an action; in so doing, they help define hospitality as an intention.
As early as the 1660s, this ethical shift to use intention for moral judgments can be seen
in Pierre Bayle’s call for religious tolerance in a Philosophical Commentary on Luke 14.23,
‘Compel them to come in, that my house may be full’. A Huguenot exiled from Catholic France,
Bayle argues that personal conviction as a motive to act is vital to moral and religious belief.24
Bayle begins by defining motives as “Acts of the Mind” and argues that physical actions “are
approved by God only in proportion to the internal Acts of Mind from whence they proceed”
19

In one of many examples of how Cumberland conflates nature and God, he contends that “our Mind is, by the
Light of Nature, let into the Knowledge of the Will or Laws of God” (252). For more on Cumberland’s discussion of
the Will and God, see Jon Parkin, “Probability, Punishments and Property: Richard Cumberland’s Sceptical Science
of Sovereignty.”
20
References to the design of a deity or higher being are made throughout the work. In one example, Hutcheson
looks at the order of the universe and asks, “what possible room is there left for questioning Design in the Universe?
None but the barest Possibility against an inconceivably great Probability, surpassing every thing which is not strict
Demonstration” (53).
21
Smith’s use of the Love Commandment will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
22
The earlier philosophical texts explored here emphasize their secular position. Bayle opens his text by proclaiming
that he will “leave it to the Criticks and Divines to comment on this Text in their way” and instead examine the text
from “Principles more general and more infallible than what a Skill in Languages, Criticism, or Common-place can
afford.” To do so, Bayle claims that he will not look at religious matters but at those of “natural Reason” (66-67).
Likewise, Cumberland writes in his introduction that he “purposely contain’d myself wholly within the Bounds of
Philosophy, and have therefore abstained from Theological Questions” in order to more directly respond to Thomas
Hobbes’ claims in the Leviathan and not dissolve into “dispute with Mr. Hobbes about the Sense of Scripture” (28081). Those texts written later in the century also take secular positions but no longer feel the need to justify this
approach.
23
The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10. 25-37) follows Luke’s version of the hospitality commandment—
“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy
mind; and thy neighbor as thyself”—with a story that illustrates the hospitable neighbor is not defined by faith but
by the feeling of compassion and response to another’s need.
24
For more on how these earlier religious persecutions and questions shape Bayle’s life and work, see Elisabeth
Labrousse,’s biography, Bayle.
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(76). These “Acts of the Mind” are separate actions that occur internally and often influence
physical behavior. This duality of action—in the mind and external to it—is used to promote
religious tolerance; force should not be used to convert a person because physical threats cannot
sway internal “Acts of the Mind.” Indeed, these internal acts are of more importance than their
external counterparts, and physical actions, to be ethical, must respond to these internal acts. This
privileging of internal “Acts of the Mind” restructures ethical standards around the individual
rather than the community and has consequences for how social interaction is judged. Bayle uses
an example of almsgiving to illustrate the nature of this change.25 According to his philosophy,
merely giving alms no longer constitutes a moral act; rather, the mind must also agree with the
morality of the act. Thus, almsgiving is immoral if the alms are given when the giver imagines
the receiver is undeserving and is moral only if the giver believes the receiver to be worthy (22225). In this example, Bayle insists that an act such as almsgiving is only moral if the mind’s
action corresponds with the physical action. Thus, Bayle finds that motive is more important than
the act itself in determining the ethical nature of a situation: “of the two Actions, one of which
we call good, the other bad, the good being done against the Instincts of Conscience, is a greater
Sin than the bad Action done from the Instincts of Conscience” (221). Bayle thus works to
rewrite ethical standards to privilege intentions over action. By defining these intentions as an
alternative type of action, he seeks to encourage his peers to calculate these intentions, along
with the traditionally judged external actions, into their moral systems of thought.
Philosophers in England were also debating the importance—and nature—of intention to
ethical standards. Thomas Hobbes’ conclusion in his 1651 Leviathan that human motivation was
primarily selfish was viewed with alarm by his contemporaries.26 Working to redeem humanity
from this negative definition, philosophers scrambled to describe human motivation as
disinterested and social. Among those who responded to Hobbes, Richard Cumberland designed
the most extensive and thorough rebuttal to reclaim human intention as a valid indicator of
ethical action in his A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Cumberland’s long response to Hobbes
25

For more on Bayle’s unusual, narrative style of philosophy see Thomas M. Lennon’s in-depth analysis, Reading
Bayle.
26
There is debate among modern scholars whether this pessimistic simplification of Hobbes’ philosophy is fair and
accurate; however, many of Hobbes’ contemporaries certainly read his work in this way. For more on seventeenthcentury reactions to Hobbes’ theories, see John Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700.
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attempts to establish humans’ natural perfection; he based this thesis on his interpretation of the
Love Commandment, which he redefines as the “general Law of Nature” or “the greatest
Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all” (292).27 Following this Law, Cumberland
argues, will lead society at large as well as the benevolent agent to the greatest good. If each
person chose to follow this Law, then his or her actions would, as a matter of course, lead to
hospitable ends. Knud Haakonssen summarizes Cumberland’s argument as a proposal that “true
happiness lies only in one’s perfection and perfection only in intentionally contributing to the
common good, that is, in making God’s will one’s own” (Natural Law 35). Indeed, the idea of
will, like Bayle’s “Acts of the Mind,” turns attention to human intention and how these
intentions correspond to physical actions. Cumberland claims that “whatever a Man can will, he
can also resolve to effect the same, as far as it is in his Power” (473). This will is defined as
intention but also, according to Cumberland, “assumes the complete Nature of an End,” thereby
asserting control over action and consequence as well (473). Will, then, like the “Act of the
Mind” attempts to bridge the gap between action and intention; at the same time it privileges
intention as the source of action and the determiner of consequence.
Cumberland’s work became more popular in the eighteenth century when it was
translated from its original Latin to English in 1727.28 Yet, by this time, the emphasis on
intention had been adopted and expanded by the moral sense philosophers. Francis Hutcheson’s
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue was a contemporary of the
Cumberland translation and proposed a similarly optimistic view of human motives. This
optimism is reflected in how Hutcheson’s theory is based on an internal moral perception he
calls the moral sense. His first thesis maintains that “some Actions have to Men an Immediate
Goodness; or, that by a superior sense, which I call a Moral one, we perceive Pleasure in the
Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin’d to love the Agent, …without any
27

J.B. Schneewind notes that Cumberland opens his treatise with two biblical quotations that offer love as the
ultimate Christian law: Matthew 22.37-39, which outlines the two commandments to “love the Lord, thy God with
all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind” and to “love thy neighbor as thyself,” and Romans 13.10,
which says “Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” Schneewind then likens
Cumberland’s philosophy to a justification of these hospitable laws in order to “show that love is the core of
morality, and law only its instrument” (102).
28
Cumberland’s work was certainly not ignored in the seventeenth century; in fact, three editions of the Latin text
were printed before 1700. The work was also adapted into a shorter text in 1701 and reprinted in Latin in 1720
before an English translation was produced by John Maxwell. Jon Parkin speculates in the Foreword of the Liberty
Fund text used here that the translation was fueled by Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of Bees (xvii-xix).
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View of further natural Advantage from them” (88). This moral sense, like Bayle’s “Acts of the
Mind” and Cumberland’s “will,” guides humans to ethical action in the world. Those actions
which elicit positive responses from the moral sense are ethical and are themselves thought to
spring from moral intentions. Like his predecessors, Hutcheson continues to consider motive to
be the chief determiner of ethical behavior. Indeed, actions without proper intentions are found
unethical, and “external Motions, when accompany’d with no Affections toward God or
Man,…can have no moral Good or Evil in them” (101). Hutcheson insists that moral judgment
of an act should be based solely on the intention that motivates the action rather than on the
action or its consequence.
But Hutcheson’s theory does differ from earlier philosophies that were concerned
primarily with the actors in an exchange and therefore found the chief stumbling block for their
theories in proving an association between intention and action. For example, this problem of
association is inherent within Bayle’s ethical system. One cannot, after all, know without doubt
whether a beggar is worthy of alms. Thus, for Bayle, the problem of judging is the problem of
belief itself—what if we believe in error? Bayle’s answer is to accept the logical conclusion such
false belief would have on his ethical construct. Bayle contends that “a Murder committed from
the Instincts of Conscience, is a less Sin than not committing Murder when Conscience dictates”
(249). Murder and other sinful acts, if they are believed to be just, are moral acts because the
intention was to do right.29 Bayle’s conclusion is rather unsatisfactory because it ultimately
condones the very persecution he writes against. Cumberland’s theory approaches the problem of
association differently, arguing that rationally determined probabilities will inform actions to
produce the desired end. Cumberland argues that “whereas we know not what shall hereafter
happen, we may, nevertheless know what is possible” and logically work through which
possibilities have the greatest probability of leading to the intended result (492). Through this
crucial connection, Cumberland provides a philosophy that allows intention, action, and
consequence to easily coincide—perhaps too easily to be believable in a flawed world.30

29

For a discussion of how this conclusion fits into Bayle’s larger philosophy see Lennon, 81-101.
J.B. Schneewind ponders this happy conflation and argues that Cumberland is proposing a world view of social
harmony in his work. See Schneewind, 101-117.

30
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Hutcheson inherits this difficulty but, unlike his predecessors, does not approach the
problem from the actor’s perspective. Rather, Hutcheson introduces an observer who can more
easily stand back from the action and determine the probable intentions of the actors.31 Yet, this
approach also has a flaw; the moral sense is determined not by the actor but by an observer, and
this new position creates new problems of perception. Because intention occurs in the mind, it is
difficult for an observer to determine what intentions are influencing the actions produced;
moreover, good intentions do not necessarily lead to good consequences, and actions are not
always an accurate means of judging intention. Hutcheson acknowledges that “Human Laws
however, which cannot examine the Intentions, or secret Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in
gross of the Action itself.” The judgments of the observer must work as though it is possible to
determine the intention, “presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain’d, which we are
oblig’d to attain” (131). The observer is to act as responsibly as he can in his judgment of others’
intentions but cannot completely overcome the limitations of the physical world. Intention,
which is of utmost ethical importance, cannot be accessed by the public observer much as the
consequences cannot be foreseen by the actors.32 Thus, the observer perspective Hutcheson
introduces might overcome the problems of associating intention and action faced by the actor
but introduces a new problem of judgment in properly assessing the connection between
intention and action. While the actor cannot determine the outcome of his intentions, the
observer cannot be sure of the intentions of the actors. While this observer stance is designed to
make the connections of intention, action and outcome more easily connected, it ultimately raises
more difficulties for determining the now essential intentions of actors.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the era in which the novels in question were being
written, the ethical importance of intention was well established. The corresponding problems of
understanding which actions would lead to the intended outcomes and identifying intentions
from physical actions were also established. These trends are apparent in the work of Adam
31

The observer position as a moral standpoint had been popularized in the previous decade in the Spectator, a
newspaper that used the persona of a detached observer to comment on the vices and virtues of public life in
England.
32
Daniela Gobetti reads this paradox as both a “source of problems for Hutcheson’s thought” and “an important
symptom of the changing nature of moral discourse, and of the changing relationship between morality, legality, and
politics” (118). Gobetti cannot answer for the problem of perception in Hutcheson’s work but does connect this
problem with the developing political and legal systems that mark our modern world.
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Smith, who continued to privilege motivation as an ethical standard but tempered the dependence
on intentions with an array of corruptions and barriers that complicate such an ethics. Intention
still remains central to morality, but its ability to be exercised is questioned more intensely.
Smith agrees that “the only consequences for which [the actor] can be answerable, or by which
he can deserve either approbation or disapprobation of any kind, are those which were some way
or other intended, or those which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the
intention of the heart, from which he acted” (93). Intention is found to be the determinant of
morality. Actions and consequences remain less important but, for Smith, they tend to
problematize the ability to discern intention. As Hutcheson’s theory began to suggest, humans,
limited to basic observation, must use action and consequence to judge. Smith argues that,
though intention is what should determine the “whole merit or demerit” of an action, these are
private and thus “beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction.” Thus, Smith claims, we
function through a necessarily flawed system wherein “men in this life are liable to punishment
for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions” (105).33 Intention is clearly the
standard by which judgments should be made, but actions are the only accessible object to judge.
Smith turns even further towards the observer’s perspective, asking even actors to take up
the viewpoint of a disinterested observer. Like Hutcheson, Smith finds that every man possesses
the means to be benevolent and reach an idealized morality; he argues man knows right from
wrong because a “demigod within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct” creates, “in
the mind of every man, an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations upon the
character and conduct both of himself and of other people” (247). Though each man possesses
this “demigod within the breast” with the capacity for benevolence, Smith qualifies that each
person will only be so good as the “delicacy and acuteness” of their observations (247).34
33

V.M. Hope claims that Smith actually proposes two systems of ethics, one based on the merit and demerit of an
action and the other on propriety and impropriety. See Hope, 88-100.
34
Yet, despite discussion of how human behavior often fails to meet an ideal of open, active hospitality, Smith’s
philosophy continues to insist on the potential of a naturally benevolent nature and strengthens this position in
subsequent editions. Wendy Motooka argues that, in each revision of Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith deals less
and less with the particulars of life or the active application of moral sentiment, which thus allows him to insist more
and more on the ideal of the impartial spectator within each man (211). She argues that Smith, by emphasizing the
universal potential of benevolence, creates a flawed system that only works “when everyone agrees…when it is least
needed” (220). The ideal, which Smith acknowledges is difficult to maintain, is only explicated within the
theoretical works of philosophy; in a messier world, the ideal of benevolence is far less easily discerned from selfinterested behavior.
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Benevolence may still be a natural response in this theory but it requires training and diligence to
turn this benevolence into action. This qualification of universal benevolence reflects Smith’s
tendency to dwell on the difficulty of removing the obstacles to benevolence, a tendency that
distances Smith from Hutcheson. His use of the Love Commandment illustrates this move: “As
to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great
precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same
thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us” (Smith 25). For Smith, even actors in an
exchange of hospitality are required to take an observer’s perspective. Rather than act on the love
of neighbor, the actor is asked to step back and observe what that love is and then apply it
internally rather than externally. By revising the commandment, Smith emphasizes neither active
love of neighbor nor benevolent intentions towards others but rather explores an internalized
consideration of another’s perspective and potential intention. When applied to hospitality ethics,
the result is a host whose perspective and distance from self allows for greater benevolence but
does not suggest that this intention will lead to action as was proposed by earlier philosophers.35
The ethics of intention and the problems it creates parallel the ethical problem of
hospitality: the ideal relies on judgments of the actors’ intentions but practice, by necessity, can
only consist of action and consequence. The ethical questions introduced in these philosophical
texts are apparent in the system of hospitality as well. As intention became the ethical standard in
the eighteenth century, hospitality became increasingly defined by the benevolent intentions
thought to promote its ideal. The questions surrounding intentional ethics thus are applied to the
hospitable exchange: how can an intention of open hospitality be translated into action and how
can its consequences be predicted? How can the observer of hospitality determine from viewed
actions the intentions of the actors in the exchange? These two questions—one of association,
one of perspective—are crucial to the ethical inquiries found in the eighteenth-century novel.
These novels often take the perspective of the protagonist, a limited perspective which illustrates
the difficulties of reading another’s intentions. Likewise, these novels explore ethical obligation
through plots of action, placed in the contexts of a larger world; this approach details the

35

Wendy Motooka discusses the “circularity” of Smith’s moral claims and the eighteenth-century responses to the
inactive nature of Smith’s ethics in The Age of Reasons: Quixotism, Sentimentalism and Political Economy in
Eighteenth-Century Britain, 205-220.
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problems of association as actions and intentions are both vital to the ethical practice of
hospitality. These novels use hospitality to work through the dimensions of these questions and
possible solutions to the problems of association and perception.

Literary Ethics: Guests in Context
Eighteenth-century novels investigate these two questions but approach intention as an
ethic from a different perspective. The early philosophy discussed here was concerned with
actors in what would be considered the host position—those actors in the position to offer
hospitality, charity, or welcome—and the later philosophy viewed ethical exchanges from the
detached perspective of an observer. Novels—and narrative in general—tend to focus on the
guest perspective, following the stories of questing heroes, pilgrims, travelers, orphans, or exiles
as they seek shelter and kindness from the strangers they meet on their journeys.36 Eighteenthcentury novels, which repeatedly take these characters as their central focus, approach the ethical
questions of hospitality from this guest perspective. This shift in perspective emphasizes the
cultural and social changes of the eighteenth century. The marginalized guest position resembles
that of Britain’s new social voices in their vulnerabilities to authority and their lack of guidelines
for behavior; these new Britons, including migrating Scotsmen and women, responded to their
surroundings much like hospitable guests. The complications of this shifted perspective are
evident in the depictions of the common scene of a carriage ride in the novels. Not a traditional
form of hospitality, the carriage ride becomes a site for hospitality as travelling guests meet
together in a space that requires each traveler to accommodate the other. However, in these
scenes, there is no host but a wide spectrum of guests from diverse backgrounds and varying
philosophical foundations. The lack of host in these scenes emphasizes the complexities of the
guest perspective; asked to be both welcoming of others and wary of harm, these guests in the
eighteenth century are asked to navigate a complex social system of social and ideological
diversity. For example, a carriage ride depicted in Sarah Fielding’s David Simple brings together
the characters of a clergyman, an atheist, and a fop; without a host, these guests must themselves
36

As their philosophical predecessors, modern ethicists also predominantly write about the host rather than the
guest. The works of Derrida, Caputo, and Tracy McNulty discussed in this work all investigate the obligations of
one who hosts. Concerned primarily with how this host might encounter the Other with more openness, they
overlook the ethical standpoint of the guest.
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manage their interactions and ride peacefully despite their conflicting worldviews (161). The
guest’s moral obligations we find in this scene and others are multiplied in the eighteenth
century. Further complicating the guest perspective, questions of hospitality and its obligations
are generally framed for the host or observer, asking for judgment of whether to act prior to an
exchange or whether the act was good after the exchange. Novels, by taking up the guest
perspective, offer important insight into the ideals and practice of hospitality from within the
exchange itself.
This point of view is immediately troubled; the questions of association and perspective
framed for the host and observer are unsolvable to the guest. For the first, the nature of the guest
position requires passivity; the guest must set aside prejudice and ambition to receive
accommodation. Moreover, the guest’s duties are to respond to the host’s lead and be receptive
to the host’s own position. As such, guests are rarely in a position to control action; no matter
their intentions, their ability to act on them is limited. Second, the guest is thoroughly involved in
the hospitable exchange and so cannot view the situation from the position of an observer. Often
in a position of dependency, the guest is unable to see the motivations behind his received
hospitality or predict the outcome of his acceptance of it. Thus, the guest can ask how to translate
intention to action but faces more difficulty completing that transaction. Likewise, he can, and
must, attempt to see the motivations behind a host’s hospitality but, from within the transaction,
is often misled or confused. The novels’ carriage scenes highlight the uncomfortable ethical
position of the host. Placed into a carriage with strangers, the guest must evaluate the other
travelers. Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling illustrates these problems. Harley seeks to accommodate
his fellow travelers by taking a seat although he knows “being driven backwards always
disagreed with him” (99). His desire to make his companions more comfortable is limited, and
his self-sacrifice seems foolish since it cannot make any one else’s ride more enjoyable and even
threatens to make the ride less pleasant for all. Despite his good will towards his fellow guests,
Harley also immediately begins to scrutinize their “physiognomy” to reveal their characters; as a
guest, he attempts to observe his company though the narrative reminds the reader of Harley’s
ill-luck with the practice in London, suggesting that Harley will have similar difficulty
discerning the characters of his companions. As both host and observer, then, Harley is largely
ineffectual in this scene. Though not designed for describing an idealized exchange, the guest
18

position is well-equipped to fully investigate the problems of practicing hospitality and, more
particularly, of practicing the new ethical ideal of hospitality so concerned with intention.
Indeed, the guest position exposes the discomfort of guest dependency and the difficulty
of determining the ethical nature of hospitality. As an actor in the ethical exchange, the guest is
necessarily concerned with the nature of that exchange. But in the eighteenth century, this
concern expanded to include the host’s intention as well as his actions. Because the ethical value
of the exchange is determined by intention, the guest must observe the situation and analyze the
associations between action and intention. This change in ethical focus takes hospitality from the
authority of the host—who traditionally had to determine the worthiness of the guest—and
places it with the guest—who now must judge the intentions behind his welcome into a
household. The guest takes on the traditional host duty of calculating the morality of the
exchange but, unlike the traditional host, is concerned not with his own intentions and actions
but with those of the host. Though holding ethical responsibility, the guest does not have the
power to act on his judgment. Instead, the guest must view the exchange from the perspective of
a detached observer in order to more accurately read the host’s intentions. In the carriage scenes
mentioned above, for example, the traveling guests must attempt to uncover the intentions of
their fellow travelers; Harley attempts to read “physiognomies” and Cynthia, a guest in David
Simple, finds herself labeling her companions as “the Clergyman,--the Atheist,--and the
Butterfly” according to the behaviors she observes (161). These observations, however, leave
little room for action in the literal confines of the carriage. These new duties of observer and host
do not negate the former role of the guest. This role is necessarily passive and follows the
“customary parameters” of the host’s household, passively accepting “the goods and services”
that the host considers hospitable (Heal 192). The very essence of the guest’s role is reactionary
as he responds to the hospitality of the host. Thus, the need for the guest to determine the
intention of his host asks for this role to be reevaluated. The guest must remain passive but also a
detached arbitrator. While the guest’s earlier duties were merely to make judgment of himself
easy by providing confirmation of his own identity (Heal 215), the guest now had to search into
the private identity of the hosts to determine the morality of their hospitality. Both of these
demands on the guest produce impossible situations—the guest cannot be responsible for the
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ethics of exchange if unable to act and the guest cannot see the exchange as an observer when
involved in the exchange.
Literature was particularly suited to explore this relationship because literature had
traditionally used the guest’s perspective to discuss hospitality and its ethics. The guest position
had always been an anxious one, and scholars have noted this trend.37 These anxieties have
generally been rooted in the physical exchange and the vulnerability of the guest. Though
susceptible to the bad intentions of the host, the guest is only concerned with those intentions
that are manifested physically. Starting with ancient Greek tales of heroic journeys, narratives
use the guest position to explore the ethics of welcome and gratitude. Greek and Roman epics,
for example, follow a journeying hero, who must often act as a guest along the journey and
meets with a range of exemplary good and bad hosts. In these narratives, hospitality is
encountered as an action in a series of plot points.38 Steve Reece breaks down these points into
moments of “arrival, reception, seating, feasting, identification, bedding down, bathing, gift
giving, and departure” to argue for hospitality as a culturally and generically coded event that
produces a system of hierarchy and reciprocity. Gifts pass from the host to the guest with
gratitude and some sort of reciprocation asked in return (Reece 35). The guest’s primary function
in such tales is to offer reassurances of his identity and purpose in travelling. Reece considers
this revelation of the guest’s identity the “most critical element” in the hospitable exchange and
one that determines the nature of hospitality and its potential for exchange (25). These depictions
of hospitality, then, dwell on the ethics within the actions themselves. The host and guest are
expected to perform their own duties and ethical values are only questioned when these duties
are not performed. These responsibilities also support hierarchies; the guest’s duties are more
passive and involve primarily giving information when requested. The host’s duties require more
action, and his ability to be a good host depends entirely on his ability to provide the proper
stages of hospitality.

37

The following will explore those scholars who speak specifically of host-guest relationships; however,
connections to the anxious guest position can be seen in the foundations of modern narrative study. For example,
Joseph Campbell’s “hero’s journey” or Northrop Frye’s “theory of modes” both discuss literature’s propensity to
follow a hero along a journey of discovery that results in either integration or separation from a larger society.
38
For example, Odysseus is taken off course from his journey home, where he is host, and made a guest (or hostage)
to Lotus-eaters, Aeolus, Circe, Calypso, and the Phaeacians in a series of adventures.
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Medieval romances are structured like classic epics as they follow the heroics of a knight
on a quest. As he journeys, the knight often finds himself in the role of guest who must interpret
the actions of the host to determine any danger to himself or those he has pledged to protect. This
judgment tends to be primarily concerned with the performance of the exchange and the social
hierarchy it upholds rather than motivations for the action.39 Instead, romance uses the figurative
power of hospitality to establish a hierarchy and obligations for the guest to negotiate. Matilda
Tomaryn Bruckner reads these hospitable exchanges in medieval romance as “a rite which
validates or invalidates the social identity of all those involved” while it “confers or confirms
status” (117). The guest and the travelling adventurer can use hospitality to receive favors from
the court or other forms of social prestige. Hospitality is not just an action that offers room and
board but it also serves as an “instrument of social identity, [or] a proof or test of his merit”
(Bruckner 119). The knight must then use these instances of hospitality to further confirm his
valor or personal merit. The ethics depicted in the medieval narratives are concerned with
external markers of social position and the fulfilling of social obligations. They offer critiques of
host’s motives only so far as these motives upset the social hierarchy or cause a failure to fulfill
social responsibilities.40
Early modern texts continue to use the guest’s position to explore the ethics of social
exchange through the guest’s vulnerability. Increasing diversity within the social systems on
which exchange depends—always a factor for the traveler—becomes of greater ethical
importance in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Charles Ross notes that, what he
terms the “custom of the castle” disrupts an universal sense of ethics because it suggests that
proper behavior is dependent on the traditions of a specific place and thus primarily a “social
construction” (Ross 85). The guest, when entering a castle, is asked to determine the conventions
specific to that estate and act according to the host’s expectations and demands, and this
interpretive act begins to demand that the guest judge his host’s intention. Ross sees this literary
use of custom shifting in the early modern period; Spenser’s Fairie Queene, for example, no
39

For example, in Lanval, the eponymous hero is offered ideal hospitality by a fairy lady and then receives poor
hospitality from Queen Guinevere and King Arthur; though Guinevere is shown to be motivated by jealousy. Lanval
is notably uncouth about deciphering such motivations. Likewise, Sir Gawain must guess at the motivations of the
Green Knight to be beheaded and to threaten beheading his guest.
40
In the examples offered in the previous note, Lanval critiques the lust and greed of the court hosts and Sir Gawain
and the Green Knight questions the pursuit of honor, the fickleness of the host’s requests.
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longer limits morality to “doing the right thing” but also insists on “a man’s knowing right from
wrong” (16). Ross finds that in these situations where the guest is asked to judge the host the
knight finds an “inability to perform” (16). The problem of guest passivity is immediately
apparent in these formative texts and suggests a burgeoning concern with the personal
motivations that drive the public social system. Early modern drama and poetry continue to
explore the nature of hierarchies but use the guest position to question the ethical obligations of
the host and the nature of the exchange. Daryl Palmer sees the use of a host character in drama as
immediately invoking “questions of societal order and survival” (28). Indeed, the host character
often signifies political disruption in this period and the guest’s point of view is often utilized to
display that worry.41 Philip Sidney’s Arcadia, for example, includes a king who retires from his
political obligations and the hospitable entertaining his position expected, thus leaving his
kingdom vulnerable to attack. Here and elsewhere, Sidney shows that the “other side of
hospitality is warfare between the ranks” (Palmer 56). By allowing for a power vacuum, the king
has asked his subjects to compete to move upward in the social hierarchy. Hospitality in the early
modern period remains concerned with physical exchange; yet, by proliferating the ways such
exchange could proceed, literary representations begin to explore the causes behind hospitality’s
deficiencies.42
As civil war, economic change, religious questioning and the growth of London disrupted
the enactment of hospitality in the seventeenth century, it also shifted the depictions of
hospitality in literature. Many aspects remained, including the central focus on the travelling
guest; however, this guest was no longer a noble hero but often a common man or, increasingly,
a woman. Moreover, the locale and identity of the host changed. Much eighteenth-century fiction
follows the travel of a protagonist from his or her home in the country to London. In the city,
they search for hospitality, not at the country estate, but at court, in coffee-houses, markets,
plays, and public parks. The hosts are not landed gentry in control of the surrounding
community, but any individual with more social or political power than the travelling
41

Shakespeare’s Macbeth offers a notable exception with its emphasis on the host and hostess.
Other early modern forms celebrate the idea of good hosting that specifically supposes a stable political state.
Country-house poems, for example, detail the hospitality of a host by celebrating the order that host maintains on
their estate. It is this order that allows them to keep their guests so comfortably.

42
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protagonist. Often, after the failure of these hosts, hospitality is sought from peers and even those
of lower orders. Indeed, these novels often look for hospitality in new places from members of
all social classes. In this varied world, these novels try to establish how good hospitality is given
and how to recognize good hospitality when it was offered. The successes and failures these texts
depict work to define the problems of hospitality as well as a new ideal; at the same time,
however, these texts indicate new challenges or threats faced by hospitality in a changing
environment.

Literary Hospitality: New Problems of Exchange
Eighteenth-century novels bring together an ethical standard that prizes intention, a
cultural form that controls moral practices, and a literary emphasis on the guest. As a result,
depictions of hospitality in these texts navigate intention, practice and the guest position and
expose the ethical changes and struggles faced during an exchange. In exploring the new ethics
of intention, these novels reveal the difficulties of problems of associating intention with action
and problems of perceiving intention from action and highlight how these problems affect the
hospitable practices meant to build relationships. Moreover, by viewing these relationships from
the guest perspective, the novels discussed here make clear the anxieties surrounding hospitality
and the specific vulnerabilities of the guest. In understanding these vulnerabilities, eighteenthcentury novels propose and accept limitations in the practice of hospitality. These novels make
clear that limitations are necessary to protect those involved in hospitable exchanges but, at the
same time, make known the difficulties of maintaining such limitations. As a result, these novels
propose limitations as a solution to problems of perception and association only to suggest that
limited hospitality is impossible in an uncontrollable world.
Chapter one investigates the turn to intention during the eighteenth century and the
resulting problems of association that derive from this shift. These problems, connected with the
host who is responsible for making his actions conform to and express his intentions, are most
notable in philosophical texts which take the host’s position as the ethical standard. I will return
to the treatises of Bayle, Cumberland, Hutcheson and Smith, which all address problems of
diversity; in a world constantly encountering new cultures and their ethical traditions, normative
practices thought to reveal specific intentions were called into question. These philosophers
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accept that such diversity makes choosing actions that accurately reflect intention all the more
difficult. Looking closely at these works, this chapter argues that philosophy fails to reconcile
this diversity and its subsequent problems associating actions with intentions. Instead,
philosophers point to narrative as a better way to resolve differences between the host’s and
guest’s expectations because narratives provide a context of practice against which the actions of
individuals involved in an exchange can be examined.
Thus establishing literature as a potential ethical force in the eighteenth century, this
chapter turns to an example of hosting in literature in the character of Harley, the focus of Henry
Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling. While most narratives take the perspective of the guest, this text
closely follows the life and death of a hosting character. More importantly, though twodimensional examples of hosts abound in literature, Mackenzie’s work delves into the psyche
and motivations of the host, almost obsessively portraying the emotional responses that drive
Harley’s benevolent behavior. Reading this text closely, however, reveals that intentional ethics
do not resolve problems of association when context and characters are provided. Instead, Harley
proves to be a startlingly inactive and ineffective host, unable to change his environment despite
his flawless intentions. Indeed, as this chapter shows, the host position is weakened by an
intentional ethic that fails to prescribe how an environment can be controlled by the host.
Chapter two considers the fate of the guest when good hosts, like Harley, are weakened
or removed from the system. Without a strong guiding force, the guest must rely on his own
judgment when pursuing hospitality. Still dependent on the care and service hospitality provides,
the guest is increasingly asked to determine the motives of the host; however, the guest is
particularly ill-equipped to perceive any ulterior motives behind a host’s hospitable actions. This
chapter investigates the depictions of bad hosts in the novel, ranging from classic negative
examples, such as misers and spendthrifts, to new forms of negative hosts who prey on the guest
through the use of deceptive hospitality. To do so, I will look at four texts which will frame the
next three chapters: Tobias Smollett’s The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, Charlotte Lennox’s
Sophia, Sarah Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple, and Frances Burney’s Cecilia, or,
Memoirs of an Heiress. In each of these four texts, the central character is made to withstand the
hospitality of bad hosts. I will show that, vulnerable to all hosts, these guests’ reactions to these
24

negative forms of hospitality range from disgust to discomfort to debilitating anxiety that
correspond to the nature of deception in the offered hospitality.
To help make this claim, chapter two uses gift theory, and particularly the work of Pierre
Bourdieu, to illustrate the steps of an exchange of hospitality. Gift studies shares with theories of
hospitality a concern with both ideals and practices as well as an awareness of cultural norms. By
likening the guest-host relationship to that of the giver-receiver, the depth of the perception
problem becomes clear. Though bad hosting is always a threat, only those forms of predatory
hospitality that conceal themselves behind seemingly benevolent actions disrupt the psyche of
the guest. In other words, it is only when the guest is deceived that hospitality is portrayed as
threatening to the guest and destructive to the larger system of hospitality. The novel thus
contends that bad hosting, made possible by the weakening host position, exacerbates the guest’s
problems of perception, which can in turn undermine the entire system of hospitality.
Indeed, chapter three contemplates how guests attempt to restructure the hospitality
systems to combat their vulnerability to deceptive hospitality. Though hosts have the traditional
power to limit hospitality by accepting or rejecting guests, the guests of these novels place limits
on hospitality by cutting out the host position entirely. Noting the weakened position of the host,
these guests create a society of like-minded guests. This society is open only to those guests that
exhibit ideal guest behavior, specifically disinterested motives and passivity to the desires of
others. In these closed environments, the guest is no longer vulnerable to the host, and the
exchange of hospitality is pursued in an equal exchange.
The ideal guest behavior, however, manifests itself differently in male and female guests.
Defense against bad hosts depends to a certain extent on the financial and social positioning of
the guest and a resulting capability to leave the exchange; only female guests are shown to be
made more vulnerable by a passive, disinterested state. Though their male counterparts might
suffer emotional turmoil because of their passivity, they do not risk physical harm; instead, the
benefits of their disinterested care for others outweigh the potential risks to their persons.
Chapter three addresses this gender split and argues that men like Matthew Bramble and David
Simple have the ability to limit their hospitality to other guests in order to act more comfortably;
in this society of guests, these men are prized for the openness, passivity and disinterestedness
that formerly weakened their social position. Female guests, on the other hand, are routinely
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shown to require a more limited expression of these prized traits than their male counterparts;
instead, the use of reason and control of personal desire is particularly valued in female
characters. The women discussed in this chapter—Cecilia Beverley and Sophia Darnley—are
both depicted as moral characters because of their ability to use reason to combat their natural
tendencies towards passivity, openness and disinterest which leaves women vulnerable to desires
or deceits of others. Passivity, a gendered trait in these texts, is shown as a potential danger to the
women that possess it; though disinterest is still highly prized and necessary to the exemplary
behavior of these women, reason must be used to limit the company worthy to receive their
hospitable attention. For both male and female guests, limitations and exclusions are necessary
to the exchange of safe and agreeable hospitality.
These exclusions, however, do not result in unequivocally happy endings in these novels.
Rather, as chapter four argues, these new limits are questioned even as they are proposed in the
texts. In each of the novels discussed here, the hospitable relationship is changed into a familial
one; through marriages and discoveries of kinship, hospitality is overwhelmed by the more
permanent and stable bonds of family. This shift suggests that hospitality as an ethic cannot exist
without its trademark of openness to others; instead, such limits cause hospitality to be replaced
with an alternative value system. Moreover, in several cases—those of David Simple and
Cecilia—the loss of hospitality is not glossed over by a comedic end to the novel. Rather these
two texts dwell on how the world cannot be excluded from the newly-established circle of likeminded guests but constantly intrudes into the limited world and makes such attempts to limit
social interactions futile. Thus, the eighteenth-century novel undermines the very theory of
hospitable limitations it puts forth.
These novels suggest, then, that there is no good answer to the problems of association
and perception in hospitality ethics; any attempt to mediate the intentions of others results in
limitations that effectively displace hospitality as an ethic. The only means to maintain
hospitality, these texts suggest, is to remain open to the very problems that the ethics creates.
This paradox—one that modern day thinkers still face and one that still plagues the practice of
hospitality today—defines the eighteenth-century novel as it approaches the revolutions and
social upheavals of the Romantic Era. Depicting the journeys of average guests, these texts
reveal a world of changing ethical standards and values that remains unstable throughout the
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century. At the same time, they expose the struggle faced by individuals who were caught
between traditional and new ethical systems and remind the reader of the discomfort and
vulnerabilities felt by the guest in an unreliable world.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE DEATH OF THE HOST
The emphasis on intention in hospitality ethics replaces an older system more interested
in the active responsibilities of the host; this ethical shift begs the question of how the host might
adapt to an intentional system. This question haunts some eighteenth-century narratives, but in
Henry Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling it is the very subject of the narrative. Mackenzie’s novel
shows a host so exhausted by the benevolent welcome intentional ethics demands that he
weakens and dies; the ethical ideal, his death suggests, is unable to adapt to the more
materialistic world. The narrative thus explores the implications of the death of the host for
hospitality’s ethical choices and reciprocal obligations. In so doing, Mackenzie’s narrative tells
of the death of traditional hospitality. By further examining the tenets of the philosophical
thinkers from the introduction, I will show that the new emphasis on intention deprives
traditional hospitality of the rather simple scheme of beneficence and obligation that organized
social relationships of an earlier time. I will argue that, in its place, the ethical responsibilities of
the host are transferred to a guest whose own vulnerable position perpetuates the weakening of
the hospitality system.
Mackenzie begins the Man of Feeling (1771) with a narrative prelude presenting the
novel as a found text. In this prelude, the reader meets the narrator after the events recounted in
the text have already occurred. The curate, the owner of the found text who gifts the papers to
their later “editor,” describes the supposed narrator as
a grave, oddish kind of man…The country people called him The Ghost, and he was
known by the slouch in his gait, and the length of his stride. I was but little acquainted
with him, for he never frequented any of the clubs hereabouts. Yet for all he used to walk
a-nights, he was as gentle as a lamb at times; for I have seen him playing at te-totum with
the children, on the great stone at the door of our church-yard. (48)
Marked as a ghost, the narrator is a man without a place in society. He fails to attend clubs and
participate in the community but instead lives detached from social life only to be observed as an
eccentric by the active members of society. Though clearly still a physical man with a “slouch”
28

and a “stride,” this ghost lacks any position or place to identify him within the adult world.
Rather than participate in the public sphere, The Ghosts limits his actions to walking at night and
playing games with children, a choice that marks the narrator as detached from social influence
and without significant influence himself. Associated here with the graveyard by name
(“Ghost”), personality (“grave”) and physical proximity (he plays “on the great stone…of our
church-yard”), the narrator functions as a link between worlds. As a ghost lingers between the
living and dead, The Ghost wanders between a living world of exchange and interaction and a
lost world of ideals. When we first hear of The Ghost, he is a liminal figure, between rather than
of the worlds of the living and the dead.
In the events that the text recounts, however, The Ghost takes part in exchanges of
hospitality. Indeed, as a character in the text, The Ghost fulfills the traditional duties of the guest.
He is the guest of two exemplary hosts who express the good intentions of the new hospitable
ideal: Harley, the hero and primary focus of Man of Feeling, takes The Ghost in when “the
malevolence of fortune” leaves him with few friends (135); and Ben Silton, the late head of
Silton Hall remembered in the text as an honest and welcoming man of sense and virtue, is the
idealized former host of The Ghost. In this recounted past, The Ghost lived actively as the guest,
Charles, a man searching for welcome in a world of discomfort. When he receives hospitality
from Harley and Silton, Charles praises their welcome with the gratitude of an ideal guest.43
Each mention of Silton is followed by an effusive interruption of praise, often accompanied by
tears.44 Likewise, Charles displays his appreciation of Harley’s hospitality with his own concern
for Harley’s well-being on his deathbed (135). In each case, however, the accommodating host
dies, and Charles’ praise must be expressed in the past tense in the narrative. Their deaths
indicate the loss of good hosts but also deprive Charles of his position as ideal guest; without the
benevolent hosts Harley and Silton, Charles is no longer an ideal guest. Indeed, the narrative
opens on Charles spitefully harassing a lapdog who is napping on Silton’s old chair rather than
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The behaviors of an ideal guest include public expressions of gratitude and uncomplaining acceptance of the
host’s offers of hospitality (Heal 192).
44
For example, the narrator sheds a tear to the memory of Silton when recounting his visit to Silton Hall after his
death (51) and offers extended praise, replete with dashes and exclamation points, when he recounts Harley meeting
Silton (104).
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acting the part of grateful guest (50); though still welcomed into Silton hall, Charles is unable to
fulfill his duties as a guest when the hosts themselves are less accommodating.
When he loses the company of these two idealized hosts, Charles also loses his own
social position. No longer participating in the hospitality cycle, Charles is outside the system and
becomes the Ghost of the novel’s introduction. He maintains a connection to the system,
however, by elegizing the loss of his two benefactors in writing, memorializing them in the text
he creates. In this writing, The Ghost takes on some of the duties of a host, introducing others to
the idealized behavior of his former hosts. Indeed, The Ghost’s strong narrative voice functions
as an authoritative guide to the proper reflections on the events in Harley’s life; this authority and
ability to guide the reader establish the narrator as a host-like figure to the reader. Yet, though a
hosting figure, The Ghost is not a true host: he does not publish his work but leaves it to be
found; he does not welcome the reader into his own life or identity, but presents the life of
another; his text is not welcoming but fragmented and dependent on the interpretive work of the
reader. As such, The Ghost as narrator functions more as a guide to the reader— able to show a
life but lacking the authority to invite others to be a part of it. This reserved position means that
The Ghost’s narrative differs from traditional hospitality in its passivity. In this way, the
narrator’s passive position maintains important connections to the guest’s position. Though The
Ghost possesses the openness and “gentleness” necessary to offer hospitality, his ability to act is
limited and thus remains in the passive position of the grateful guest. Burdened with a sense of
responsibility to fulfill the ethical obligations of the host and to memorialize the host’s ethical
work but also unable to regain an active connection with society, the narrator becomes a
transitory figure between guest and host and becomes a ghost in his attempt to blend the two
positions.
The Ghost exists outside hospitality but still comments on it, mourning the loss of strong
hosts throughout the novel; whereas many other texts depict hosts neglecting their duties and the
loss of a working system of hospitality, Mackenzie dwells on the loss of actual hosts who took
their obligations seriously. While other texts make clear that something is lacking, Mackenzie’s
text identifies the lack. Mackenzie does so, I will argue, by directly addressing the philosophical
turn to intentional ethics that defined the eighteenth century. This turn begins with seventeenthand eighteenth-century philosophy, which argued for a new moral emphasis on good intentions.
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The new ideal of benevolence towards others, however, is complicated by the diversity of lived
experience, an experience that literature is better suited to explore. Indeed, whereas philosophy is
primarily concerned with active choice more in keeping with the host’s duties, literature has
traditionally used the guest’s perspective to explore diversity, commenting on the range of host
behaviors and the dangers of bad hospitality. Mackenzie builds on this tradition, using the guest
perspective to explore how an intentional definition of hospitality threatens the existence of the
host. When the guest begins to judge the intentions behind the host’s welcome, he takes over
many of the duties of the traditional host; whereas the host was previously asked to judge
character and worth to determine whether to extend an invitation, the guest now makes such
ethical judgments; however, as Mackenzie’s Ghost illustrates, these responsibilities cannot be
acted upon—the guest cannot invite. Though the guest may intend to welcome others, he often
lacks the ability to fulfill that intention. This fiction shows that, when the guest is made
responsible for determining the legitimacy of hospitable intentions, the hospitality system
becomes unstable because the guest had no authority—literally no place—to enact this ideal.
Outside of a hierarchical system, the roles of guest and host and the duties associated with each
became difficult to define. As Mackenzie’s Ghost disappears, leaving behind only his
remembrances of a working system, eighteenth-century novels depict how ill-defined roles of
host and guest question the possibility for the ideals of hospitality to be enacted in the world.

The Problem of Diversity
Ideals of hospitality became increasingly defined by intentions. As I discussed in the
introduction, philosophy encouraged this shift in ethical standards, proposing that the goodness
of an action depended on the actor’s intention. Yet these same philosophies uncover the problem
of association inherent in intentional systems: the ability to predict the connection between
intentions and the actions and consequences they produce is unstable. For the primary actor—in
the case of hospitality, the host—this instability is one of predicting association; good intentions
do not always produce good results. Moreover, the available courses of action that would reveal
good intentions were diverse and dependent on context. Benevolence might be universally
admired, but the actions that were considered to be evidence of benevolence varied widely. This
diversity of action was both particularly true and relatively new in the eighteenth century. Even
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among Christian religions, prescriptions for charitable behavior ranged broadly, and new contact
with foreign cultures furthered a sense of relative ethics.45 For hospitality, this variety meant that
no one method of hosting was prescribed and a host might consider certain behaviors, such as
constant attendance on a guest or queries into his travels, to be hospitable, whereas the guest
might find such behaviors invasive. To produce the desired association, the primary actor or host
needed not just good intentions but the knowledge and luck to properly act on those intentions.
The very philosophers who proposed intentional ethics struggled to overcome this
problem of association in their texts and show clear guidelines for choosing which actions reflect
good intentions. These thinkers identify the root behind the association problem as one of diverse
ethical codes. Indeed, basing morality on intention was a means to combat diverse cultural codes
of behavior; with so many systems for moral action available, intention was seen, in some ways,
as a more accurate indicator of the ethical value of a particular action. If many codes exist to
regulate activity and all are accepted systems, then the only universal code would be one based
on the intentions that inspire this range of action. Intentional ethics, then, might narrow ethical
standards to their root source but did not clarify which system to pursue or how to practice this
ethics. The individual consequently had much more responsibility in choosing how best to
respond to an intention. The following philosophers attempt to guide the individual choice while
struggling to overcome the diversity of choice.
Bayle perhaps knew this diversity best; a Huguenot within Catholic France, his
Philosophical Commentary incorporated the idea of diversity into his ideal for universal
tolerance. He claims that religious tolerance is necessary because there is no way to ensure
universal belief in one religion. Indeed, each religious belief claims the right to persecute
believers of other faiths. But Bayle takes this position even farther to argue that diversity of
intention also exists. He notes, “I have firmly believ’d a thousand things in some part of my Life,
which I am far from believing at present; and what I now believe, a great many others I see of as
45

Such differences were reported as part of the Grand Tour. Travelers debated the relative hospitality of the
countries visited. Though religious differences were mentioned frequently, the perception of hospitality was not
based on religion; Catholic Italy was generally considered very hospitable while Spain was not, while Protestant
Germany was considered inhospitable even as the cities of the Netherlands were praised. For more on British
perceptions of hospitality in Europe, see Jeremy Black, The British and the Grand Tour, 41-59. Trade to the Middle
and Far East also created knowledge of cultural differences; though these accounts discuss hospitality, they often
include the perspective of a merchant encouraging trade rather than a tourist evaluating guest accommodations. For
more, see Robert Markley, The British Imagination and the Far East, 1660-1730, 104-144.
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good Sense as my self, believe not a tittle of: my Assent is often determin’d, not by
Demonstrations which appear to me cou’d not be otherwise, and which appear so to others, but
by Probabilitys which appear not such to other men” (94).46 Here, Bayle admits his own diversity
of thought and questions the accuracy of his thought process, while at the same time admitting
that his, and others’, beliefs are often unable to be proven. Bayle only rehabilitates the ideal,
then, to promote not an active hospitality, but a passive lack of judgment upon non-believers.
The diversity of belief compromises the host position; Bayle no longer encourages the host to
perform to an ideal of an open house, but simply asks him not to “compel” non-believers to
accept his mind-set by threat of violence.
Cumberland, too, notes the problem of diversity for the benevolent ideal but maintains
the possibility of his ideal even within a diverse world. Knud Haakonssen notes that
Cumberland’s “value-pluralism” is what makes his theory stand out within the large number of
attacks on Hobbes’ theories. Cumberland’s theory supposes that “People have the ability to find
a wide, indeed, an unspecifiable range of things valuable; hence human motivation is complex
and constantly changing. More particularly, it is not possible to reduce human motives to mere
self-interest, let alone a concern just with self-preservation, as Hobbes is supposed to have done”
(Haakonssen, Natural Law 33).47 By making human motives more complex than self-interest,
Cumberland both allows for a benevolent idealism and opens up his moral system to diversity.
While avoiding the negative view of human nature Hobbes proposes, Cumberland fails to
address the problems of idealistic conflict that Bayle asks his readers to overlook and also
suggests that benevolence can never be the sole motive for human interaction.48 As such, the
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Indeed, Bayle knew he had to have been convinced in error at least once. Raised a Protestant, Bayle briefly
converted to Catholicism while attending a Jesuit college. At the time of his conversion, he was fully convinced of
the Catholic teachings but as convinced in the Protestant beliefs when he reverted back to his Huguenot faith a few
years later.
47
Whereas Haakonssen reads diversity as strengthening Cumberland’s opposition to Hobbes, J.B. Schneewind finds
that diversity weakens Cumberland’s philosophy. He explains that Cumberland’s theory supposes that “no two true
propositions can be inconsistent,” thus allowing that what is permissible in one context, such as stealing to combat
starvation, need be permissible in another. Schneewind observes that “it is interesting that Cumberland does not see
this principle as in any way threatening his claim that we are to maximize the good in each of our acts. He sees it,
rather, as bringing home to us the blessings of mutual dependence in a harmonious universe. Avoiding the
inconsistency of judging like cases differently is a source of social harmony” (115). Thus, Schneewind argues,
Cumberland’s philosophy depends on ignoring diversity and instead emphasizing universal happiness.
48
Cumberland’s translator, John Maxwell, had difficulty following this logic, noting contradictions in Cumberland’s
theories on self-love and benevolence. He added extensive footnotes to Cumberland’s treatise to attempt to explain
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universalism of his benevolent ideal is questioned. The host may have a number of reasons for
inviting his guests in or offering them hospitality, including interested and disinterested ones; his
intentions are ethical only if the interested motives do not supersede the disinterested ones. By
blending motives, Cumberland makes intentional ethics more practical but exacerbates the
problem of association. The actor, or host, must now also determine which intentions are
influencing his actions more and not just which would best reflect his intentions.
Hutcheson effectively sidesteps the problem of diversity by separating intention and
action; ideal, benevolent intentions, he claims, precede action and so precede the moment of
public judgment. He admits that, while man is intuitively benevolent, the means to enact
benevolence might vary. In other words, while the intention remains ideal, the actions and
consequences that come from that motive can vary. D.D. Carey points to Hutcheson’s nationbuilding examples as an indication of his problems of accounting for diversity. When Hutcheson
introduces “the bold, liberty-loving country and the timid, peace-loving country,” he proposes
that both countries arrived at these opposite ideals using the moral sense. Moral sense, influenced
by cultural ideology, determines the particular actions and consequences of individuals (Carey
176). Though mankind all agree on the proper motivations for action, they disagree on what will
provide the greatest good. Diversity thus makes Hutcheson’s benevolent ideal hard to identify
within the practical world.49 In a hospitality scenario, each host may offer good intentions to
their guest, but each might practice a different way of doing so. The ultimate morality, however,
has been determined prior to the actual hosting and is not contingent on the actions themselves or
the guest’s interpretation of them.
Smith, building on Hutcheson’s moral sense that reacts prior even to conscious motive,
admits that practical rules of morality are hard to determine. He qualifies moral philosophy in
this paradox. For example, he acknowledges the potential to object “That, according to our Author’s Scheme, the
Principle of Self-Love is more strong and uniform than that of Benevolence.” He rejects this critique but then argues
for its place in Cumberland’s overall philosophy: “I don’t see, that our Author has advanced anything from which it
particularly follows, ‘That we desire our own Advantage more strongly than that of others.’ However, I am of the
Opinion that it is so in most People, and that it is not inconsistent with Virtue: Nevertheless I believe there are some,
of so exalted and generous a Disposition, as to entertain as great, nay, a greater, Desire of the general Good of
Mankind, than of any private Advantage” (Cumberland 606).
49
Daniela Gobetti argues that Hutcheson tries to reconcile this diversity by privileging man’s “natural sociability”
over self-interest. But, as Gobetti points out, the “the epistemological facts” skew any means to judge whether
sociability or self-interest have inspired action, thus leading Gobetti to contend that Hutcheson creates a separate
“juridical mode” that allows for logical judgment in the world (111-122).
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general by noting that “the general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which
determine what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship,
are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many
modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them”
(Smith 174). Even what he considers the most stable virtue, gratitude, allows for many
exceptions, and the rules governing behavior as to how or when to show gratitude remain vague
and open to diversity. The general virtues are much less clear when one attempts to describe
them in detail.50 The diversity in even defining these terms that Smith points out causes difficulty
for understanding norms of hospitality; hosts are unsure how to act, and guests are unsure how to
respond.
It is the problem of diversity that most often plagues these moral philosophies,
particularly those that suggest a moral sense theory or propose sensibility as a virtue. Wendy
Motooka evaluates the downfall of this eighteenth-century trend and argues that the “pejorative”
sense of sentimentalism arises from “moral diversity, for moral ideas can be recognized as
‘sentimental’ (pejoratively) only in the context of plausible alternatives. Moral ideas in the
absence of such alternatives are never dismissed as sentimental, rather they are accepted as selfevident truths” (21).51 Indeed, as the century advanced, sentimentalism became increasingly
ridiculed and the benevolent ideals that were often supported by sensibility were dismissed in the
wake of other moral options.52 It became harder and harder to believe the disinterested assertions
of a host when practical motives of self-interest were also available to explain behavior. The
problem of association could not be reconciled and so riddled the ethic that it caused the demise
of moral sense theories. In some ways, the same demise came to an ethic of hospitality. The
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Richard Teichgraeber argues that Smith overcomes this problem of diversity in practice by his theory of a
“correspondence of sentiments” which would allow one to pursue his own interests while also requiring him to
attend to others’ interests. This balance, Teichgraeber contends, successfully mediates the diversity (115); while
Smith certainly promotes understanding, a “correspondence of sentiments” is not shown to overcome the diversity
of cultural and personal expectations encountered in a hospitality exchange.
51
Motooka sees this move as an influence of skepticism, which dwelled more extensively on the subjective nature of
moral judgment. Marking Hume as the quintessential skeptic, Motooka argues that he, and other skeptics, helped
expose the diversity of moral behaviors and subjectivity of moral judgment (20).
52
Philosophically, this new thought might be characterized by Immanuel Kant’s privileging of “understanding” over
“sensibility.” Though still building on moral sense philosophy and seeing the value of sensibility as a means of
gathering information, Kant’s theory emphasizes that how we process this information is of primary ethical
importance.
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diversity of choice for welcoming guests coupled with the distrust of intention made it difficult
for the host to reconcile his intentions and actions in the eyes of the public. With weakened
standards for action, the host struggled to continue to offer hospitality. It is this process of
diminishing the host’s power to act that eighteenth-century narratives explore.

An Ethical Narrative
Novels, and narrative in general, approach the ethical problems the host faces with
greater flexibility in explaining the diversity of ethical choice. Able to follow the contexts of an
ethical quandary, novels can portray how choices are made, implemented and evaluated. It is
perhaps because of the lack of particularity in the philosophical ideals that many of their own
proposers turn to narrative as a philosophical vessel. Both Hutcheson and Smith suggest that
narrative can explore more fully the benevolent ideals that their philosophies espouse.
Hutcheson, for example, recommends fiction’s flawed rather than ideal characters because they
resemble more closely those we see in real life and because the reader will be more “touch’d and
affected by the imperfect Characters” and thus more likely to condone their virtuous behavior
(43). Likewise, Smith recommends the works of “poets and romance writers” for moral
improvement because of how well they “paint the refinements and delicacies of love and
friendship, and of all other private and domestic affections” (143).53 While these two
philosophers offer their own works to uncover the principles behind morality, they suggest that
narratives are a better source for virtuous instruction. These philosophers hope that narrative’s
use of particular contexts and characters can effectively display how best to overcome problems
of association and act in ways that reflect their good intentions.
What these early philosophers noted in their own theories, contemporary philosophers
and scholars have discovered as well.54 Martha Nussbaum, most famously, uses her background
in philosophy to argue for the ethical lessons found in literature. She finds that novels
“characterize life more richly and truly—indeed, more precisely—than an example lacking these
53

C.L. Griswold makes the connection between Smith and narrative quite literal, contending that Smith’s ideal
ethical figure is a theater critic able to switch between the narrative action and observation.
54
A branch of narrative theory is, in fact, devoted to exploring the ethical nature of narrative. This school of thought
advocates for ethics to consider the position of narratives and argues that the very structure of narrative mimes our
ethical thought. Many of these critics, including Nussbaum but also Wayne Booth and James Phelan are used
throughout this study.
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features ever could; and they engender in the reader a type of ethical work more appropriate for
life” (47).55 The detail and depth, indeed the diversity, of narrative offers the reader more
practicable and instructive moral direction. Similarly, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argues
that narrative is where contemporary morals might have a chance to re-emerge in today’s
society. He finds narrative essential to virtue and argues that “any specific account of the virtues
presupposes an equally specific account of the narrative structure and unity of a human life and
vice versa” (243). Morality and life, he contends, are thus understood through narrative; narrative
is essential to understanding ethics, and, without it, the ideals become separated from real life.
Thus, narrative presents an opportunity for the practice of hospitality to work through an ideal
hospitality exchange and show how to overcome problems of association. However, narrative’s
own purpose, I will argue, has a different, though perhaps as powerful, ethical goal to pursue.
The novel, unlike philosophy, is more concerned with the recipient and his ethical
response to diverse possibilities than with the actor and his diversity of choice. While it was the
responsibility of the actor to properly match intention and action, the recipient must judge
actions and results to determine intention. These ethical struggles are often depicted as scenes of
hospitality; a guest receives hospitality but must decipher his host’s intentions for selfpreservation.56 Faced with diversity, the guest also faces trouble deciphering the connections
between action and intention. This trouble, however, is not a problem of association but one of
perception; the guest’s primary concern is not in choosing which actions reflect his intentions but
in determining his host’s intentions from his actions. These judgments certainly affect the guest’s
actions. Even as the guest evaluates his situation, he is also required to respond to the host with
gratitude. In a position of dependence, the guest must evaluate how best to act on his own
intentions and how best to respond to the host. These duties are often in conflict, making the
guest position even more ethically complex. It is perhaps because of this level of complexity that
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Nussbaum also maintains that literature is more helpful than life itself for thinking through moral choice because,
“in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe with greater precision, focusing our
attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly—whereas mush of actual life goes by without that
heightened awareness, and is thus, in a certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived” (47).
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For example, a common theme in eighteenth-century novels is the plight of the female guest, who must judge if
she is invited as a guest for disinterested reasons or because of the lust of her host. This was a common theme in
Samuel Richardson’s influential novels, Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded and Clarissa, or the History of a Young Lady.
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narrative more often takes the guest and his ethical situations as their subject, despite its potential
to work through problems of association.
One of the few novelists to create a protagonist in the host’s position in the eighteenth
century is Henry Mackenzie in Man of Feeling.57 Mackenzie’s central figure, Harley, is a host;
yet the narrative is told by his guest and, as the novel progresses, his experiences in the exchange
of hospitality take more and more precedence. At the same time, the story closely follows
Harley, who, though clearly a rather disempowered host, still retains the estate and abilities to
host others even if his fortune is small and his personality eccentric. While a large portion of the
narrative shows Harley traveling and staying in London, he consistently orders his own space,
holds the power to welcome others into his company, and controls his own moral action without
applying to others for counsel or direction. As such Man of Feeling offers a rare inquiry into the
host’s problems of association. Yet, ultimately the novel reveals exactly how perplexing the
problem of association and hosting by intention can be. Mackenzie’s novel defines the host as
one stymied by the good intentions necessary for ethical hosting; Harley’s disempowerment
rejects the possibility of the benevolent ideal proposed in the philosophical treatises. When a host
is filled with only disinterested ideals, he is unable to overcome problems of association and,
often, unable to act or to act effectively.58 This weakness is manifest in many of Harley’s
hospitable actions: he gives money to beggars but does not materially change their position, he
enjoys the company of two gentlemen in what he believed to be an ideal exchange but discovers
that he has only “hospitably” aided their gaming schemes. In a scene that clearly illustrates
Harley’s benevolence and impotence, Harley meets an inmate at Bedlam, a woman whose illfated love results in the loss of her sanity. Harley responds benevolently, shedding a tear, giving
a coin, and sympathizing with her story; at the same time, however, Harley’s benevolence is
never practiced as hospitality. He extends no welcome, offers no protection, and is unable to
even comfort the woman. Harley’s benevolent intentions result in his tearful and hurried exit (x57

Many eighteenth-century novels include characters in the hosting position, but not protagonists. One of the most
famous is Allworthy in Henry Fielding’s Adventures of Tom Jones. It is worth noting, however, that this ideal
hosting figure, a man willing to treat the stranger as his own son, is, like Harley, a disempowered host consistently
misjudging those he accepts into his house and falling prey to the manipulations of others.
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This inability to act or effect the larger world is a popular criticism of Harley and the man of feeling character in
general. Perhaps the most vocal and influential critic is R.F. Brissenden who refers to Harley as “pathetic” and an
“epicene, impotent, passive, almost completely ineffectual character” (255, 251). Though other critics soften their
rhetoric, they agree that Harley is unable to radically change and better the world around him.
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x). Though perhaps Harley felt unauthorized to host in this position, his reaction to feel for others
but not extend welcome is typical. Mackenzie’s text thus turns to the guest’s position as an
ethical standard. Portraying Harley’s hosting through the voice of one of his guests, the reader’s
sympathies and attention are shifted away from the protagonist and host Harley and towards the
narrator as guest. Harley’s death makes clear the exhaustion inherent in the problem of
association. Harley, always filled with good intentions, has difficulty acting on those intentions;
those actions he does decide to pursue, however, seem to further weaken Harley as he sacrifices
his own interests. Overcome by the demands of hosting, Harley wastes away, leaving behind his
guest to provide a moral voice.
Certainly the eighteenth-century novel still offers an ideal—and often a benevolent
ideal—to the reader, but the formal elements of the text, the need to develop both character and
plot and to offer some sort of conflict, ensure that this ideal is never unquestioned or unqualified.
The goal of narrative is not to present a clear standard for behavior as philosophy tries to do but
to push new ethical thoughts by questioning norms and offering new illustrations of behavior.
Yet, it is perhaps this limiting of context that makes narrative a better way to explore hospitality;
able to ask questions of practice and ideals, narratives can provide the nuance hospitality ethics
require. Indeed, narrative assures the reader of the need to strive for ethical ideals and search for
practical systems that can approximate the results desired; novels thus promote an ethics of
intention but also place it in a situation that would allow for good practice.
Eighteenth-century novels were quite aware of their potential as moral guides as the
convention of boasting their virtuous teachings in introductions illustrates.59 Henry Mackenzie
takes this trend one step farther in Man of Feeling. The introduction is a narrative itself that
depicts a literal transference of ethical power from philosophy to narrative through the curate and
Editor’s exchange of texts. Mackenzie introduces the inner text by allowing his readers to hear
the manner in which the curate has disliked it. Indeed, the curate has been using the narrative as
wadding for the hunting expedition he and the Editor have been engaged in. The Editor,
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Many eighteenth-century novels advertised themselves as ethical tales meant to guide a young, and often female,
readership to better decisions. The prefaces of the first publications of authors are particularly prone to that sort of
advertisement: Sarah Fielding’s first publication of David Simple is advertised as a “Moral Romance” (2); Samuel
Richardson promotes his Pamela as a text aimed “to divert and entertain” and “to instruct, and improve the Minds of
the Youth of both Sexes” (31); and even Tobias Smollett’s Roderick Random promises to show the “contrast
between dejected virtue and insulting vice” (xxxiii).
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however, rescues the narrative and its reputation, exchanging his wadding text with the curate.
The Editor, we discover, had been using a work of philosophy—“part of an edition of one of the
German Illustrissimi”— to load his shot. The reader is then made privy to the Editor’s much
more favorable opinion of the narrative, an opinion that led him to publish the text. As the reader
is introduced to the text through the perspective and values of the Editor, the novel that follows is
clearly represented as more enlightening than the philosophy formerly in the Editor’s
possession.60
Indeed, the novel approaches its philosophical teaching very differently than does
philosophy and even rejects several of its approaches as being untenable in real life situations.
The narrator, for example, at times rejects the ability to understand the causes of human emotion.
To explain Harley’s love for Miss Watson, he does not look for causes and effects, or original
impulses. Instead he claims that “In times not credulous of inspiration, we should account for
this from some natural cause; but we do not mean to account for it at all; it were sufficient to
describe its effects” (58). Here, the narrator clearly asks different ethical questions than does
philosophy. Rather than query origins, the narrator acknowledges a skeptical public and looks to
the less controlled realm of Harley’s actions. These actions, the narrator tells us, “were
sometimes so ludicrous, as might derogate from the dignity of the sensations which produced
them to describe. They were treated as such by most of Harley’s sober friends, who often
laughed very heartily at the aukward blunders of the real Harley, when the different faculties,
which should have prevented them, were entirely occupied by the ideal” (58). Instead of asking
the philosophical questions about Harley’s emotional state and care for others, the narrator
separates the idealism of benevolence and its execution from the real abilities and character of
Harley. While the “real Harley” “blunders,” the ideals he espouses occupy his mind and have
real effect on his actions. Yet the narrative here contends that it is not interested in the
philosophical ideal, proving its existence or describing its “natural cause.” Rather, narrative
looks to its “effects” and in doing so shows the complexity of an ideal of benevolence. Although
his feeling of benevolence results in Harley’s humiliation, it is also the cause for admiration.
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Barbara Benedict follows this unusual framing of the story and argues that the reader, like the Editor, “learns from
exemplary fiction, read privately, not from rational proofs” and suggests that Mackenzie designs his novel to best
reflect this ethical approach to teaching the public virtue (120).
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The host’s practical position is separated from its ideal and instead contends with a reality
of diversity. When Harley must decide whether to visit the prostitute he has befriended, he
worries about the possibility that she has been lying to him about her situation to extort money
and favors. After some hesitation, Harley decides to proceed with his promised visit because “to
calculate the chances of deception is too tedious a business for the life of man!” (84). Harley’s
actions cannot rely on being sure of others’ intentions. Instead, he must trust in the goodwill of
others in order to remain benevolent. But while in this quandary he has judged correctly and he is
successfully able to use his influence to reconcile the woman and her father, he more often fails
to notice immoral behavior and corruption. The novel thus complicates the very notion of a
benevolent ideal. The man of feeling represented in the novel is certainly filled with the
sensibility, tolerance, and good intentions that the philosophers suggest as part of the moral
framework necessary to the ideal host; but the outcomes and actions that these same philosophies
propose will reasonably follow from such intentions are noticeably lacking. The narrative cannot
provide a guide to hosts concerning how to avoid problems of association; in fact, Mackenzie
still supports the very approach to hospitality that causes these problems.

Ethics, Distance and Man of Feeling
The ethical standards presented in Man of Feeling, then, do not offer a system of how to
act but instead explore how an ethic of intention might function in the world—to limited success.
Harley is often shown observing others’ distress and perhaps relieving it with a little money; he
does not, however, address the larger social issues creating their distress. While this inactivity
can be seen as unethical, particularly from a modern standpoint, eighteenth-century culture
proposed an ethics of observation to cultivate a greater awareness of moral obligations. Addison
and Steele’s Spectator papers and Smith’s “impartial Spectator” asked their readers to step back
from the world and analyze others’ intentions.61 Indeed, it is a similar emphasis on Harley’s
benevolent intentions and their lack of real impact on the world around him that has caused Man
of Feeling and its central character to be criticized as passive.62 This ethics of observation
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For more on how the detached form of the Spectator narrative informs its ideological goals, see Michael G.
Ketcham’s Transparent Designs: Reading, Performance and Form in the Spectator Papers.
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See note 58.
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requires personal distance from the situation, even as it asks the viewer to identify with what is
virtuous in the scene.63 Eighteenth-century authors similarly create narrative distance, asking
readers to contemplate the narrative and identify with the virtue presented therein.64 Man of
Feeling creates distance through two narrative frames; an Editor introduces the text and
occasionally interrupts its performance, and a narrator relates the narrative, intruding his own
opinions and experiences into Harley’s life. Harley, at two removes, is thus presented to the
audience for observation as a character of ethical interest.
The double frames of this narrative create distance between the character Harley and the
reader, and similar frames are the most common distancing effect discussed by critics seeking to
understand the ethics of observation in eighteenth-century narratives. R. F. Brissenden notes the
novel’s particular emphasis on observation and argues that it calls for moral judging from the
audience but criticizes that this call is not for “moral action” but for “moral discrimination.” This
distinction indicates the growing importance of intention rather than action or outcome in
narratives. As narratives increasingly show “the conflict of motives within the minds of
characters” rather than in an active morality (119), the reader is increasingly asked to consider
models of behavior based on intention. Barbara Benedict ultimately claims this emphasis on
judging motive creates distance between reader and character. The episodic nature of eighteenthcentury narratives, including Man of Feeling, is used to create examples of behavior that
“conjure a social context and the conventional values of restraint, discrimination, and moral
hierarchy.” In doing so, however, Benedict claims that these novels “seek to draw the reader
back from too fervid an identification with the character and into a balanced evaluation of their
behavior and moral standards” (10). Benedict’s view suggests that eighteenth-century narratives
did not seek to create an involved reading experience where the reader identifies with the
characters (12). Rather, the reader remained detached in order to glean the moral of the story.
Likewise, Patricia Spacks argues that it is the voyeuristic nature of Harley’s behavior that
distances the reader from Harley’s perspective; Harley’s sympathy towards those in need
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Narrative theory suggests distancing is a means of controlling ethical messages. For more on how distance
functions as an ethic, see James Phelan, Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical Theory
of Narrative, especially 199-215.
64
Because Man of Feeling follows the host and then guest movements, it is one of the few novels to create distance
at two removes. Most novels attempt to build their ethic at one narrative remove from the protagonist.
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“dramatizes the separation between victims and agents of providence so forcefully as to make
them seem virtually members of different species.” She claims that the episodic nature of the text
and the “plotlessness” and passivity of its main characters are attempts to “deny separation
among people” that ultimately fail (Desire 121). According to Spacks, the reader is unable to
interact with the characters and this lack of action and interaction exacerbates the gap between
individuals. Maureen Harkin, editor of the latest scholarly release of Man of Feeling, argues that
it is not just Harley’s passivity but also his own inability to judge that creates this distance.
Indeed, Harley’s judgment is suspect in the text as he is shown repeatedly being duped by
sharpers and imposers in London. Harkin claims that the reader reacts to this poor judgment by
feeling distanced from Harley and “superior” to him (331-32). The reader is aware or at least
suspicious of Harley’s judgment as he makes his way through London, losing money to gamers,
poorly navigating the political bribery game, and mistaking the rank and character of
“gentlemen” he meets along the way. This awareness ultimately serves to separate the reader
from Harley’s viewpoint. All of these scholars see distance within the text and attribute it to the
elements of the character himself.
But to dwell on the reader’s distance from Harley misses the much more complex way
that the narrator creates distance in the text. Some critics have argued that the narrator is the
source of the reader’s distance rather than Harley himself. For example, Ildiko Csengei argues
that
the description of Harley’s mind…simultaneously reveals the speaker’s own narrative
and epistemological standpoint. When describing Harley, the narrator interprets Harley’s
way of reading the world…The exposure of Harley’s distorting vision is at the same time
the narrator’s self-exposure, and a confession of his own epistemological skepticism. His
framework of thought is embedded in its context of contemporary philosophical ideas on
subjectivity and perception. (957)
The narrator reveals himself in his description of Harley’s experiences and his insight into
Harley’s motives. Though the narrator observes and describes Harley and his surroundings, he
cannot present Harley’s intentions without his own mediation. Csengei sees this distance from
Harley’s perspective as a means of improving the reader and ultimately argues that it closes the
gap among character, narrator, and reader. Referring to Harley as a mirror, he argues that Harley
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“reveals more about those who read him than about Harley himself…[H]e is never the subject in
question, but instead brings about a shift in focus, turning both the narrator and the reader into
men of feeling” (954). In this construction, the reader and narrator become like Harley even if
they do not identify as Harley while reading. In fact, the narrator often uses irony to expose when
Harley’s judgment is flawed; unlike Harley, the narrator is not fooled by the corrupt men he
finds in London and, because of the focalization of the text, neither is the reader. Benedict
addresses this satiric nature of the narrator as a source of distance from Harley, but sees both
narrator and character as distanced from the reader. She argues that the narrator’s tone
“condemns the literary refinement of feeling that replaces judgment with a self-regarding
emotion wrongly portrayed as sympathy.” Benedict continues to explain that this ironic distance
is created by a “double frame of two narrators, each of whom represents an ironic variation on
the theme of the title” (118). Benedict defines these two variations as the “self-conscious, literary
taste” of the Editor and the “outraged morality” of The Ghost, a disembodied narrator (119). In
both cases, Benedict sees both narrator and Editor separating themselves from Harley and his
moral faux pas.65
Csengei and Benedict, I would argue, have identified a more likely, though perhaps not
the complete, source of distance in the effect of the narrator’s commentary on Harley’s choices
and judgments. The reader is kept from feeling emotions with Harley from early in the narrative.
This distancing goal is evident in the manner in which the narrator relates Harley’s love for Miss
Walton. The narrator describes Miss Walton in details that emphasize her unremarkableness:
Her complexion was mellowed into a paleness, which certainly took from her beauty; but
agreed, at least Harley used to say so, with the pensive softness of her mind. Her eyes
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However, Benedict stretches this framing and satire to argue that Mackenzie does not intend any sort of reader
identification with the text—not with Harley, the narrator, or the Editor. Instead, Benedict argues that all are flawed
and “Mackenzie supplied no model of balanced feeling; rather he condemns several literary types of sentiment for
sifting feeling out of social reality” (119). The radical distance Benedict supposes is perhaps well taken in regards to
the Editor. He introduces the text with a self-conscious display of how sentimentalism is viewed by the public and a
critique about how it is read. He describes the text as “a bundle of little episodes, put together without art, and of no
importance on the whole, with something of nature, and little else in them. I was a good deal affected with some
very trifling passages in it; and had the name of a Marmontel, or a Richardson, been on the title-page—‘tis odds that
I should have wept” (48). To respond with such a tongue-in-cheek manner to the narrative causes the reader to begin
the text already distanced from both narrator and implied author. Instead, the reader is focused on his or her own
role as reader and expectations of narrative. As a result, the reader wonders which perspective, the curate’s or the
Editor’s, to trust. The narrator, on the other hand, has a clearer cut relationship with Harley and with the reader as
the next section will discuss.
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were of that gentle hazel-colour, which is rather mild than piercing; and, except when
they were lighted up by good-humour, which was frequently the case, were supposed by
fine gentlemen to want fire. Her air and manner were elegant in the highest degree, and
were as sure of commanding respect, as their mistress was far from demanding it. Her
voice was inexpressibly soft…The effect it had upon Harley, himself used to paint
ridiculously enough; and ascribed to it powers, which few believed, and nobody cared
for. (56)
From such an unremarkable appearance and personality, the reader might like Miss Walton but
does not love her with Harley’s passion. In fact, the narrator insures reader distance through his
own careful separation from Harley’s feelings. He qualifies his praise of Miss Walton by placing
it solely in Harley’s view—“at least Harley used to say so” or “the effect it had upon Harley.” At
the same time, he qualifies his harshest views by associating them with a sarcastic reference to
“fine gentleman.” The effect of this description of Miss Walton is that the reader does not
actually see her, but instead is introduced to her reputation as seen by others. The reader is not
introduced to Harley’s feelings in order to identify with them but instead views Miss Walton
much as the narrator does—as a kind and generous woman but not interesting enough to capture
our attention. The effect of this is also to distance the reader from Harley; rather than observe
Miss Walton with Harley, the reader is shown their relationship as observed by the narrator.
Thus the narrator is seen to be distanced from the character Harley. But even this distance
is more complex than separation between narrator and character. Each of these critics has missed
a crucial element of Man of Feeling—the narrator is a character within the text. This character
may distance himself from many of Harley’s judgments and viewpoints but also connects
himself to Harley as a friend and, I would argue, a guest. The two share a host/guest dynamic
that shifts the ethical force of the novel to the narrator’s state as a guest. Indeed, the guest’s
responsibilites—gratitude, receptivity, responsiveness, passivity—become more important in the
text. The character as guest, not narrator, allows the reader to experience Harley as a host
without personal distance or the problem of association distance attempts to overcome.
Mackenzie thus illustrates the ethical shift of literature away from the host and his problems of
association and towards the guest perspective. At the same time he avoids the guest’s problems
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of perception, showing the reader first the clear benevolence of the host. Not worried about
deciphering Harley’s intentions, Charles—and the reader—are able to admire his hospitality.

The Disappearing Host and the Ghostly Guest
Indeed, Charles does not face the problem of perception that other guests do but is
assured of the good intentions of his host. The first two-thirds of the novel establish Harley as a
benevolent ideal. Never self-interested, Harley’s good intentions are proven through the relation
of his fragmented interactions with others. The last third of the text marks the narrator’s entrance
into the text as Harley’s friend and a shift in sympathetic approach to Harley as a host, a fact
commonly overlooked by critics. Well informed of Harley’s good intentions, Charles never faces
a problem perceiving the motivations behind Harley’s hospitality. Indeed, Harley now actively
realizes his role as host and is shown inviting Edward, his old steward fallen on hard times, and
his grandchildren as guests into his home; he hosts them according to an ideal, setting up
Edwards in a comfortable home on the property and even helping work his land.66 Harley’s ideal
hosting also includes welcoming Charles, allowing the narrator to emerge physically in the text.
Losing the sense of self-conscious distance found in the narrator’s voice early in the text, Charles
interacts and identifies directly with Harley. Assured of his host’s aim, Charles abandons the
doubleness of his earlier narrative where he was simultaneously observer and character as well as
the doubleness of many guests, who must both serve another and protect oneself.
Instead, Charles is a part of Harley’s world and relates Harley’s motives as they would be
received by a separate person; in other words, Charles no longer announces the inner thoughts of
Harley directly to the reader, but instead finds them physically. For example, he discovers
Harley’s sentiments concerning Miss Walton left “on the handle of a tea-kettle, at a neighbouring
house where we were visiting; and as I filled the teapot after him, I happened to put it in my
pocket by a similar act of forgetfulness” (126). This amount of detail concerning how the
narrator learns about Harley’s thoughts or actions is new to the narrative style. The disembodied
voice of The Ghost has taken on a physical body—one that eats and drinks, wears clothing, and
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This example of hospitality follows an older model of estate ownership where landowner shows connection with
tenant. For more on how this rhetoric is used in the eighteenth-century, see Virginia Kenny;s The Country-House
Ethos in English Literature, 1688-1750: Themes of Personal Retreat and National Expansion.
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is capable of being distracted from the Harley narrative. Moreover, the relationship between
Harley and the narrator is given more distinction. The narrator claims that “Harley was one of
those few friends whom the malevolence of fortune had yet left me: I could not therefore but be
sensibly concerned for his present indisposition; there seldom passed a day on which I did not
make inquiry about him” (135). The narrator Charles is discovered to be friends with Harley, and
the gaps in the text leave more questions concerning this character’s situation than in Harley’s.
The reader is not made privy to the specific causes of the narrator’s deeper affection for Harley,
but it is clear that the narrator is no longer sarcastic about Harley’s sentimentality but feels
gratitude and friendship towards him. These emotions work to create a deeper relationship with
the reader as well. No longer is Harley’s observation the focus of the narrative; rather, the reader
now encounters the despair and difficulty of Harley’s life with the narrator. No longer kept at a
distance, the reader is asked to feel for Harley what the character narrator does, namely
friendship, gratitude and concern.67
This relationship with Harley resembles that of another guest-host relationship in the text;
Charles had previously been the guest of Ben Silton and mourns the loss of this ideal host
throughout the narrative. Indeed, the very first fragment offered to the reader begins not with
Harley but with a scene featuring Silton and Charles. The narrator makes clear that what he
mourns is the loss of a host:
He is now forgotten and gone! The last time I was at Silton hall, I saw his chair stand in
its corner by the fire-side; there was an additional cushion on it, and it was occupied by
my lady’s favourite lap-dog. I drew near unperceived, and pinched its ear in the bitterness
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At this point of the novel, the narrative distance between reader and narrator more closely resembles that of other
eighteenth-century novels; the reader is able to identify with the characters as they are presented in the text at this
simpler, singular distance. Yet in the case of Man of Feeling, current reception of the novel suggests that this
identification does not always occur. The critics discussed earlier, for example, dwell on distance and irony (and
Benedict goes so far as to claim that Mackenzie did not aim at identification with the sentiments of the narrative but
created a parody of the sensibility narrative). These reactions might reveal some complications that obscure this
relationship for the contemporary audience, because today’s audience is separated from the narrator’s perspective by
different cultural values and realities. Modern day readers find it more difficult to accept several of the narrator’s
positions. Among these is the particular language of mourning. Filled with exclamation points and high prose, the
narrator’s eulogies are too overwrought to be felt as loss for many current readers. The fact that the book is so often
mistaken to be about Harley suggests participation in the narrator’s perspective. The reader, by joining in the
narrator’s perspective, forgets his presence and instead feels with him.
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of my soul; the creature howled, and ran to its mistress. She did not suspect the author of
its misfortune, but she bewailed it in the most pathetic terms; and kissing its lips, laid it
gently on her lap, and covered it with a cambric handkerchief. I sat in my old friend’s
seat; I heard the roar of mirth and gaiety around me: poor Ben Silton! I gave thee a tear
then: accept of one cordial drop that falls to thy memory now. (50-1).
Without Silton, Charles clearly feels unwelcome at Silton hall. Though the trappings of
hospitality are still there—a roaring fire in a comfortable room filled with happy guests—the
narrator is unable to enjoy them. Certainly, some of this distance is caused by the loss of his
friend; however, the quality of hosting is also diminished. The hostess coddles her lap-dog, a
traditional symbol of idle luxury, in the scene, suggesting a motive to display wealth and prestige
to a crowd rather than enjoy the company of a friend. Moreover, this passage also highlights the
irreplaceable nature of the host. Charles mourns Silton in the past tense here but also in the
present. Each time his grief is equal and draws the same response of a tear. The discomfort the
narrator feels in this first episode displays how the loss of an ideal host leads to the dissolution of
social connection in general.
Ben Silton reappears in the narrative to nostalgically reinforce this loss, this time in
conversation with Harley as he makes his journey home. The two men and their exchange of
benevolent ideals links them as exemplars of hospitality. Sharing the disinterested mindset
necessary to host well, the loss of both men signals the loss of good hosts in general. Indeed, at
the end of this interaction between the two hosts, the narrator draws the reader back to his state
of mourning: “And Silton indeed it was; Ben Silton himself! Once more, my honoured friend,
farewel! –Born to be happy without the world, to that peaceful happiness which the world has
not to bestow! Envy never scowled on thy life, nor hatred on thy grave” (104). In mourning the
loss of Ben Silton, the narrator predicts his similar mourning of Harley seen at the end of the
text. In both cases, Charles mourns the loss of a friend and host. This insertion of the narrator’s
emotional state into the narrative also serves to draw attention to the guest perspective. In this
case, the narrative explains how the narrator detaches himself more and more from society with
the loss of each ideal host until the curate and townspeople consider him a Ghost.
Man of Feeling, then, is a text to explain how Charles, a flesh and blood character,
becomes a man so detached from his neighbors that he is called The Ghost. The answer to this
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“how” lies not within Charles’ own character but in his state as a guest. As such the narrative
follows the host’s movements and not Charles’ own. Yet, because Charles is defined by his guest
status, the death of the host requires his own character to falter. The Ghost described at the start
of the narrative is what is left of the guest’s identity when the host is lost. Ultimately, what
Charles experiences is the death of his host and the loss of an ideal. Harley’s generosity and
openness, indeed the very passiveness that makes him a good host, also leaves him vulnerable.
Unable to pursue his own self-interest, his love for Miss Watson, Harley weakens and dies. His
slow demise reveals a crucial problem in the ideal for a host, namely, complete openness is
impossible to maintain. But Harley’s death also reveals the vulnerability of the guest. Without an
ideal host, Charles also fades, becoming the ghost who narrates the story. Mackenzie’s text, then,
reveals that the host’s problem is larger than one of association but lies in the very possibility of
practicing an ideal. Likewise, Man of Feeling reveals that, as problematic as the ideal is to the
host, the true sufferer is the guest. If the ideal host does not exist in the world, then the guest is
left to protect himself from the cruelty of the world, including the cruelty of other hosts. It is no
surprise, then, that Charles’ ultimate narrative function while a guest is mourning the loss of
ideal hosts and the possibility for hospitality.
When both hosts have died, the narrator is left to chronicle his own actions and
intentions; the novel ends with the narrator’s thoughts as he places himself fully in the setting of
the story. Rather than hover in the background of a scene, here the narrator is the focus and the
text turns to the present tense to drive home his presence. The narrative ends with the narrator’s
declaration: “I sometimes visit his grave; I sit in the hollow of the tree. It is worth a thousand
homilies! every nobler feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart awakens a virtue!—but it
will make you hate the world—No: there is such an air of gentleness around, that I can hate
nothing; but, as to the world—I pity the men of it” (139). The host, indeed the ideal host, has
died, carried along in his illness by the very exertion and giving that the ideal of hosting
demands. The guest, however, is left behind, lonely and uncomfortable. The narrator’s final line
of pity to the world bemoans the lack of hospitality to be found in it. Without the ideal host,
virtue, the narrator suggests, cannot exist in the world. The memory of this virtue—“every nobler
feeling”—remains in the guest, but, unable to host, he cannot spread this virtue. Instead, he pities
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others, and, if the curate is right about the character he defines as The Ghost, does not reestablish
hospitality but absents himself from the exchange entirely.
As such, Man of Feeling is less a text about specifics of virtuous behavior and more a text
mourning the loss of a stable morality. The mourning reveals that hospitality as a moral system
has lost its controlling force; without proper hosts to lead the exchange, immoral hosting
dominates and guests are left unprotected and unaccommodated. Without these hosts, the ideal
guests are unable to remain involved and active in the system and the system itself can collapse.
Mackenzie’s text, then, reveals the new problems that are caused if the problem of association is
overcome; if the host is able to perfectly match his intentions with his actions and the guest is
able to set aside worries about the host’s intentions, they both become vulnerable. Harley wastes
away, dying from his complete openness to others and inability to pursue his own desires.
Likewise, Charles disappears, leaving behind only a fragment of both men’s relationship.
Intentional ethics, it is seen, have changed the exchange and the conception of morality to
emphasize the motives and interior life of the actors; they do, however, at a price that weakens
the external practice of hospitality. The following chapters will look at how eighteenth-century
novels attempt to construct guest obligations to fill the role of this lost host and overcome the
weaknesses intentional ethics bring to the hospitality exchange.
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CHAPTER TWO
BAD HOSTS AND ANXIOUS GUESTS

In The Adventures of David Simple, Sarah Fielding introduces the character Cynthia
through her position as a guest in the house of an unnamed lady of fashion. Though educated and
of genteel birth, Cynthia has been denied an inheritance or any means to support herself and is
completely dependent on her host. This dependency earns Cynthia the label of “toad-eater,” a
derogatory term for a guest seeking to gain from the host.68 Cynthia describes the label to David:
It is a Metaphor taken from a Mountbank’s [sic] Boy’s eating Toads in order to show his
Master’s Skill in expelling Poison: It is built on a Supposition, (which I am afraid is too
generally true) that People who are so unhappy as to be in a State of Dependence, are
forced to do the most nauseous things that can be thought on, to please and humour their
Patrons. And the Metaphor may be carried on yet farther, for most People have so much
the Art of tormenting, that every time they have made the poor Creatures they have in
their power swallow a Toad, they give them something to expel it again, that they may be
ready to swallow the next they think proper to prepare for them: that is, when they have
abused and fooled them, as Hamlet says, to the top of their bent, they grow soft and good
to them again, on purpose to have it in their power to plague them the more. (103)
Cynthia reevaluates the use of “toad-eater” to describe an inhospitable guest by returning to the
term’s etymology.69 She notes that, as the Mountbank’s boy is asked to swallow poison, the
guest, rather than the host, is asked to accept inhospitable behavior because of his dependent
state. The power relations in this scenario place the guest in an uncomfortable situation wherein
she is “forced,” “tormented,” “abused and fooled” by her host in order to display the host’s
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There are few outright definitions of the term in the eighteenth century but plenty of context clues. Just briefly,
toadeater is considered a synonym for adulator in several translation dictionaries, and Lord Chesterfield includes in
his instructions to his son advice that “indiscriminate familiarity will either offend your superiors, or make you pass
for their dependent or toad-eater” and lower one’s own station by the appearance of dependence (42).
69
There is circumstantial evidence that Fielding was successful in recasting the term. Following the publication of
David Simple (1744), the term is used to chastise hosts. Toad-eaters are considered victims of poor hosting in
several later novels, including Frances Brooke’s The Old Maid (1764), Frances Burney’s Evelina (1779), Sarah
Gunning’s History of Coombe Wood (1783), Miss Smythies’ History of Lucy Wellers (1754), and the anonymous
History of Lady Emma Melcombe (1787). Interestingly, these novels are all written by women, perhaps gendering
the use of the term.
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“skill”; here, however, the skill is not “expelling Poison” but bestowing gifts on the less
fortunate. As the original toad-eater was forced to eat poisonous toads in order to bolster his
master’s reputations for dispelling poisons, so the metaphoric toad-eater is asked to withstand
poor hospitality in order to improve the host’s reputation for good hospitality. In this telling, the
term toad-eater should reprove a host who keeps her guest captive and submissive through
conscious acts of hospitality but, as Cynthia points out, the term is applied as a slander to guests
like Cynthia in order to ridicule their state of dependence.
Cynthia’s uncomfortable position as toad-eater raises several points of concern about the
eighteenth-century system of hospitality and the guest’s position within that system. First,
Cynthia’s situation illustrates the problem of perception for the guest; the guest must judge the
intentions of the host but can only evaluate actions. Cynthia originally believed her relationship
with her host to be mutually rewarding; she interpreted her host’s invitation and early signs of
welcome as motivated by friendship but later learns of her host’s more selfish motives. From her
original position within the exchange, however, Cynthia has difficulty determining whether she
is a toad-eater or an honored guest. Second, even with her gained knowledge of the host’s
intentions, Cynthia is unable to extract herself from the exchange. She is dependent and as such
must remain a guest and be labeled a toad-eater. Cynthia’s situation thus highlights the
vulnerabilities of the guest: guests cannot see the completion of hospitality from within the
exchange nor, when they chance upon a clear and objective view, can they act on their new
knowledge.
Emphasizing the anxieties and vulnerabilities of the guest position, eighteenth-century
authors describe exchanges of hospitality wherein hosts prey on the guest’s weaknesses. Many of
these hosts see hospitality as an economic exchange, either literally as a form of a financial gain
or, like Cynthia’s host, as a metaphorical gain of prestige and social placement. Because a
hospitality exchange was still marked by external signs of welcome, such as the offering of food
or housing, these self-interested exchanges were called hospitality without regard to new ethical
distinctions. I will argue that these self-serving approaches fail to follow an ethics of hospitality
that demands the creation of a mutually dependent relationship between the host and guest. The
traditional hospitable relationships of mutual trust, reciprocal service, and shared need were
reduced to one-sided attempts to gain from another that required little interaction. In each
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scenario explored below, the hosts seek to gain from their hospitality without returning these
gains by fulfilling their responsibilities to their guests. Because of the selfish intentions behind
bad hospitality, these exchanges share much with economic relationships where one party seeks
to gain from another. These selfish exchanges result in guests feeling anxious not only about
their hosts’ intentions but also in questioning the very nature of hospitality itself. This chapter
will argue that, although bad hosts are not new to literature, the eighteenth-century host is
particularly threatening to both the larger social order and individual psyches. By revealing the
motivation behind hospitality and exposing bad intentions, eighteenth-century novels illuminate
problems not just in the character of particular hosts but also in the very system of hospitality.70
Indeed, as I will argue, the very questioning of host motive and awareness of guest vulnerability
is necessitated by an intentional ethic and complicates the relationship between host and guest. In
particular, I will show how eighteenth-century novels use concepts of credit and reputation and
their relationship with hospitality to build a distrust of hospitality and the power dynamics in the
relationships it creates.

Traditional Threats to Hospitality
Vestiges of older critiques of hospitality remain in eighteenth-century novels; indeed, not
every representation of bad hosting undermines the larger system. In fact, bad hosts who fail to
upset the order of exchange abound in many eighteenth-century novels. These hosts misuse the
hospitality system but their failures do not upset a sense of hospitality as a system but rather
suggest misunderstandings concerning how hospitality should be offered. Their failures are
generally not of cunning but of personality; selfish rather than malevolent, these hosts simply fail
to consider the needs of their guests alongside their own. Their selfishness, however, often leads
to guests being held as hostages or left unprotected. Generally seeking financial gain or social
prestige, these hosts see hospitality as a way to fulfill these desires rather than as a social
responsibility to accommodate others. These forms of negative hospitality have been
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Virginia Kenning notes a similar transition between the seventeenth-century country-house poem and how its
conventions are used in the eighteenth century; she attributes this change to both a “widespread consciousness of the
fragility of social constructs” that led to a “reassertion or adjustment of the idea of the good society” and to new
emphasis on the individual that forced a “new ethic” (2-3).
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traditionally denounced in literature,71 and eighteenth-century novels treat them as conventional
objects of satire. These hospitality missteps thus fail to create hospitable relationships but also do
not disrupt the system and thus do not produce moral anxiety in the guest.
Among these satirized forms of hospitality are misuses of personal economics or
traditional social hierarchy. Both forces were linked to negative virtues in the eighteenth century.
In fact, economics and ethics were discussed in the same texts. While Smith sectioned his moral
treatise from his work on commerce to some degree, many other philosophers did not. Among
the more popular texts, David Fordyce included a chapter on “social duties of the commercial
kind” in his Elements of Moral Philosophy, and Samuel Pufendorf discusses ownership,
contracts and financial authority in his On the Duty of Man and Citizen. Hutcheson’s A System of
Moral Philosophy also included commerce as an important part of a moral life, and George
Blewitt wrote an entire thesis on the overlap of morals and economics entitled, An Enquiry
Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage
of a People. These texts, among others, establish commerce, economics, and capitalism as well
as the social hierarchies these systems disrupted as part of the moral practice of daily life.
Literary and historical scholars have noted how these changing commercial interests and
structures redefined ethics in the eighteenth century. J.G.A. Pocock’s work links capitalism and
corresponding changes in power structures to a new sense of private virtue. Michael McKeon
finds the origins of the novel lie in “questions of virtue” that “internalize the emergence of the
middle class and the concerns that it exists to mediate” (22). Liz Bellamy contends that a
commercial pursuit of self-interest “began to be presented as the duty of the individual” in a new
capitalist system and thus become incorporated into moral codes (3). Deidre Lynch argues that
fictional characters helped bridge the gap between the new commercial system and ethics,
offering characters as a way to explore new “social relations in their changed, commercialized
world” (4) but also as a way to receive “moral training and self-culture” through reading
character (10). These critics and others find that new economic systems of exchange disrupted
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Examples fill the western tradition of literature and its sources. The Gospel of Luke alone, for example, includes
parables against miserly behavior—the Parable of the Unjust Steward (16:1-13) and of the Rich Fool (12:13-21)—as
well as warnings against the pursuit of luxury—the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (16:19-31).
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the older moral code;72 novels integrated these codes and offered moral judgment on capitalism
and new ethics.
In many cases, these cultural changes are addressed as having negative impacts on the
hospitable exchange in the novel, disrupting old systems of hospitality that depended on noblesse
oblige and the social hierarchy from which it derived.73 Yet, in the novels explored here, these
negative impacts are generally the source of satirical lampooning rather than complications to
character or integral movements in plot. As such, they are easy to see as negative forms of
hospitality and also easier for the characters to set aside. Clearly immoral, these representations
of hospitality rarely cause the characters more than a moment’s discomfort and are easily
laughed away by the reader. Indeed, the threats these behaviors pose to hospitality are fairly
traditional. Self-interest in the form of miserliness, luxury or snobbery has always hindered the
delivery of hospitality. These negative forms of hospitality are included in the eighteenth-century
novel but do not cause a large philosophical restructuring of ethical standards.74 Easily identified,
though not easily combated, these forms of hospitality create uncomfortable situations for the
guest but do not ask them to reevaluate their conceptions of what hospitality looks like. Primarily
the source of satire and direct criticism, these traditional forms of negative hospitality are used
only to introduce the larger problems hospitality was facing in the eighteenth-century: namely
the unstable relationship between the host and guest and the increasing demands on the guest in
the hospitable exchange.
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Two collections of economic texts from the eighteenth century include discussions of morality and virtue. Stephen
Copley introduces the economy section of his Literature and the Social Order in Eighteenth-Century England with
the claim that “In the humanist tradition, discussion of political and economic affairs is conducted in explicitly
moral terms” (3). Henry Clark lists among the topic discussed in his Commerce, Culture, and Liberty: Readings on
Capitalism before Adam Smith, “the role of commerce in fostering civility and sociability, the effects of commerce
on the fabric of community life, [and] the dangers to moral virtue posed by increasing prosperity” (ix).
73
This sense of loss is perhaps the cause for the nostalgia for older orders of hospitality. Many novels of the earlier
eighteenth century certainly contain this nostalgia. Eliza Haywood’s Fortunate Foundlings includes praise of the
hospitality found in the French nobility in what is presented as a more stable social hierarchy; Smollett’s first novel,
The Adventures of Roderick Random, also looks nostalgically back on older forms of hospitality as the hero ends the
novel returning to his place as head of a country estate.
74
Barbara Zonitch sees the critique of both luxury and aristocratic snobbery as promoting a new middle-class
culture, defined by “emotional self-regulation and economic frugality.” Such a culture, she argues changes the
nature of the country estate and its hospitality from one that “paraded the signs of aristocratic patrimony” to one that
“modestly displayed…regulation and charity” (27-8). Virginia Kenning agrees, exploring a tradition in the country
house poem that investigates luxury only to contrast it to a more proper hosting in the virtues of “good stewardship,
simplicity, right use, frugality” (6-7). While I agree that hospitality shifted in this way in the eighteenth century, I
would attribute the shift to new concepts of credit and reputation discussed later in this chapter.
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In many novels, the miserly host is easily dismissed by the guest and rejected for his lack
of hospitality. The easy target of satire, this host is often introduced and dismissed with the
language of ridicule. For example, Tobias Smollett spends little of his considerable satiric power
on Mr. Pimpernel in Humphry Clinker, where he is dismissed by Matthew Bramble as “a sordid
miser” whose despotism is “truly diabolical.” Bramble finds Pimpernel’s inhospitality influences
all other areas of his life and lists his evils, marking him a “brutal husband, an unnatural parent, a
harsh master, an oppressive landlord, a litigious neighbour, and a partial magistrate” (161). 75
This list of invectives is hardly witty but does offer a clear signal to the reader that the treatment
Bramble received as a guest was not ideal. The guests enter Pimpernel’s home, only to leave
quickly with a negative judgment and a desire not to return. The narrative follows this desire and
neither Pimpernel nor his particular brand of miserliness is heard from again. Frances Burney
similarly dismisses miserliness as opposing basic needs of hospitality. In Cecilia, Mr. Briggs is
the only guardian of the three her uncle appointed that Cecilia absolutely refuses to live with.
Finding his house dirty and unwelcoming, Cecilia, who could laugh at how Briggs’s miserliness
leads him to make a spectacle of himself, ultimately judges him to be filled with “parsimony,
vulgarity, and meanness” and labels him the “lowest and most wretched of misers in a city
abounding with opulence, hospitality, and splendor” (374). Though Cecilia should live with him
as his ward, she rejects his house because of its miserly inhospitality.76 Briggs is certainly more
involved in the narrative and plot than Smollett’s Pimpernel but his miserly behavior effectively
negates him from becoming a host or playing a larger part in the narrative.
In these same novels, Smollett and Burney also explore the opposite of miserliness,
luxury. Though luxury causes more discomfort to the guest characters than miserliness, it is also
easily identified as a marker of inhospitable behavior. Smollett and Burney each relate luxury to
a distant, irresponsible host. Smollett creates the character of Mr. Burdock, Mr. Pimpernel’s
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David Punter notes that Pimpernel is not just a member of the influential landed gentry but also a justice of the
peace. Punter points out that not only is Pimpernel deficient as a responsible host but also as a J.P. because of his
previous work as an attorney and consequent “association with the other side of the legal profession, his
acquaintance with the recesses of legal ideology, which stains his judgments” (55).
76
Though rejected as a suitable host, Margaret Doody points out that Briggs is an unconventional miser because his
“buoyant assurance” and happy nature set him at odds with the “misery conventionally associated with misers”
(123).
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cousin, and describes his house as “a great inn, crowded with travelers” (153).77 Mr. Burdock’s
hospitality is generous and welcoming but, because it insists on displaying his wealth, fails to
form the proper relationships between guest and host. Thus, Burdock’s home is little more than
an “inn” or “ordinary” where “mine host seems to be misplaced.” Bramble critiques Burdock’s
absence, claiming “I would rather dine on filberts with a hermit, than feed upon venison with a
hog” (153). Such a claim emphasizes the importance of the relationship created through
hospitable exchanges and criticizes Burdock for his distance from his guests.78 The same
sentiment is repeated by Burney; Mr. Harrel, Cecilia’s guardian consistently in the pursuit of
luxury, “seemed to consider his own house merely as an Hôtel” where Mr. Harrel himself was to
be served and accommodated rather than fulfill his own obligations to serve and accommodate
his guest. Mr. Harrel and his wife may keep an “acquaintance [that] were numerous, expensive
and idle” but their relationships with these acquaintance are pursued to fulfill their own needs
and the duties of the host are ignored for the pursuit of wealth and prestige (53). Rarely present
in their own home, the Harrels fail to accommodate Cecilia’s needs.79 Luxury, in both instances,
is denounced as too economically hospitable; comparing these houses to inns or hotels, Burney
and Smollett suggest that the estate owners are not true hosts but commercial venturists. Thus,
luxury, like miserliness, is exposed as a hindrance to proper hospitality.
Yet, unlike miserliness, luxury is not easy to escape. Smollett revisits the coldness that
luxury creates in the hospitality cycle in his description of the Baynards, and Burney complicates
the Harrels’ characters to illustrate the temptation that luxury creates for a host. In particular, the
problem the Baynards and the Harrels face is that they cannot afford the luxury they live in. Both
families face stifling debt yet continue to pursue luxury to gain prestige among their neighbors.
Such competition hints at difficulty forming relationships of respect and common pursuit.
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I.C. Ross claims Burdock and Pimpernel are the “counterparts” of Bramble and Dennison, a farmer who manages
his estate without luxury or miserliness (187-188).
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Michael Rosenblum sees this irresponsible hosting as a theme in Smollett’s work. Studying all five of Smollett’s
novels, he concludes that Smollett’s image of a bad society is “one which recognizes no values and has lost the
sense of obligations and distinctions upon which social class depends” (560). Taken together, these confluent
displays of bad hospitality suggest Smollett sees financial constructs as a threat to social order; his characters,
however, maintain the power and foresight to combat these flaws.
79
As this luxurious lifestyle entraps Cecilia, it also entraps the Harrels. D. Grant Campbell notes that the luxurious
lifestyle seems similar to “intoxication and addiction” in the novel, “a mental dependency upon an alluring lifestyle
that ruins the finances, wastes the physique, and overwhelms the intellect” (136). The luxurious lifestyle, and its
counterpart of gambling, directly opposes Cecilia’s own desires for an ordered, rational life.
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Indeed, this competition among neighbors affects their behavior towards guests: the Baynards
leave Bramble and his travelling companions waiting in a “temple of cold reception” for “above
half an hour,” and the Harrels repeatedly expose Cecilia to company and parties of pleasure that
she would rather avoid. Both situations leave the guests uncomfortable in their hosts’ homes.
Yet, Cecilia and Bramble are insistent in upholding their duties as guests to these hosts; unlike
the misers, the host of luxury is an object to reform in the novels, and the guests attempt to
rearrange the hosts’ approach to hospitality by stifling the pursuit of luxury. Though Bramble is
successful where Cecilia is not,80 the discomfort felt by these guests is caused by their easy
identification of the flaw in the hospitable exchange and their attempt to rectify that problem
from a position that demands subservience to the host’s ways of living. Luxury, then, might be a
larger threat to hospitality than miserliness but also one that the guest can attempt to revise.
As easily identified but less easily combated is the behavior of the old nobility. A
traditional giver of hospitality, this social class was redefining its role in the hospitable exchange
in the eighteenth century and a traditional emphasis on social hierarchy produced its own form of
negative hospitality. Smollett and Burney also turn their satiric critique here and detail how the
reserve of the nobility made the relationships that hospitality requires more difficult. Both
Smollett and Burney ridicule the snobbery of the elite and the resulting demand for respect from
the guest as both unnerving and unproductive. Bramble complains of his treatment at the hands
of Lord Oxmington, where he attended a “fashionable meal served up with much ostentation to a
company of about a dozen persons, none of whom we had ever seen before.” These
circumstances are not mediated by the host who, Bramble complains, “is more remarkable for his
pride and caprice, than for his hospitality and understanding” and who “considered his guests
merely as objects to shine upon, so as to reflect the luster of his own magnificence” (260).
Bramble’s chief complaint, then, is that the host’s attitude of superiority effectively turned his
guests into objects rather than welcomed guests. Bramble finds this behavior most threatening
and so refuses to maintain his role as grateful guest; he attempts to pay the servants for his meal
and offers to duel Oxmington, an offer that would force the lord to see Bramble as his social

80

Interestingly, neither Bramble or Cecilia sees any real hope in reforming their luxurious hosts until one of the
spouses dies. These texts then suggest that luxury is in part connected to the morality of the married state and the
habits created by this relationship.
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equal.81 The situation quickly becomes more absurd when Bramble sends his friend, the exsoldier Lismahago, to offer his challenge but even Lismahago’s abuse at the hands of
Oxmington’s servants underscores the inhospitality and violence that a reliance on noble
superiority causes for the guest. Bramble is, however, unable to gain his desired retribution for
Oxmington’s inhospitality; instead, Oxmington remains distant and Bramble and his companions
are further ridiculed. Though able to read the problem in the exchange, Bramble is left powerless
to respond.
Burney also uses the last of Cecilia’s three guardians to depict a similar version of noble
snobbery. Mr. Delvile takes great pride in his family history and insists on being treated with
respect by his guests though he fails to return that respect. He, like Oxmington, has all the
external trappings of a good host but lacks the proper demeanor; his house is “grand and
spacious” if outdated and his servants are “profoundly respectful.” Yet Cecilia complains that the
house was too “gloomy” and “while it inspired awe, it repressed pleasure” (97). Of larger
complaint is Mr. Delvile’s behavior; he makes his guests wait and remains so focused on the
running of his daily life that he fails to take any interest in his guest Cecilia (98). Even at his
castle in the country, Mr. Delvile insists upon distancing himself from his neighbors in order to
display his superiority; the castle has few guests because Mr. Delvile had “offended all the
neighbouring gentry, who could easily be better entertained than by receiving instructions of
their own inferiority” (460). Mr. Delvile’s snobbery thus makes any relationship—even the
traditional relationship between host and guest—impossible.82 His care to distance himself from
all others around him results in his failure to uphold the traditional responsibility of the nobility
to offer hospitality. Cecilia, like Bramble, remains unable to respond to Delvile’s inhospitality,
and the narrative ultimately exaggerates Delvile’s distance by placing him outside of Cecilia’s
marriage negotiations with his son.
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I.C. Ross views Oxmington as Smollett’s commentary on the nobility at large, who have “lost not only virtue but
even civility” by being influenced by the middle class’s “rage for luxury” and “imitation the nobility’s dereliction of
their social duty” (187).
82
Delvile’s snobbery leads to a closed hospitality; so concerned with his own prestige and how he is stationed in a
hospitality exchange, Delvile fails to welcome others. Indeed, Doody notes that Delvile’s obsession with
“maintaining a position” is literalized in his hosting “as he literally maintains a position in ungallantly refusing to
rise from his chair to greet [Cecilia]” (124).
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These versions of hospitality are clearly marked as improper exchanges in these novels,
but these types of exchanges have been marked as improper throughout literary history. Midas’s
pursuit of luxury resulted in his loneliness as he turned all those around him into gold;
Shakespeare’s Shylock and Ben Jonson’s Volpone, who rivaled one another as most reviled
miser on the Renaissance stage, both died alone; Chaucer’s Prioress is so concerned with
maintaining the laws of good manners that she fails to create relationships with people and
instead dotes on animals. Though the critiques by Smollett, Burney and their contemporaries
modernized the manifestations of these traits, the behaviors they ridicule are traditional threats to
hospitality. As such, they certainly make the guest uncomfortable but it is physical, not
psychological or philosophical, discomfort. These clear and immediate threats to hospitality are
thus more easily set aside as representations of immoral behavior. However, these critiques do
indicate an awareness of the exchange implicit in hospitality and how that exchange must be
carefully navigated as a set of relationships and not just the flow of goods and services. In other
words, these authors acknowledged hospitality as an exchange but insist on an ethical and
relational component in the exchange.

An Exposed Economy
Indeed, when a hospitality relationship is not honored, not only that exchange fails but
the system of hospitality falters. As the potential for selfish motives becomes uncovered in the
eighteenth century through intentional ethics, the guest begins to distrust the giving of
hospitality. Uncovering selfish motives for the host’s behavior, the guest starts to doubt signs of
hospitality. The position of the “toad-eater” that started the chapter illustrates this loss of trust in
the system. Noticing the host’s selfish intentions, the toad-eater, unlike the guest of the miser or
snob, does feel psychological and philosophical disorder. Such is certainly the position of
Cynthia in Fielding’s David Simple. When she perceives her host’s deception, she becomes
disenchanted with her host, her own position, and the possibility of good hospitality. Still
ensnared within the exchange system, she feels anxiety over how to act now that the system and
the self-interest it sought to hide is exposed. Cynthia’s inferior position in the exchange, though
always present, becomes a threat to the exchange when it is made apparent through her host’s
treatment of her: “To her Usage was owing all my Misery; for by that time I had been with her
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two or three Months, she began to treat me as a Creature born to be her Slave” (105). Cynthia’s
description here clearly identifies her disenchantment with her hospitality exchange; she styles
her placement not as a guest but as a slave compelled to remain in the service of her host,
respond to her demands, and receive no compensation in return. Relegated to an object or
commodity for exchange, Cynthia is unable to embrace her role in the hospitable exchange. The
ideal of hospitality interrupted, the toad-eater too must rewrite her understanding of the exchange
cycle.
Cynthia certainly did not expect to be treated as an inferior member of the hospitable
exchange when she entered into it. Rather, Cynthia expected a more ideal exchange of shelter
and protection from her host in exchange for her gratitude and friendship; though financially
dependent on her host, Cynthia believes that her host is dependent upon her for the opportunity
to fulfill her civic duty and the gratitude Cynthia supplies. In fact, Cynthia did not initially resent
being dependent on her sponsor nor did she desire hospitality without some sort of exchange.
When Cynthia entered the agreement, she hoped only to deserve the offered hospitality:
The Lady I went with, had something very amiable in her Manner, and at first behaved to
me with so much Good-nature, that I loved her with the utmost Sincerity, I dwelt with
pleasure on the Thoughts of the Obligation I owed her, as I fancied she was generous
enough to delight in conferring them; and I had none of that sort of Pride, by Fools
mistaken for Greatness of Mind, which makes People disdain the receiving Obligations:
for I think the only Meanness consists in accepting, and not gratefully acknowledging
them. (102-3)
Here, Cynthia is clearly expecting an exchange of good nature and manners for obligation and
gratitude in her role as the guest. Willing to pay the price by incurring these obligations and
feeling grateful, Cynthia hopes her host will in part be paid for the pleasure she feels in aiding a
woman in distress. This anticipated exchange consisted not just of exchanged goods but also of
exchanged behaviors that would work to create a bond between host and guest. Cynthia begins
her toad-eater life, then, feeling a sense of closeness and attachment to her host and believing her
host felt a similar sentiment. In Cynthia’s imagined exchange, the gain that each party hopes to
acquire is not economic but social. Had both participants shared a value for this trait, their
hospitable exchange could have remained the happy relationship Cynthia hoped for. Cynthia’s
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host, however, ruins such benevolence by her selfish behavior and lack of respect for her guest;
she accuses Cynthia of selfishly using their relationship for her own gain, while at the same time
claiming her continued hosting as a sign of her own benevolence.
Cynthia’s early idealism, however, suggests that there is some room for self-interest in a
hospitality exchange. If each party is able to gain from the relationship, the exchange would still
be successful. In the way this potential exchange includes both goods and services circulated
between individuals for mutual gain, it begins to resemble an economy but not a barter or
moneyed economy. Rather, hospitality in practice, if not ideal, is most easily likened to its close
cousin, the gift economy.83 A gift economy exchanges tangible items but these items represent
and build a relationship between giver and receiver.84 Because these exchanges involve complex
social navigations that are intricately interwoven with the gifts exchanged, they function
according to cultural norms often hard to define. As such, gift economies, like hospitality, are
both a theory of ideal interactions and a practice contingent on its human players. These players
exchange goods or services but also gain and give social stability, prestige, and community
through the more material exchange. The relationships built through gift economies, and
hospitality as well, are the most valuable pieces of the exchange and also are what separates
these economies from market economies. By absenting the relationship that hospitality is meant
to build, Cynthia’s host fails to address the ethical obligations inherent in the exchange.
Gift economies build these obligations by building relationships through what Pierre
Bourdieu calls “symbolic capital.”85 Unlike the goods found in a money or barter economy,
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Gift giving practices were noted on many eighteenth-century accounts of encounters with new cultures but seems
to have declined as an interest following the Napoleonic Wars, when (unlike hospitality) mention of gift-giving
practices in other cultures became rare. See Harry Liebersohn, The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global
Idea: 3.
84
According to Linda Zionkowski and Cynthia Klekar, the gift “must remain distinct from commodities and
wages…[and] this required direct involvement in the lives of dependants” in order to turn dominant social relations
into ones of attachment (3-4).
85
Unlike many anthropological studies, Bourdieu’s theories remain detached from a specific culture or time and
instead dwell on the basics behind gift economies in general. Certainly anthropological studies make larger claims
about the functioning of gift economies in general. Indeed, Marcel Mauss’s The Gift is an important text for both
philosophers and anthropologists. However, because his conceptions originate from a tribal culture, as do the works
of many of his predecessors, it is more difficult to draw parallels between his findings and the world of eighteenthcentury Britain. Unlike many philosophical studies, his work insists on exploring how worldly contexts affect this
system of exchange. Likewise, many of these philosophical works also discuss real-world situations. Jacques
Derrida’s work, for example, includes discussions of the current immigration debate in France. However, these
works, when they do comment on current events, do so from a post-modern perspective anachronistic to thinkers of
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symbolic capital includes a shared value system for specific cultural traits such as “recognition,
honor, [or] nobility” (“Marginalia” 234). In order for exchanges of gifts or hospitality to work,
the participant must acknowledge this value system; indeed, the potential for exchange is “only
available to agents endowed with dispositions adjusted to the logic of ‘disinterestedness’” who
are willing to sacrifice in order to obtain these traits (Bourdieu, “Marginalia” 235). The exchange
of such symbolic capital relies on the shared perspective of the exchange participants.86 This
dependency manifests itself in a relationship between the participants; because each relies on the
other for recognition of the desired traits, both participants, regardless of more tangible states of
dependency, require the other’s participation. When Cynthia’s host fails to sacrifice yet
continues to expect to gain symbolic capital, the hospitality relationship suffers. Her selfish
behaviors fail to note her dependency on Cynthia’s acknowledgement of her hospitable actions;
instead, the host demands social recognition for only the mere act of housing and feeding
Cynthia devoid of any intention of making Cynthia comfortable.
Thus, the relationship between Cynthia and her host is injured by the bad intentions of the
host but also in the ways these selfish intentions are manifested in practice. Not only does the
host abandon any attempts to serve Cynthia but she also fails to consider practices of welcoming
that adjust to the specific contexts of each exchange and the common ground that helps
individuals determine how to behave. Performing only literal actions of hospitality—housing and
feeding a guest—Cynthia’s host does not perform any additional acts to increase her guest’s
comfort that are less easily prescribed. Indeed, hospitality requires a balance of rules of conduct
and flexible negotiations between guest and host that Bourdieu calls “practical logic.” He claims
that this balance amounts to a “stylistic unity which, though immediately perceptible, has none of
the strict, regular coherence of the concerted products of a plan” (“Practical Logic” 194).
Exchanges of hospitality, then, depend on a system of norms but not rules. These norms involve
the eighteenth century. Thus, Derrida’s conception that the gift cannot be recognized by either host or guest in order
to be a gift; rather it exists as the idea of the impossible. This approach to gift-giving, as I hope will become
apparent in this chapter, is not part of the eighteenth-century mindset.
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Mireille Rosello notes that, in practice, hospitality works best when based on similarities between the agents. If
the host and guest share at least “the impression that they share the same assumptions about what it means to be
hospitable, they both have agency: they can share the responsibility for formulating an objection to a given rule,
their strong dislike of another, their attachment to a different principle” (171). Under these conditions, the host and
guest can reshape or debate the laws of hospitality; without such similarity, however, such compromise or
discussion is not possible.
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strategic handling of methods of exchange, including time between exchanges, displays of
gratitude, and returns adjusted to personal position. These methods of exchange, as practical
logic, are flexible but are also easy to misinterpret or handle improperly; each participant must
properly judge how, what, and when to return or offer an exchange. Yet when completed, this
cycle of exchange can create “durable relations of dependence” that allow a society to function
smoothly (Bourdieu, “Marginalia” 239). While Cynthia has attempted to respond to this logic by
returning gratitude for hospitality, her host breaks the cycle of exchange by refusing to accept her
gratitude or offer continued welcome and thus revealing the fragile nature of hospitality.87
Bourdieu’s system implies, however, that had Cynthia received a timely and well-mannered
return to her gratitude from her host, it is possible their relationship could have continued to
thrive and offer both participants pleasure.
Unhappy, yet still dependent on her host, Cynthia is unable to escape her negative
relationship. Because a dependent guest, Cynthia remains not only vulnerable and inactive, but
also uncomfortably aware of her vulnerability now that her host’s intentions have been exposed.
Thinking of her host’s future reactions rather than what she is obligated to return in the
exchange, Cynthia complains that she cannot speak or be silent or complain about her treatment
without risking her host’s displeasure and the potential end of the exchange. Yet, despite this
treatment, Cynthia must remain a guest and her ethical choices are all unappealing. She tells
David, “I think it impossible to be in a worse Situation. She had raised my Love, by the
Obligations she had confer’d on me, and yet continually provoked my Rage by her Ill-nature: I
could not for a great while, any account for this conduct [sic]: I thought if she did not love me,
she had no Reason to have given herself any trouble about me, and yet I could not think she
could have used me in that manner, if she had had the least Regard for me” (105). The
relationship Cynthia relates to David still maintains vestiges of the symbolic system, and Cynthia
feels responsible for the obligations she has accrued. However, the assumptions about intention
the symbolic capital relied on are exposed, and Cynthia is made aware of the intentional ethics to
be judged—the “Reasons” her host would “give herself any trouble” about her. Despite this
87

Elliot argues that gifts naturally combine self-interested and disinterested motives. However, within any gift
exchange is “a necessary escape hatch” which insists that “obligations may be refused and the gift may be used for
purposes entirely beyond the giver’s intent.” For Elliot, this very “unpredictability” is “what makes a gift exchange
different from a market exchange” (121).
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objective contemplation of her uncomfortable situation, Cynthia is unable to act in the exchange
but instead feels anxiety about her position.88
This anxiety is rooted in the fact that, as a guest, Cynthia still has ethical responsibilities
to her host but is also charged with judging the host’s actions and intentions. As such, Cynthia is
both an active participant in her own hospitality exchange as well as an observer of it. This dual
position insists on remaining involved in the exchange of hospitality but also observing from
outside the hospitality exchange. However, because the hospitable exchange is not available to
its participants as an observational ethics, it fails to fit in with the eighteenth-century’s popular
moral standards for spectatorship and sympathy. Lauded in both natural law and moral sense
philosophies, observational ethics promised to regulate behavior and instill a disposition of
disinterestedness necessary for hospitality. However, as the century progressed, this
observational lesson designed to train for in-the-moment behavior was applied to the actor as
well. Adam Smith famously encouraged his readers to listen to “the inhabitant of the breast, the
man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” (137) that could evaluate one’s own
behavior from an objective position. Smith calls on his readers to absent themselves from
exchange altogether and judge their relationships with others “neither from our own place nor yet
from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a
third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality
between us” (135). Taking a perspective of an outsider, Smith proposed, will help the actors
choose ethically. The problem for the guests and hosts involved in exchanges, however, is that
the very nature of the exchange insists that they do not have an objective perspective and cannot
know what to expect but must act all the same.
Moreover, by absenting oneself from the exchange, the guest makes apparent the
mechanics of hospitality and the symbolic capital on which it functions. The enactment of
hospitality, however, depends on these mechanisms remaining hidden. Bourdieu insists that the
gift exchange must remain a “collective self-deception” among those in the exchange and cannot
“become public knowledge” or be “publicly proclaimed”; to attempt to look “through the eyes of
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Bourdieu marks this as a sign of what would occur if the mechanics of the gift economy were exposed; then, “the
uncertainty, even anxiety, linked to anticipation” of the future effects of the exchange would strengthen and
emphasize the “relation of domination” that these exchanges rely on (“Marginalia” 234).
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a third person” threatens to reveal the self-interest in a hospitable exchange in the drive to gain
symbolic capital (“Marginalia” 232). Though Bourdieu certainly does not believe in the
possibility of disinterested benevolence that eighteenth-century philosophers proposed, his
notion of collective self-deception marks a paradox in the eighteenth-century hospitality
construction. Because intention was so important to the exchange, the guest was required to be
suspicious of the host’s behaviors, and this suspicion threatened to uncover any pursuit of
symbolic capital in the exchange. At the same time, the detached observer also threatens to
remove herself as an actor from the exchange altogether, making their own participation in the
exchange more wrought.89
Indeed, Cynthia entered her hospitality exchange without worries of deception, concerns
about the hospitality system, or beliefs that she could not fulfill her obligations. Her behavior
early in the hospitality relationship was based only on the assumption that her host was
benevolent and the hospitality system would create a cycle of reciprocity. Her ease in misreading
her host’s disposition, however, is part of the practical logic of hospitality. Because the
hospitality exchange is temporal and particular, it is impossible for the participants to predict or
see their exchange objectively. Referring to the continued gift exchange as a “cycle of
reciprocity,” Bourdieu argues that the obligations that drive this cycle “exist only for the absolute
gaze of the omniscient, omnipresent spectator, who, thanks to his knowledge of the social
mechanics, is able to be present at the different stages of the “’cycle.’” Within the exchange,
participants are offered the chance to refuse a gift or not return one (“Practical Logic” 190). Only
retrospectively is Cynthia able to see the flawed exchange for what it is; when her host’s
behavior halts the cycle by failing to offer a return for Cynthia’s gratitude, Cynthia begins to
worry about her host’s intentions, the very nature of hospitality and her passive position in the
exchange.90
89

Liz Bellamy reads this passivity as a response to the more economic lifestyle available in Britain. She argues that
“while the sphere of virtue is clearly recognized as private, the scope for private virtue is limited by the growing
acceptance of self-interest as a legitimate code of behavior” and characterized a resulting moral distrust as a
“conflict between a masculine, competitive economic ethos and a more feminized private code, which recognized
the limited role of the individual within a complex community, but sought to stress the importance of affective
values of sympathy and generosity” (132).
90
As the century progressed, it seems that the practice of gift-giving was questioned more widely. Harry Liebersohn
cites the 1788-1795 court case of Warren Hastings, former East India Company governor of Bengal, as a marker of a
changed view of the gift in late eighteenth-century England. Hastings was tried by Edmund Burke for accepting
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Bad hosts thus reveal the fragility of the hospitality cycle. By exposing hospitality’s
dependence on a shared value system and a hidden cycle, bad hosts threaten more than just one
particular exchange of hospitality but the whole institution and the social system it perpetuates.
Moreover, the exposure of hospitality’s potential for self-interest alters the guest position.
Seeking host intentions, the guest is tasked with more moral responsibility; no longer only
responsible for her own actions in an exchange, the guest must also serve as arbitrator of the
system; such additional responsibility, coupled with an inability to act, produce the problems of
perception that make the guest so anxious. Eighteenth-century narratives explore the fragility of
hospitality and the vulnerability of the guest by continually exposing the self-interest of hosts
and thus the machinations of hospitality. This chapter will turn to two ways the cycle and selfinterested motives are revealed in literature but potentially hidden in hospitality: through the
pursuit of credit and reputation.

Delayed Credit
Indeed, eighteenth-century novels repeatedly depict the hidden deceits of bad hospitality
as the cause of more internal discomfort for the guest. One such deceptive form of hospitality is a
relationship based on credit;91 like the economic sense of hospitality discussed above, the hosts
in these relationships seek some sort of financial gain from their guests.92 Unlike the miser or
luxury seeker, however, these hosts seek economic gain based on a credit system that includes
delayed gratification. Because the hospitality system includes delay, the credit-seeking host is
more difficult to identify than miserly or luxurious hosts. Hospitality includes norms that ask
bribes that Hastings defined as gifts necessary to be accepted for orderly rule. Liebersohn marks this time period as
one in which gift exchange went from being “taken for granted in European society” to one in which it had become
“so contrary to rational administration that its legitimacy in the Hastings controversy was hard to reconstruct. Once
intrinsic to European society, the language of the gift had become submerged and problematic” (26). See
Liebersohn, 9-26.
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According to Miranda J. Burgess, credit had both economic and moral connotations in the eighteenth century,
particularly for women. A woman could be valued both for the financial gains she could bring to a match as well as
the moral credentials she displayed in her character. Burgess argues then that “financial theorists and conduct writers
share responsibility not only for the co-existence of moral and financial registers in the concept of credit, but for
their mutual contamination as well: as a woman’s reputation for sensibility tends to be seen by moralists as an
economic matter, so economic theorists tend to view financial credit as a moral issue” (137).
92
D. Grant Campbell finds a larger eighteenth-century concern with credit and the ways in which it created a “false
appearance of prosperity” that was ultimately unrealizable. Reading the sermons of the day, he claims that credit is
represented as “a sinful dream, from which the sinner must awake to a ruin which suggest both a personal
confrontation with death and an apocalyptic vision” (136). Thus, credit was an emblem of deception.
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participants to remain obligated to the initial giver in order to build a relationship; to remain in
debt is to allow the other participant a time as the dominant member in the exchange, and the
returned gift was designed with its recipient in mind and to inspire a cycle of exchange. The
financial credit system followed the same time lag but without the relationship or the cyclic
nature; the lender gave money and sought interest in return. While the borrowing member was
subservient to the lender, the potential for a reversed exchange does not exist and the only way to
perpetuate the relationship was for one member to become further and further indebted. Because
acting within the moment of exchange, the guest can easily read a credit exchange for one of
hospitality; while they believe they are building a relationship and entering a cycle of exchange,
their host hopes either to gain interest or use their guest as collateral. As a result of these
mismatched interests, these situations are filled with anxiety for the guest as he questions his role
in the hospitality exchange.
The most notorious depiction of these credit relations is found in the character of Mr.
Harrel in Cecilia. He uses Cecilia, his ward, for collateral on his loans. In debt for gambling and
maintaining a luxurious lifestyle, Mr. Harrel sees Cecilia’s fortune and person as a way to pay
back his financial obligations. Cecilia, however, enters his house believing she is viewed as a
friend by Mrs. Harrel and a moral obligation by Mr. Harrel. Cecilia does not become aware of
Mr. Harrel’s intentions until after his death, when she meets his creditors. Then, Cecilia
discovers that her guardian had promised her as a “prize” to both Sir Robert Floyer and Mr.
Marriot in exchange for the cancellation of his debt to each of them (433). He had likewise
placated his creditors with assurances that Cecilia would repay them when she came of age.
Upon learning of Mr. Harrel’s plots, Cecilia “saw now but too clearly the reason” for Mr.
Harrel’s odd treatment of her (435) that had before been unclear because interpreted according to
a hospitality rather than a credit relationship. Because Mr. Harrel was always able to postpone
his obligations, Cecilia remained unaware of her position as collateral. She continued to perceive
herself as a guest and thus acted as a member of an ordinary hospitality exchange and made her
decisions based on these assumptions.
Though certainly Cecilia had some indications of Mr. Harrel’s mistreatment of her, she
continually attributed this mistreatment to his pursuit of luxury alone and not to the credit he was
gaining through her. However, Mr. Harrel’s most provoking behavior indicates his dependence
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on his guest and the reversal of their positions in the hospitality exchange. In these moments,
Cecilia feels her greatest discomfort in the Harrels’ house. Particularly unnerving is Mr. Harrel’s
dependence on Cecilia’s to pay his debts in private and then require her presence in public. In
one instance, he forces Cecilia to go to the Pantheon after she had paid his debt to a group of
tradesmen. He insists that if Cecilia is not in attendance, “every dirty tradesman in town to whom
I owe a shilling, will be forming the same cursed combination those scoundrels formed this
morning, of coming in a body, and waiting for their money, or else bringing an execution into
my house”; Cecilia’s unwilling presence is, according to Mr. Harrel, “the only way to silence
report” and keep him from financial ruin (273). Cecilia recognizes an element of captivity in this
moment and resents having to protect her host from his debts. However, she still reads her
captivity as being caught in a life of luxury rather than a relationship based on credit. Cecilia
hopes her loan will inspire a reformation in the Harrels’ lifestyle and lead them to attend fewer
parties of pleasure and commission no more projects which they cannot afford. In her belief in
the hospitality exchange, Cecilia hopes for a return of her sign of friendship but, of course, waits
in vain.
Cecilia, exacerbated by being forced to immediately return to luxury in a public outing,
agrees to attend her host but also begins to more seriously pursue other options for hospitality.
Her resulting resolution to move to the Delviles, however, further reveals Mr. Harrel’s
dependence on his guest.93 Mr. Harrel needs Cecilia to remain in his house to subdue his
creditors; Cecilia, believing she is merely a guest, is surprised and confused by the panic her
announcement to move causes. Both Mr. and Mrs. Harrel beg Cecilia to remain, and their
supplications make Cecilia feel both “ashamed and shocked” and disrupt her notions of morality;
she tells her friend “it is painful to me to refuse, but to comply is for ever in defiance of my
judgment—Oh, Mrs. Harrel, I know no longer what is kind or what is cruel, nor have I known
for some time past right from wrong, nor good from evil!”(396). Placed in a position of
collateral, Cecilia loses her ability to distinguish moral value; as the hospitality cycle is
93

D. Grant Campbell reads Cecilia’s discomfort in the Harrel’s and her desire to leave as a result of her different
economic approach to her wealth. Because she “practices economic restraint in a society whose pattern of expansion
depends on the abandonment of such restraint,” Cecilia is unable to understand how her actions fail to complete their
intended results. As Campbell notes, “her caution at a time of risk causes fear; her payments at a time of unstable
credit cause a stampede; her liberality at a time of hostility and suspicion awakens greed” (141).
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disrupted, so too is Cecilia’s capacity to judge it. Aware that something is wrong with her
presence in the house, her full understanding is delayed until the extent of the Harrels’
dependency is revealed. The hospitality cycle is broken, but Cecilia as the guest, because of the
delayed demands on her and her polite patience for a return, is unable to choose her actions from
the objective position she gains after the fact. As a result, she loses the portion of her inheritance
from her parents to the debts of Mr. Harrel. Ultimately, her status as collateral for the loan makes
her a hostage in the house of her hosts and compromises the morality of the exchange of
hospitality. As Mr. Harrel converts his hosting into a financial investment, he threatens Cecilia’s
status as a guest and thus the morality of the entire exchange of hospitality.
Indeed, these exchanges are distressing in part because Cecilia is forced to take on the
traditional roles of the host. She, as guest, should be the member in debt to her host; however,
Mr. Harrel’s borrowing places him in debt to her while he also maintains his control as host over
her behavior. Thus, Cecilia feels moral uncertainty as she allows her host to extract money and
her attendance from her. Unlike the delay of return in a hospitality system which builds
relationships between host and guest, the delay in the credit system seeks only financial gain and
specifically designs not to build relationships. D. Grant Campbell explores the implications of
the credit system in Cecilia and notes that credit creates “a false appearance of prosperity, an
appearance which is highly unstable, and whose inevitable termination in ruin advances and
recedes according to the fluctuation of rumor and financial confidence” (136). The relationships
they build, I would argue, have the same characteristics: unstable, based on rumor, and always
on the cusp of ruin. Because credit is designed to financially improve the position of one of the
participants and no symbolic capital is included in the exchange, credit relationships can never
create the cycle of reciprocity that hospitality relationships do. Cecilia’s discomfort, then, arises
not just from her different economic habits and dislike of luxury but also from her belief that she
is functioning in a different system. Unaware of the creditory behavior surrounding her, Cecilia
continues to act on the assumption of a hospitable relationship.
Burney relates the relationship between Cecilia and Mr. Harrel to the reader from
Cecilia’s own limited perspective. The reader experiences with Cecilia the doubts concerning
Mr. Harrel’s motives and the discomfort of his quests for money. Like Cecilia, the reader is
surprised by his suicide and only learns the extent of Mr. Harrel’s treachery after his death.
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Burney creates an additional credit relationship—that between Cecilia and Mr. Monckton—in
the novel that allows the reader a more objective view of the relationship throughout the story.
Whereas the reader remains close to Cecilia’s position as participant in her relationship with Mr.
Harrel, Mr. Monckton’s interested motives are immediately revealed. In fact, Cecilia’s
relationship with Mr. Monckton is introduced as one of credit: “Pleasure given in society, like
money lent in usury, returns with interest to those who dispense it: and the discourse of Mr.
Monckton conferred not a greater favour upon Cecilia than her attention to it repaid” (9). Cecilia
thus sees their relationship as one in which both participants are “mutually gratified” (9).
Foreshadowing the disparities between usury and hospitality the relationship exposes, Cecilia
here believes that each party gives and repays in a cycle like that of a hospitality exchange.
However, Cecilia’s misinterpretation is immediately revealed by the narrator, who informs the
reader that Mr. Monckton “had long looked upon her as his future property; as such he had
indulged his admiration, and as such he had already appropriated her estate, though he had not
more vigilantly inspected into her sentiments, then he had guarded his own from a similar
scrutiny” (9). Mr. Monckton sees the relationship differently than Cecilia, viewing her not as the
pupil for his guidance but as an object of interest to be obtained through his investment of
admiration and hospitality. Indeed, though Mr. Monckton does not think of Cecilia as collateral
as Mr. Harrel does, Mr. Monckton does expect to gain her person and her fortune through his
investment of the symbolic capital of hospitality. In doing so, however, he fails to “inspect”
Cecilia’s feelings and interests and consequently sets up a shallow relationship much like that
between Mr. Harrel and Cecilia.
Because she sees their relationship as one of hospitable exchange, Cecilia continues to
misread Mr. Monckton’s intention throughout the novel. She repeatedly feels a sense of gratitude
and obligation to him for his advice, particularly when it concerns money matters. She borrows
money from Mr. Monckton in order to repay the loans she incurred to pay off Mr. Harrel’s debts.
Cecilia reads this act as one of “kindness [that], as she suspected not his motives, seemed to
spring from the most disinterested generosity” (437). The reader, however, is made aware of Mr.
Monckton’s calculations for his own interest. He hoped that “by giving her pleasure,” he could
gain the additional “gratification” of her fortune (437-8). While Cecilia received hints of Mr.
Harrel’s motives because of their reversed power dynamics, she remains unaware of Mr.
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Monckton’s desires because she remains in the guest position as the person who is obligated and
in debt. Though Monckton does all he can to maintain the appearance of a hospitable exchange,
his ulterior motives ultimately destroy the exchange and Cecilia’s vision of their ideal hospitality
exchange. Mr. Monckton continually acts to preserve his interest in Cecilia and is eventually
caught in his plot to stop Cecilia from marrying young Delvile. Exposed as a creditor rather than
a host, Mr. Monckton loses Cecilia’s trust, along with all the debts of obligation he had inspired.
Like Mr. Harrel’s creditory relationship, Mr. Monckton’s pursuit of Cecilia as an object negates
the relationship that hospitality is designed to inspire. Thus, Cecilia misconstrues the intentions
of her hosts in two very different credit relations. Her confusion about their inhospitable
treatment marks the moments in the text when Cecilia feels moral discomfort; following her
understanding of their ulterior motives, Cecilia questions not only her ability to practice
hospitality but also her understanding of the very nature of hospitality exchange.
Other eighteenth-century protagonists are also duped by credit relationships as hosts
attempt to gain their money as interest for their hospitality. David Simple, the protagonist of
Sarah Fielding’s work, offers a masculine version of a guest used as a source of income.94 David
is treated as an investment by his brother, Daniel, who fakes their father’s will to exclude David.
Like Mr. Monckton, Daniel pretends great love and respect in order to earn David’s trust. Like
Cecilia, David believes their relationship is one of hospitality and imagines they are so closely
connected that their personal possessions cannot be distinguished. The narrator, however,
quickly lets the audience know that Daniel merely put on the “Appearance of Friendship” and
“was in reality one of those Wretches, whose only Happiness centers in themselves; and that his
Conversation with his Companions had never any other View, but in some shape or other to
promote his own Interest” (9). Daniel’s kindness towards his brother, then, is merely designed to
win the entirety, rather than his half, of the family inheritance. Once this goal is obtained
(through the forgery of his father’s will), Daniel “threw off the Mask” and begins to treat his
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James Kim argues that David Simple as a narrative is structured around market concerns. He reads David’s travel
as one of “affirming the citational logic of market value,” noting in particular how David learns the values of his
acquaintances by hearing their characters “discredited” and exposed by a later potential friend (485). Such a cyclic
way or revealing worth suggest that “in the fallen world of modernity, value depends not on the putatively intrinsic
worth of things, but rather on an all too corruptible system of competing citations” (484). Gary Gautier, however,
reads this same cycle of replaced value as a sign of subjectivity without closure; because each subsequent character
is revealed to be deceptive, such a quest for friendship reveals that “interior truth is as yet elusive” (206).
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brother poorly. Seeing his kindness to David as an investment for his future acquisition of the
family fortune, Daniel fails to follow proper protocol of hospitality towards David once his
objective is complete. As such, his position resembles Mr. Monckton’s approach to Cecilia: he
too sees an investment of symbolic capital as the means to obtain a financial gain.
Indeed, David and Daniel’s relationship, though brotherly, is closely connected to that of
hospitality in Fielding’s novel. David searches for a true friend, whom he defines by a
relationship of equal reciprocity. This friend would be perfectly disinterested, one “whose every
Action proceeded either from Obedience to the Divine Will, or from the Delight he took in doing
good; who could not see another’s Sufferings without Pain, nor his Pleasures without sharing
them” (68-69). David envisions this friend as a member of his household, wherein the friends
would return favors of host and guest to one another in an idealized, perfectly reciprocal,
exchange of hospitality. David had seen his brother as a friend of this sort, imagining that they
shared interests and goods to be exchanged in a cycle of mutuality. When David becomes a
literal guest of Daniel’s house, however, he discovers that this mutual exchange does not exist.
David had believed his brother, like himself, would be “extremely happy…in continually sharing
with his best Friend the Fortune his Father had left him” (12). Daniel, however, makes it his
objective to make David uncomfortable in his house in order to further secure the family fortune
from his brother. He “resolved it should not be long before [David] felt that Dependance” that
Daniel had tricked him into (13) and sets to work treating him as an unequal member in their
relationship. But Daniel delays his behavior here as well, gradually slackening his attentions and
encouraging his servants to do likewise. David, assuming he and his brother are still functioning
in a system of equal exchange, fails to see the ulterior objective of his brother, and continues to
act according to a system of hospitality.
As a result, Daniel’s behavior, when finally revealed as inhospitable, causes David much
mental anguish. David becomes impassioned by his mistreatment, and Daniel uses this
passionate response to justify his inhospitable behavior. Meeting with no compassion from his
brother, David “could not account for such a Difference in one Man’s Conduct” (15) and flees
the house “as fast as he was able, without considering where he was going or what he should do
(for his Mind was so taken up, and tortured with his Brother’s Brutality, that all other Thoughts
quite forsook him.) He wandered up and down till he was quite weary and faint, not knowing
73

where to direct his Steps” (16). Though he left home without his possessions or money, “his
Mind was in so much anxiety, it was impossible for him to spend one Thought on any thing but
the Cause of his Grief” (16). This mental anguish and the difficulty David finds in providing for
his basic needs in such a state indicates the extent to which Daniel’s creditory relationship has
upset David’s basic perception of the world.95
Like Cecilia, David is also made the target of credit scheme involving marriage. Having
regained his fortune, he is taken into the home of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson extends hospitality
to David in order to encourage him to marry his daughter; he considers making David a guest in
his home “the wisest way to engage David to Affection” (27). He likewise instructs his daughter
to treat him with hospitality, and she complies “with cheerful Smiles, and Good Humour” (27).
But David discovers this scheme to win his fortune through marriage when he overhears Miss
Nanny Johnson debating whether to marry David or a wealthy Jewish merchant. Shocked at the
father’s encouragement of his daughter to accept the wealthier suitor and at Miss Nanny’s lack of
feeling, David is once again in mental anguish. He discovers that his money has been the cause
of his host’s warmness and his daughter’s welcome. Yet rather than feel angry, David finds
himself torn on how to react; feeling “Amazement” instead, David “could hardly persuade
himself that he was in a Dream. He was going to burst open the Door, and tell her he had been
witness to the Delicacy of her Sentiments; but his Tenderness for her, even in the midst of his
Passion, restrained him” (34). Faced with the revelation of the terms of exchange, David is
unable to act and instead remains passively outside the door. Unsure what to think of Miss
Nanny’s conversation, he determines to allow her to break their engagement. Yet even as David
once again resolves to leave an inhospitable house, he has difficulty understanding or believing
his situation. He admits he was “several times tempted by her Behaviour to think he was not in
his Senses, when he fancied he over-heard her say any thing that could be construed to her
Disadvantage” (36). Faced directly with his host’s selfish motives, David has difficulty
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David is made homeless through improper hospitality but he is not made captive. Likewise his perceptions of his
host are injured but his unwavering belief in his own morality and ability to make ethical decisions remains
unscathed. As such, his discomfort is continuously overcome; unlike Cecilia who was tied to a guardian and unable
to act, David repeatedly resorts to the only strength a captive has—he leaves the bad hosts he meets and searches for
a more suitable one. David, as a male and later as a male with money, continues to hold some ability to choose to
whom to offer hospitality and often thinks of himself as a host, often acts in the position of host, and, even as a
guest, remains in a state of lesser dependence than other guests such as his friend Cynthia.

74

rearranging his understanding of their relationship. His response is to flee the house of his host,
escaping the credit relationship but also failing to address the problems there.
These novels show that, because credit uses the trappings of hospitality and offers the
appearance of symbolic exchange, the guest believes himself to be functioning in a hospitality
exchange. The host’s selfish intentions attempt to turn a relationship based on symbolic capital
into one based on the literal exchange of capital.96 As such, their behavior fails to take into
consideration the needs of the guest. Instead, the host delays as a means to invest in the financial
gains the guest might offer. Thus, in the moment of the exchange, guests are often unaware of
their ill-usage. Unable to depend on the hospitality system to produce reciprocal relationships,
the guest is faced with questioning every interaction with a host or risking his well-being with a
bad host.

The Capital of Reputation
Each of the scenarios discussed above involved guests with some amount of power; both
Cecilia and David are susceptible to credit relationships because they have the fortune to be
gained from an exchange. This fortune, however, does offer them ways to eventually improve
their situation: David eventually finds a circle of friends whom he supports financially and
Cecilia does manage to choose her own company when she comes of age and can manage her
own property.97 Cynthia’s situation as toad-eater with which the chapter opens offers a different
view. As a dependent, Cynthia is not useful for creditory financial gains but her vulnerability
makes her a more viable means of gaining symbolic capital. Thus, while credit relationships use
social capital for financial gain, some hosts use financial entrapments for symbolic capital gains.
These hosts make a display of their hospitality, highlighting their material generosity, while
failing to take into consideration their guest’s comfort and happiness. Guests in this position, like
Cynthia as toad-eater, find themselves confined in a broken hospitality system that consistently
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Gautier claims that the issues Fielding deals with in her novels are not ones of old versus new hospitality but one
that “expose[s] contradictions within the emerging bourgeois ideology” (196). Indeed, Fielding, Burney and other
novelists are less concerned with how a new ethic is replacing an old, but with how the new ethic is creating new
paradoxes in moral behavior.
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Though Burney’s Cecilia is saved from the particular misuse of being a toad-eater because of her fortune, Sharon
Long Damoff notes that her final book, The Wanderer, features a dependent guest who is made more vulnerable by
the “the way in which reputation becomes reality” and leads several female characters to refuse to host Juliet for fear
of losing their good reputation.
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requires them to “pay” more into the exchange than they receive; yet, still in need and dependent,
these guests can only continue this loan of symbolic capital without real hope of a return. This
relationship thus includes a reversal of roles: the guest must cater to her host’s needs while the
host is dependent on the guest for symbolic gain. Tasked with more responsibility in the
exchange, the guest becomes anxious and struggles to return the hospitality act to its ethical
function.
In many representations, this situation is exacerbated by the host’s unawareness of her
misuse of the exchange. While the bad host in a creditory situation is always consciously
scheming for his own gain, the bad host building a reputation is often unaware of her own
intentions. Such unconscious intentions undermine ethical situations wherein motive is used to
determine the rectitude of actions. This, Adam Smith argues, is a problem for any ethical
situation, like that of hospitality, wherein judgment and ethical positions require a detached
perspective. The host may be influenced by a real desire to help the guest and by a desire for the
praise such an act will elicit. While both motives help produce the action, “how far his conduct
may have been influenced by the one [motive] and how far by the other, may frequently be
unknown even to himself” (126). How one interprets these actions, Smith argues, depends on the
disposition of the observer: those “disposed to lessen the merit” will attribute the action to love
of praise, while those “disposed to think more favourably” will see good intentions as the chief
motivator (126-7). But here Smith speaks of the external observer. Within the exchange, such
judgment becomes more difficult. The host, believing her intentions are good, fails to understand
the guest’s dissatisfaction and believes that the deteriorating relationship is caused by the lack of
gratitude. Because focused on the public interpretation of the exchange, these hosts fail to adapt
their behavior to ease their guests. Instead, the guest becomes a placeholder in the exchange
rather than an acting member. Somewhere between friend and possession, the guest experiences
anxiety about her place in society and value in the household.
Charlotte Lennox’s Sophia, in many cases a conventional text following genre norms,
includes representations of negative hospitality that cuts the guest out of the relationship.
Following the financial hardships and social threats that plague Sophia, the narrative builds a
series of illustrations of Sophia’s virtuous patience. Most threatening is the behavior of Mrs.
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Howard, who treats Sophia as a toad-eater and preys on her financial dependency.98 Mrs.
Howard, a member of the new upper class, seeks social prestige and has worked hard to cultivate
a reputation for benevolence through a “few ostentatious benefactions” and subscriptions to
“some fashionable charities” (162). These public behaviors are contrasted by her private ones:
she serves her guests with “parsimony,” collects her rents “with the most unrelenting rigor,” and
turns the poor away “sighing from her gate” (162). She takes in Sophia, then, to improve her
reputation for charity while also taking advantage of Sophia’s “economical talents” by putting
her to work on embroidery (162). The narrator thus characterizes Mrs. Howard as one of “those
who are most celebrated for their charity, [but] are in reality least sensible to the feelings of
humanity” (162-3).99 Mrs. Howard’s own lack of moral questioning perpetuates this
contradiction. She, like Smith’s imperfect agent, does not thoroughly analyze her own
hospitality. Choosing only to broadcast her benevolent actions, she fails to consider the effect of
all of her actions or to evaluate the consistency of her intentions.
However, Mrs. Howard soon extends her lack of consideration to viciousness when she
finds her interests challenged in the hospitality exchange. Only interested in her gain in
reputation by hosting Sophia, Mrs. Howard fails her duties to protect her guest and ultimately
actively plots to hurt Sophia when hosting Sophia no longer serves her interests. When her
young, rich nephew falls in love with Sophia and expresses an interest in marrying her, Mrs.
Howard no longer wishes to host Sophia but does not wish to lose the social capital she has
gained. Because this marriage would hurt Mrs. Howard’s fortune, she resolves to send Sophia
from her house despite Sophia’s lack of interest in the boy or of place to go. Thinking only of her
own desires, Mrs. Howard convinces herself that Sophia has abused her position as a guest and
deserves punishment; she schemes “to destroy Sophia’s reputation, and to secure her own” and
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Charles Hinnant, studying gift exchange in the eighteenth century, claims that gift-givers are “likely to expect,
even demand, some form of reciprocation” and these demands only increase “the greater the social distance between
the donor and recipient.” In such cases, the gift was specifically used as “part of a campaign of conquest and
possession” (147). Such is certainly the case for Sophia as she escapes from the care of a man seeking a sexual
return to Mrs. Howard’s home where financial returns are expected.
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According to Eve Tavor Bannet, a discomfort with nobility and the newly rich, such as Mrs. Howard, is pervasive
in Lennox’s work. Aristocrats and “pseudo-aristocrats” are shown “to use politeness to control and mitigate conflicts
arising from local competition for power, spouses, and markets” (78). While Bannet reads this narrative trend as
Lennox using capitalism to create or restore relationships, Sophia suggests that such economic structures fail to
create long-term, stable relationships.
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decides that, rather than dismiss Sophia “with contempt,” she will “ruin her with all possible
gentleness” (166). Continuing to barter in symbolic capital, Mrs. Howard seeks to build her own
reputation at the cost of her guest’s. As such, Mrs. Howard begins to spread rumors that Sophia
seduced her nephew in order to gain his fortune. Thus, rather than protect her guest, Mrs.
Howard actively works against Sophia’s interests in order to further display her generosity and
capacity for forgiveness. So concerned with her own interests, Mrs. Howard becomes a vicious
host and reveals the shallowness of her affection for Sophia.
Sarah Fielding continues to pursue this idea of selfish building of reputation through
hospitality in her sequel to David Simple, Volume the Last. Whereas Cynthia’s host remains
fairly hidden in the original narrative, Fielding spends a great deal of time discussing host
motivation in her sequel. Here, she returns to the character of Mr. Orgueil and adds the character
of Mrs. Orguiel to explore the limits and consequences of hosts who hope to build their
reputation for hospitality without creating deep relationships with their guests. Mrs. Orguiel and
her husband hold the traditional position of hosts as the wealthiest family in the neighborhood;
the extended Simple family, as both old friends and as a family of quality, are often made guests
at the Orguiel household. As the Simple family’s fortune diminishes, however, they fail to
receive more than the promises of hospitality from the Orguiels. Mrs. Orguiel, continuously
depicted as selfish, finds these misfortunes to be opportunities for displaying her generosity but
also for acting on her jealousies of Cynthia. Her selfish behavior involves attempts to disrupt
Cynthia and Camilla’s friendship, abuse Cynthia’s child, and keep her husband from helping
either David’s or Cynthia’s families. For example, she takes in Cynthia’s daughter, little Cynthia,
as an act of generosity. Yet, when the young girl is a guest in Orgueil’s care, Mrs. Orgueil
repeatedly gives preference to her own daughter, Henrietta. Forced to sleep in a damp room
rather than share with Henrietta, Cynthia falls ill and dies. Mrs. Orgueil’s jealousies of the
mother thus inspire poor hospitality and expose Cynthia’s daughter to harm. Though she acts
generously in order to maintain a reputation for generosity, her behaviors are always motivated
by her own desires.
But Mrs. Orguiel herself lacks awareness of her own inhospitable desires, a lack that
makes it difficult for her to understand hospitable relationships and moral behavior at all. She
fails to take any blame for young Cynthia’s death, refusing to see how her inhospitable
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behavior—and the jealous intentions that inspired it—might have caused the girl’s death.
Instead, she continues to offer ‘benevolent’ acts for insincere motives. Indeed, Mrs. Orgueil
encourages her husband to help Cynthia and her husband find a place in Jamaica that results in
the opportunity to take in young Cynthia. Mrs. Orgueil secretly hopes that Cynthia would fall
prey to the “Violent Heat of that Climate, as nothing was more apt to weaken her Constitution.”
Yet, Mrs. Orgueil remains unaware of this desire because “this Motive lay too deep in Mrs.
Orgueil’s Breast even for her own Discovery of it; and she would have started as strongly at the
most distant step towards Murder, as the most tender-hearted Creature upon Earth” (340). Mrs.
Orgueil remains convinced of her own benevolent intentions and, because of this self-deception,
is unable to see the consequences of her actions. Instead, she blames Cynthia and her family for
all of their own downfalls and uses their misfortunes as reasons to not offer further hospitality.
Her husband also lacks awareness of his inhospitality; yet he prides himself on his ethical
behavior and builds his identity and reputation on a specific set of rules.100 First introduced in
David Simple before his marriage, Mr. Orgueil there was faulted for failing to “make any
allowance for the Frailties of Human Nature” (52) and viewing compassion as “a very great
Weakness” that detracts from moral behavior determined by “the real Love of Rectitude” (64-5).
Mr. Orgueil’s insists that he only act when “the Laws of Society and right Reason” (65) and this
determination dictates that his actions are ultimately routed in a desire for a virtuous reputation.
He is revealed to be one of “a Set of Men in the World, who pass through Life with very good
Reputations, whose Actions are in the general justly to be applauded, and yet upon a near
Examination their Principles are all bad, and their Hearts hardened to all tender Sensations” (65).
His actions go only so far as to fulfill his sense of pride that he gathers from following moral
principles. Without a sense of compassion, however, Mr. Orgueil remains detached from those
he is obligated to assist and thus fails to offer real aid or hospitality. Indeed, his philosophy often
only justifies Orgueil in not offering assistance to those in need. When David suffers misfortune
after misfortune, Orgueil convinces himself not to help because “David was voluntarily
miserable, for he could not be unavoidably so whilst he had a God [--Human Reason--] at his
100

Gerard A. Barker reads Orgueil’s character as a critique of Stoicism, which sought to detach emotion from moral
decisions. Disinterest, this critique shows, is not the only quality necessary for a moral character (72). However, in
Fielding’s sequel, Orgueil is shown to have a selfish motive in removing his emotion—namely, he gains a sense of
moral superiority.
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Command” (332). Because David was unable to foresee the consequences of his choices, Orgueil
contends, he is unworthy of receiving aid. While a truly hospitable host would seek to
understand David’s situation and offer relief, Orgueil cannot feel compassion and so holds David
accountable for each of his mistakes no matter how justified.
This lack of compassion derives from Mr. Orgueil’s rules that attempt to systematize
hospitality and give him the objective positioning necessary to judge ethically. This positioning
absents Mr. Orgueil from the hospitality cycle altogether and makes it difficult for him to create
relationships. Attempting to codify the system, Mr. Orguiel fails to involve himself in the
practical logic of hospitality exchange and, in the case of his wife’s mistreatment of Cynthia’s
child, remains so distant from the exchange that he does not notice the child’s illness. Though the
child is in his house, Mr. Orgueil spends his time “in his Study, contemplating on his Rule of
Rectitude, and exulting in the Beauties of Human Reason” (328). These rules, codified to make
exchanges more ethical, actually detract from Mr. Orgueil’s ability to offer hospitality because
they distance him mentally and emotionally from his guests. Intent on knowing his duty, Mr.
Orgueil fails to fulfill his duties to protect his guests and welcome them in his home. Mr. Orguiel
remains oblivious to his failure to uphold his hospitable responsibilities and his motives also
remain hidden to himself and further detract from his ability to host. Indeed, he believes that he
offers hospitality to David and his family. When David seeks his help, Orgueil offers it in the
form of Advice “which it was impossible for his Family to feed on…[and] what either his
Disposition, or his Situation, rendered impracticable” (330-1). Mr. Orgueil believes that such
advice and reasoning are the duties of the host. Yet, because advice cannot provide hospitality or
aid, offering only advice leads to Orgueil’s failure to uphold his responsibilities to host.
The Orgueils’ behavior exemplifies the most threatening form of hospitality. Seeking
their generous reputations, they repeatedly draw the Simple family into exchanges that resemble
hospitality but fail to create a relationship between the host and guest. Because they do not truly
consider the needs of their neighbors or guests, the Orgueils wreak havoc on the Simples’ lives
with false or vague promise of aid and hospitality that never comes. The hospitality that is
offered manifests in forms that fail to connect with the Simples, denying their need and confining
them to act against their inclinations. The Simple family, of course, is the party who suffers;
constantly anxious and hopeful of assistance, they look to their so-called hosts for aid and
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protection. Offered only enough hospitality to continue their dependence and their hope, the
family becomes toad-eaters. Thus, real hospitality is not exchanged when only the reputation
built by dealing in the symbolic capital of hospitality is pursued.

The prevalence of bad hosts threatens the individual guests but also leads to distrust of
the entire system of hospitality. Guests, once subjected to the abuses of a host, worry about the
intentions of any other hosts who offer hospitality. Hospitality is no longer the bastion of
protection from a threatening world but a threat itself. Indeed, this threat is particularly imposing
because of the ability for hosts to deceive guests, hiding their self-interest behind guises of
benevolence. Following an encounter with a deceptive host, a guest is reluctant to accept any
offer of welcome because unsure how to judge the benevolence of the offer. In such an
inscrutable world, then, the guests turns to those most easy to understand because most like
herself—other guests.
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CHAPTER THREE
GUESTS AS HOSTS
Guests seek the company of other guests because the welcome they meet with from these
guests is easier to scrutinize. In similar positions, guests have a greater sense of potential
interests and feel more confident in reading other guest’s behavior. Though still cautious, guests
find the sense of comfort and sympathy they expect from hospitality in one another. Such is the
case for Cynthia and David in Sarah Fielding’s David Simple. The two characters share a series
of conversations about Cynthia’s position as a toad-eater where both characters seek to
accommodate the needs and desires of the other; Cynthia objects to troubling David with her
situation, and David insists the telling will bring him pleasure. Each receives from the other the
accommodation that they earlier sought from a host. This particular exchange, however, actively
seeks to exclude a host and is instead enacted more ideally because between two guests. Indeed,
David hopes to hear how Cynthia came to be in her position as a toad-eater and plots to visit
Cynthia her when her host is gone (91). The guests thus take over the obligations of hosting one
another in an environment that excludes host and their potential to distort hospitality. In the place
of that guest-host relationship blossoms a more egalitarian guest-guest relationship.
The more equal relationship between guests stems from the benevolent motivations each
guest expresses. Such benevolence is, however, connected to the contexts of being a guest in the
novels discussed here. Because guests do not direct hospitality but react to the host, they take a
more passive position. This passivity is closely linked to the disinterested behavior so idealized
in hospitality. Cynthia and David’s exchange, for example, is disinterested as each passively
approaches the other and act only because the other desires it. Cynthia repeatedly apologizes for
speaking so much of herself, but she relates her story to David because of “the Sincerity which
was visible in his Manner of expressing himself,” a manner expressed in his many
encouragements to continue (92). For David’s part, he tells Cynthia that he want to hear her story
because “nothing in this World was capable of giving him so much Pleasure” as relieving her
distress (92). Their desire to please the other defines the passive guest position. As the guest
replaces his own intentions with the desires of another, he opens himself to the motivations of an
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outside force. This openness takes away self-control but encourages hospitable service. This
passive guest is thus vulnerable to bad hosts but perfectly hospitable to a fellow guest.
The exchange between guests thus has the potential to be ideal but reveals a flaw of
practice; the exchange can only be perpetuated by two similar characters. Seeking guests instead
of hosts, the new positive form of hospitality reveals narcissism in the system. Cynthia and
David are able to offer one another benevolence because they recognize elements of their own
character and position in the other. David, for example, recognizes and sympathizes with
Cynthia’s treatment. When she is accused of envy she did not feel, David “could easily
comprehend the Reasonableness of what Cynthia said” because he, like Cynthia had never had
“one envious Thought” (96). The hospitality between guests is made possible, then, because
these characters share traits that make them vulnerable to other the self-interested hosting so
common in the novels.
Because of this similarity, reciprocal hospitality remains confined to guests and cannot be
transferred into the larger contexts of hospitality exchange. The exchange between guests is
ultimately unsustainable because the guest lacks the space to entertain and ability to protect
guests. Instead, the hospitable encounters must evolve to maintain the newfound benevolence in
a stable relationship. Indeed, eighteenth-century novels generally extend a hospitable relationship
into a filial one, as the guests involved in an exchange are more stably connected through
marriage. David and Cynthia’s relationship ends when it cannot be perpetuated in marriage.
Though David offers his hand, Cynthia refuses and the two guests return to their vulnerable
positions as guests to bad hosts. Their hospitality alone cannot protect them form the returning to
the less benevolent world. In other situations, however, novels show that hospitality makes way
for more sustained relationships by converting those relationships between strangers into
intimate family relationships. Although such a conversion or evolution results in more stable
connections between partners of the exchange, it fails to solve hospitality’s ethical problems or,
ultimately to protect the guests.
This chapter will explore the nature of the guest’s passivity, arguing that passivity
became increasingly defined by disinterested behavior. I will show how the definition of
passivity became more closely associated with benevolence as eighteenth-century novels
emphasized its potential to create openness to other’s needs. This idea of passivity, however,
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counters other definitions of passivity that saw human desires as an uncontrollable, external force
capable of inspiring action. To combat this competing definition, the novels discussed here
allowed a means to control personal passions; reason offered a way to ensure the repression of
passions, even as reason itself is shown to have self-interested connections to self-preservation.
This chapter will discuss how the balance between benevolence and reason become associated
with gender in the novels. Female guests, because of the elevated consequences of their
vulnerability are depicted as emblems not just of passivity but also of reason; conversely, male
guests reject the protection that reason might offer to embrace the disinterested state and the
vulnerabilities it creates.101 Ultimately, I will argue, both men and women characters escape the
problems of these imbalances in relationships with other guests, who share the same need for
reason and impulse towards disinterestedness.

Passive Relationships
The guest position, unlike that of the host, is predicated on passive behaviors. The
passive state is defined by its openness to outside influences; passive individuals react to external
motivations which are internalized to inspire action or, perhaps more accurately, reaction.102 An
ideal guest remains open to the host’s welcome and waits for accommodation; in fact, he
accommodates the host by internalizing the host’s desires and using those desires to inform his
own actions. Cynthia and David’s exchange illustrates such openness and accommodation:
Cynthia, open to David’s requests, tells her story to accommodate David’s desire, a desire which
soon can be attributed to Cynthia as she enjoys the sympathy she receives in response. Yet, even
in less ideal exchanges, the nature of the guest encourages passivity. Even in positions of
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Travel literature also reveals interesting gender dynamics, as the traveler is often termed male and the foreign
cites were identified as female. See Susan Lamb, Bringing Travel Home to England: Tourism, Gender, and
Imaginative Literature in the Eighteenth Century, 12.
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In The Power of the Passive Self in English Literature, 1640-1770, Scott Paul Gordon argues that passivity
“locates the agency for such behaviors outside the individual to eliminate any space in which individuals could
calculate their interest or even consider their audience” and blames any incendiary actions on an outside source;
inspired by “another individual, …external nature or in God” (4-5), the actor can act without being an agent. Gordon
describes this flaw as the “cost of defining oneself not as a freely choosing actor but as the passive agent of another
force” (8). Such ideal passivity leads to disinterested intentions but it does not lead to control over oneself or the
surrounding contexts and people. As such, the guest is certainly able to act morally, as defined by benevolent
intentions, but is not able to control when, where, or how to act on those intentions.
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vulnerability and subject to abuse from the host, the guest responds to his host, attempting to
mediate rather than control, reacting rather than acting.
This less active position offers the guest a certain moral standing. His very passivity
allows for the disinterested perspective so highly prized in the eighteenth century. Because the
guest must react to the host, he approaches the hospitable exchange with little thought of
personal gain.103 Indeed, Cynthia does not tell her story to help her own position but to
accommodate David’s requests, requests which she believes to be disinterested. The narrative
does indicate that Cynthia’s willingness to respond to David’s request is based on his own
disinterest. Had she suspected David of ulterior motives, Cynthia might have been less
forthcoming with such personal information. Her position as a toad-eater has taught Cynthia this
caution; she is wary of being too open to another and exposing herself to harm. However, the
novel’s ideal relationships make clear that, though some self-interest is necessary to protect the
guest, the passive state is more easily adapted to the demands of intentional ethics and
benevolent hospitality. The guest’s passivity, then, encourages disinterest, an ideal intention, but
this disinterest must be mediated if the guest is to be protected from bad hospitality.104
This disinterested definition of passivity was opposed to an older definition of passivity
that proclaimed the outside force motivating action was the passions. Gordon notes that this
older definition of passivity, still used in the eighteenth century, connected the “passions” to the
passive state, attributing the responsibility for action to uncontrollable desire. For example,
blameworthy desires such as lust were considered passive and thus allowed the agent who acted
on this passion to deny responsibility for his predatory actions. These passions, however, are far
from disinterested and, as such, threaten the ethical value of passivity proposed in the competing
definition. Philosophy, by promoting disinterested intentions, spends a considerable amount of
time warning about the passions that misguide behavior. Bayle finds that “Passion and Prejudice
do but too often obscure the Ideas of natural Equity” and calls for his reader to “raise his
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Scott Paul Gordon notes that this passive disinterest was often a trait attributed to women and has led scholars to
claim “the first ‘modern’ subject was a woman.” I will follow Gordon in claiming that this trait was encouraged
beyond women as “all subjects come to be defined—indeed, come to define themselves—by means of qualities of
passivity and responsiveness rather than activity and responsibility” as well as his suspicions that passivity became
the defining trait of modern subjects (Passive 8).
104
Gordon notes the rarity with which literature claimed this trait of passivity could be upheld; eighteenth-century
novels in outlining the dangers of the selfish host also suggest that the “disinterested self is a rare thing” (Passive 6).
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Contemplations above” such passions (69). But Bayle here defines these passions as “private
Interests” and argues that seeing these passions in any other way is a corruption of the mind.
Hutcheson similarly calls passions the “Springs of Vice” that are born of “a mistaken Self-Love,
made so violent, as to overcome Benevolence” (121). Though passions may feel like the work of
an outside force, they are considered the very essence of self-interest in intentional philosophy
and turned into a source of evil.105 For these philosophers, passion is not an external force but an
internal vice capable of a violence that can overcome a person’s better motives.
The same distinction is made in the eighteenth-century novel; passivity is portrayed as
virtuous when disinterested and as immoral when passionate. Here, however, the definitions
come in conflict and vie for control over characters and plot.106 For example, in Charlotte
Lennox’s Sophia, Sophia and her sister Harriot represent the two definitions of passive. Patricia
Spacks, one of the few critics to comment on the work, reads the novel against its proposed
moral message and argues that passivity is revealed as a form of cultural oppression for women
in the novel.107 Harriot, the more sexually available sister, is condemned for her freedom in the
text; Spacks sees Harriot as the more active sister because she “slams doors, storms at those who
displease her, often controls her mother’s actions; she openly expresses her rage at her sister; she
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Christine Roulston sees the repression of the passions as part of the work of sentimental fiction, particularly for
women. She argues that the “process of revelation and self-revelation that takes place in sentimental discourse works
less to expose the subject—as scientific or moral experiment—than to reveal the subject’s control over, and
domestication of, her desire” (xix).
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The problems of this conflict are escalated for women, whose virtue lay both in inactivity and activity in the
eighteenth century. Sharon Long Damoff, among others, has defined this conflict of action as the central moral
problem explored in Burney’s Cecilia. Relating the scenes of Cecilia’s charitable and hospitable attempts, Damoff
argues that Burney’s heroines are often perplexed because a woman was instructed to “avert her eyes” and remain
chaste while also extolled to follow Christian imperatives to aid the distressed (154). To do the latter, one must both
see and act; this action, however, exposes a woman to claims of acting on passion, particularly if the host or gift
recipient is a man. Indeed, Judith Frank also notes this catch 22 and argues that “Cecilia is taken to be unchaste
precisely because of her benevolence: indeed, nothing could be more mutually exclusive than the claims of
benevolence and the claims of feminine propriety” (154). If a woman acts on the Christian commandment to love
your neighbor, she risks appearing unchaste. Feminists like Helene Cixous have tried to reclaim this position, giving
power to the loss of self inherent in women’s benevolence. Though portrayed more positively, this celebration of
women gift-giving does not solve the problem of women being made available. Though this “outpouring” can be
“intoxicating,” it can do so only with the loss of reason that can protect a woman (163).
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Patricia Spacks expresses some discomfort with the emphasis on passivity as a moral state in the eighteenth
century. Noting both eighteenth-century praise of action and that “only the self can experience happiness,” Spacks is
surprised by the continued insistence to privilege self-denial. This passivity, Spacks argues, creates moral
inconsistencies as “protagonists evade the moral problem of their titillation at the suffering of others by extravagant
identification with victims” (“Sisters” 126). Passivity rather than action does create moral inconsistencies and
paradoxes that the eighteenth-century novel struggled to overcome; yet, the emphasis on the passive guest position
offers much to the ethical constructions of the period.
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acquires fine clothes and jewelry and flaunts her acquisitions as well as her beauty” (141).
Sophia, on the other hand, “follows the path of meekness, too ‘innocent’ to know any sexual
feelings in herself, too docile to oppose her mother, always choosing restrictive courses, so eager
for goodness that she allows herself little pleasure…she does not trust her intuitions and she
considers physical response an index of danger” (141). However, when both definitions of
passivity are employed, it is evident that both sisters are passive: Harriot is passive to her
passions, letting them rule her actions, while Sophia is passive to desires of others, such as her
mother. Though Spacks argues that Sophia’s disinterested passivity is oppressive while Harriot’s
more passionate passivity is punished, Lennox’s novel of rewards for moral behavior is not
privileging passivity so much as a specific kind of disinterested passivity. Sophia, monitoring her
behavior with reason and maintaining benevolent intentions, is passive but also creates that
passivity in her husband; as will be seen, their relationship thus exemplifies two equal parties—
two passive guests— in a hospitable exchange. Though neither Sophia or Harriet have the
authority of the host position, the guest position—and the passivity it requires—holds a moral
power and seeks new types of relationships that give the guest equal power to the host.
To address this dueling notion of passivity, many philosophers and literary texts promote
the use of reason to regulate the passions and promote disinterest.108 In many ways, these novels
again took their lead from works of philosophy which acknowledged that the passivity they
encouraged needed a means to fight against the passions and avoid the violence of deception
they caused. Most philosophies turned to reason as a vehicle to moderate these passions and
leave the path open for a more benevolent form of passivity. For example, Bayle recommends
judging behavior according to “a sober Inquiry” (69), while Cumberland claims that reason
naturally “inclines Men…to assist one another mutually” (642). For both philosophers, reason is
a means to regulate passions in order to allow man’s natural benevolence to shine. Reason
continues to hold an important place in intentional ethics as the century progresses. In Theory of
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As Scott Paul Gordon notes in his study of eighteenth-century quixotic characters, The Practice of Quixotism:
Postmodern Theory and Eighteenth-Century Women’s Writing, reason and benevolence are contradictory
approaches to relationships. Gordon argues that, while quixotes were originally used to “reaffirm the stark
distinction between reality and delusion,” eighteenth-century quixotes often “disrupt this project” of affirming the
reader’s world view (6). This disruption is carried out by showing how reason and reality weaken the practice of
benevolence. Drawing from Sarah Fielding’s work, Gordon argues that the quixote’s “unthinking goodness seems
utterly incompatible with the reasoned choice and deliberation on which…producing prudence depends” (71).

87

Moral Sentiments, Smith places much responsibility on reason listing it as the “principle,
conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our
conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls
to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but
one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it” (137). In Smith’s formulation,
reason serves two functions: it suppresses the passions of self-interest and also returns us to our
passive state as “one of the multitude” whose actions must respond to the needs of others.
Passivity as an ideal thus needs reason to maintain the path of disinterested intentions.
The guest must balance reason and benevolence in order to be a responsible guest in the
exchange of hospitality; he must follow the ideal but survive the practice of hospitality. Reason
is necessary to control the exchange but, because it requires an awareness of potential harm, it
also makes disinterested behavior more difficult. Julie Choi, however, notes that the eighteenth
century was a time of “curious fluidity between the two traditionally discrete domains of head
and heart, intellect and feeling, in this period” (642). Choi refers to this fluidity as “common
sense” drawing on the dual meaning of the word sense as both rational thought and physical
sense reception as well as the shared nature of the word common. Drawing from Enlightenment
thinkers following Locke, Choi argues that “the reigning belief was that to be a fully reasoning
being, one had first to be a fully sentient subject” (642). Comparing reason and the moral sense
response that philosophers related to a natural human benevolence, Choi argues that the
eighteenth century did not see the heart and head as an easy binary. Eighteenth-century novels
use this fluidity, Choi argues, to create a new relationship with the reading public; the feminine
but disembodied narrative voice “permits the technology of a seemingly seamless entry into the
soul of another. Women who engineer this possibility have a stake in creating a view that
presents itself as if from nowhere; in the spirit of a common enlightenment, a common reason,
they take their share in construing that fiction of ultimate authority: objectivity” (659). What
Choi’s work reveals is that the fluidity between reason and sensibility is best pursued from a
passive position—here one of disembodiment—but also that this position lends itself the
authority of objectivity. I see a similar fluidity in the representations of hospitality. Though these
characters do not and cannot erase their bodies, they do work from a more passive state. This
passive state internalizes the desires of others, allowing for a close sympathetic union. At the
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same time, the guests in the novels begin to regulate the exchange, choosing to create hospitable
relationships with other guests able to sympathize with their position. The new exchange thus
has two passive participants, each able to adhere to the guest position’s blend of reason and
benevolence in order to fulfill the ideals and the means of practice for the guest.

Feminine Reason
The ideal balance between reason and passivity, however, manifests differently based on
the gender of the guest. In eighteenth-century novels, female guests require more protection from
the host, both physically and morally. Physically, women must guard against violence and
particularly against sexual violence; if raped, assaulted or seduced, the female guest’s social
status diminishes and she can become even more exposed to violence as their status as guest is
compromised. A woman’s wealth is also at risk from the host; if this wealth is questioned or lost,
a woman faces difficulty supporting herself and can be exposed to more violence. Morally a
woman’s reputation was more fragile than a man’s and of more importance. In a society that
demanded chastity, women had to guard not just against actual violence but also against slander
and rumor of improper behavior. If her reputation was compromised, a woman might lose her
social support and also be exposed to mistreatment. To combat this greater vulnerability,
literature shows female protagonists making greater use of reason.109 Remaining detached from
hospitality exchanges and reserved from the host, women attempt to foresee threats to their
person and preserve both their body and virtue. At the same time, these women seek to
accommodate those around them, passively reacting to the host’s desires. Indeed, as guests, these
women had to prove their disinterested passivity to maintain their position in the exchange. Their
disinterest, however, was tempered by a reason used to protect themselves, a self-interested
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Identifying women rather than men with rationality counters prevailing gender dynamics. As Helene Moglen
notes in her work on gender in the eighteenth-century, “male interiority was identified with reason, female
interiority with feeling” and argues that women’s feeling nature “required cultural embodiment and control” (3). It is
this very association that perhaps reverses the gendered association of these traits in representations of hospitality.
Though Moglen suggests that feminine feeling needed external regulation, these novels show female guests forced
to take on traits of rationality because of their vulnerability.
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move in its very nature.110 With this conflict of self-interest and disinterest, women rarely
actively combated violence but rather worked to preempt attacks.
Upon entering a hospitality exchange, these female guests remain passive to their hosts,
seeking only to fulfill the host’s desires. For many of the female protagonists, this passivity
manifests itself in good conversation and good “nature.” When placed in social situations, these
women strive to put others at ease, displaying how a guest repays the host for physical
accommodation in social accommodation. In the novels discussed here, both Cecilia and Sophia
require skill at reading others’ behavior and seeking to make those around them more
comfortable. For example, Sophia first catches Sir Charles Stanley’s attention because of her
skill at hospitality. The narrator places her social abilities in her “nature,” “a dignity which she
derived from innate virtue, and exalted understanding” (62). Here, these qualities suggest the
traits of an ideal guest: an “innate virtue” of passive accommodation and an “exalted
understanding” of reason to control this accommodation. Indeed, Sophia consistently defers to
the guest position and seeks to accommodate the needs of others. When she first meets Sir
Charles, she and her sister are technically equal hosts; Sophia, however, attempts to divert
attention from herself and let her sister shine as host. Yet in so doing, Sophia displays both her
ability to control her own passions and her desire to fulfill others’ desires. This behavior,
however, only makes Sophia more attractive and “displayed her whole power of charming” in
her ability to converse (62-3). Sophia, by trying to accommodate her sister rather than their
guest, displays her own ideal characteristics as a guest. Placing her sister in the host position,
Sophia performs as an ideal guest who puts the host’s needs above any others. Sophia continues
to perform as an ideal host and “inspire friendship” (163) throughout the novel. She wins over
Mrs. Howard and the whole Lawson family and continues to act as the ideal guest in both
households. Indeed, she is as accommodating to Mrs. Howard’s selfish demands as she is to the
Lawsons’ “true politeness which is founded on good sense and good nature” (99). Sophia thus
proves herself an ideal guest capable of disinterested intentions.
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Nancy Armstrong’s influential Desire and Domestic Fiction contends that the novel, and its female authors and
characters, ushered in “a whole new vocabulary for social relations, terms that attached precise moral vale to certain
qualities of mind” (4). For Armstrong, it is precisely the emphasis on women that creates the moral importance of
intention; I argue that such that the turn to intention was part of a much larger social moment but would agree that
this movement was both developed and spread by women.
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Cecilia is also a benevolent guest and attempts to uphold the passive ideals of this
position, though her situations certainly makes such behavior more difficult. Cecilia is
introduced to the reader as a guest who strives to keep her own interests in check in order to
better serve her hosts. Despite her grief over her uncle’s death, Cecilia seeks to act graciously to
Mr. Harrel as he takes her into his protection and escorts her to his home. She represses her
sorrow about leaving her old home and instead responds to Mr. Harrel’s desire to “dispel her
melancholy”; putting aside her own distress, Cecilia “revived her spirits by plans of future
happiness, dwelt upon the delight with which she should meet her young friend, and by
accepting his consolation, amply rewarded his trouble” (7). Though Cecilia more clearly
struggles to enact the ideal of distinterestedness than Sophia, she too seeks to “reward” her host
by attending to his desire. Because his desire is to ease Cecilia’s grief, these two display a perfect
exemplar of a hospitality exchange. Like Sophia, Cecilia responded passively to the host’s
desires, neither starting nor pursuing the exchange but responding to the needs that arise in the
situation. Thus, both women display the benevolent, disinterested nature prized in a guest.
As they seek to please their hosts, these guests must also protect themselves. Indeed,
such protection is necessary as Sophia is threatened by Sir Charles and Cecilia by Mr. Harrel—
men they seek to accommodate as hosts in the texts. To combat the selfish intentions of these
men and others in the novel, these guests use reason to detect bad intentions and evaluate the
hospitality exchange.111 This reason thus helps preserve the women but also turns them from
mere guests to both guests and moral observers.112 With these new duties, Cecilia and Sophia
find themselves given more of the ethical responsibilities of the exchange. As guests, however,
these protagonists find difficulty acting on their reasoned insights.
Sophia’s reason is moderated by Mr. Herbert, her declared guardian. Herbert is not a
guardian of Sophia’s property but of her “honour and reputation” (94). He acts as Sophia’s voice
of reason and warns her to judge closely of Sir Charles’ motives and avoid “debasing the dignity
of her sex and character” with too easy a trust (80). Herbert pushes Sophia to develop her own
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My discussion of reason here resembles Martha Brown’s definition of female reason as “prudence,” defining
prudence as a particular use of reason to “order…passions” and protects oneself from fraud (32).
112
Paula Backscheider notes that this detached perspective is one feminists have identified as part of the female
perspective. Noting both American and French feminists, she finds that women are often encouraged to see
themselves from internal and external viewpoints (7-8).
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sense of reason and praises her for its use. In one exemplary scene of this relationship, Herbert
prompts Sophia to tell him “when was it that your heart, or rather your reason, gave you these
secret admonitions you spoke of?” and then praises her answer that she “immediately” suspected
Sir Charles of “some latent design [that] lay concealed under his specious offer” (87-88). Sophia
here proclaims her ability to overcome her initial benevolent reaction of gratitude to Sir Charles
for his generosity in order to reason through her need for preservation. Through this tutelage,
Sophia is able to accurately interpret Sir Charles’s malevolent intentions and protect herself and
her family from accepting his offers to take them in and make them his guests. In so doing, she
protects herself from being the victim of Charles’s unmitigated lust and his designs to make her
his mistress.113 Sophia’s need for a host, however, remains undiminished, and she ultimately
changes one bad host for another as she moves away from Sir Charles and into the house of Mrs.
Howard, one of the bad hosts discussed in the previous chapter.
Cecilia also asserts her own reason in an attempt to save herself from the malevolent
intentions of her host, Mr. Harrel. Despite their happy start to hospitality, Mr. Harrel takes
advantage of Cecilia’s fortune and seeks to ensnare her in a life of luxury. Though Cecilia is
already Harrel’s guest and is unaware of the extent of his misuse of her fortune, she is able to see
the flaws in his hosting and takes steps to preserve herself. She sees the flaws in luxuries that are
“very shallow as sources of happiness” (163) and then seeks to take control of her own behavior,
though a guest, and “arranged the occupation of her hours of solitude” to avoid as much of the
luxury and the company of those who enjoyed it (55). Yet Cecilia finds such a resolution
difficult to follow when living in the Harrel’s house and, after being disappointed in her ability to
remove herself from such a life, determines to move in with another guardian. Cecilia’s attempts
are only partially successful, however; she must remain a guest and Mr. Harrel’s house remains
the place where she would be best protected. Less successful than Sophia in avoiding the selfinterest of her host, Cecilia does portray the guest’s need for reason. Though her reason helps her
see her danger, Cecilia, as a guest, remains unable to act fully on her moral knowledge.
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Correctly judging Sir Charles’ motives is made more difficult by the irrational and passionate reactions of
Sophia’s mother and sister. Patricia Spacks claims that Charlotte Lennox and other female authors of her age
“convey more psychological complexity than they can afford to acknowledge.” Among these complexities are
sibling rivalry and “the need to grow beyond parents” and “the freedom and pleasure as well as the superior
importance of intelligence” (“Sisters” 150). Sophia, to use her reason, must contradict both sister and mother while
exhibiting a freedom of sorts in doing so.
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Cecilia’s relative lack of success, however, shows a downfall in the guest position and its
passivity. By seeking to protect herself from the interested advances of others, the guest must
herself be interested. Again and again, Cecilia must disappoint her own benevolence in order to
protect herself. Her own interests ultimately must trump her benevolence. Her dissatisfaction
with the Harrel household becomes coupled with her own attraction to Delvile. With her interests
for preservation so coupled with her own amatory interests, Cecilia find that “neither exertion of
the most active benevolence, nor the steady course of the most virtuous conduct, sufficed any
longer to wholly engage her thought, or constitute her felicity; she had purposes that came nearer
home, and cares that threatened to absorb in themselves that heart and those faculties which
hitherto had only seemed animated for the service of others” (252). The demands of the passive
position of guest also demand a rigor in maintaining control over oneself. The constant diligence,
as well as its interruption, threatens to interrupt the easy flow of hospitality. The moral demands
on the guest in this situation are complex. To remain passive requires a sense of benevolence
easy for these moral characters to exhibit. However, when coupled with a need for protection or
even one’s own desires, this passivity is difficult to maintain. The only way to avoid the pitfalls
Cecilia encounters is to find a host who poses no threat and thus relieves the guest of her need to
preserve herself. Such a host would need to share the ethical responsibilities that the guest has
acquired; in other words, the necessary host would be another guest, equally benevolent and
passive and, therefore, non-threatening to the creation of a disinterested relationship.

Masculine Vulnerability
The male protagonist’s ideal guest behavior is less straightforward. Men, because not
kept passive by their gender, are often hosts in control of the hospitality exchange. David Simple
and Matthew Bramble, the two male protagonists explored here, both serve as hosts on some
level in the texts.114 David does not require the hospitality of others at all times and very often
offers it; indeed, he does not begin the story as a guest in his brother’s house but as his equal.
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It is worth noting that the two male characters discussed here qualify as men of feeling. Barker notes two types of
men of feeling. David Simple exhibits traits of the “naïve Man of Feeling” because “the goodness of his heart
dramatically underlines the malevolence of those who abuse him, even though his own qualities make him more
vulnerable to deception.” The “naïve Man of Feeling” is opposed to the “worldly Man of Feeling” whose is a more
“idealized figure designed to be emulated and to expound traditional moral principles” (69-70). Matthew Bramble
lies between these two poles; still vulnerable, he is certainly aware of the potential threats that surround him.
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Matt Bramble runs a country estate and, before his travels, serves primarily as a host to his
neighbors and dependents. On his journey, he often reverts to that position, taking old friends
and strangers into his company. Though occasionally hosts, both men also take on the role of the
ideal guest, expressing benevolent intentions and passively responding to the needs of others.
Though often privileged with the authority of the host, these men consistently defer that
authority and are uncomfortable with the host position. Rather, these men attempt to give up the
host position and act as guests, taking on the traits of receptiveness and reciprocity.
David Simple, for example, finds it easier to follow his benevolent nature in the guest
position.115 We are introduced to David through his relationship with his brother Daniel. Daniel
acts solely on selfish desires, while David has only disinterested ones. David repeatedly hands
over his ability to host—his money and his status as older brother—to Daniel. This impulse
stems from benevolence: David “had no Ambition, nor any Delight in Grandeur. The only Use
he had for Money, was to serve his Friends” (23). As a result of this desire to serve others, David
repeatedly gives up his means to host. Though Daniel’s mistreatment shakes David’s belief in
goodness, his own benevolence convinces him to continue to serve others; he reasons that “his
own Mind was a Proof to him, that Generosity, Good-nature, and a Capacity for real Friendship,
were to be found in the World” (41). David’s benevolent behavior is thus supported by his
passive rejection of authority and his continued belief that he will find a worthy host.116 David
thus takes up the guest position, traveling in search of a host—but a host who would be a version
of himself. David thus begins to indicate what the new hospitality relationship would look like:
two equal, passive guests attempting to accommodate the other without being driven by selfinterest.
Matthew Bramble also gives up his authority as a host but in a very different manner.
Uncomfortable with the host position and his own benevolence, Bramble adopts a misanthropic
persona. His nephew Jery reveals his character as he starts to understand his uncle’s
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Liz Bellamy also comments on David’s passive behaviors and claims that he is a “feminized hero” designed for a
female audience which was “debarred from the field of public action but which was also seen as being under threat
from the general dominance of materialistic and acquisitive values emanating from the commercial system” (132).
David’s passivity denounced the selfish desires of the market to this female audience.
116
As Barker notes, David Simple does not change as a character in Fielding’s original novel or its sequel; rather he
remains “ingenuous, benevolent, ready to be shocked anew by each instance of cruelty or injustice” (77). His static
character suggests a continued ethical approval of his passive and reactionary state.
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motivations.117 He comes to believe that his uncle’s “peevishness arises partly from bodily pain,
and partly from a natural excess of mental sensibility” (15-16). Jery suspects that Bramble feels
too much of others’ pain and puts up a defense of irritability. At the same time, it seems that if
Bramble is not focused on the needs of others, he is unhappy. Jery finds that his uncle “betrays
no markes of disquiet” when he is in the company of others, and only “when his sprits are not
exerted externally, they seem to recoil to prey upon himself” (46). Bramble thus requires a
somewhat passive stance—responding to the needs of others—in order to meet his ideals of
benevolence. He finds himself most happy when in the position of the guest responding to the
host rather than the host who is required to serve another. This discomfort is perhaps best
illustrated in Bramble’s awkward offer of charity to a widow in Bath; though certainly
comfortable with the benevolent intentions, he cannot handle the widow’s gratitude, pacing the
room when she faints and cursing at her to stay quiet when she expresses gratitude. Bramble
wishes to give the gift but not to receive the gratitude the host deserves. Instead, he is much more
comfortable secretly and passively helping those around him.
The male protagonists face similar challenges maintaining the passive position and
balancing their needs with their benevolence. Matthew Bramble, for example, must relinquish
his benevolent intentions in order to protect himself. His protection, however, is not the reasoned
work of Cecilia and thus does not have a specific host’s intentions to deflect. Instead, Bramble
turns his misanthropy towards all. Jery again notes this behavior and explains that Bramble
“affects misanthropy, in order to conceal the sensibility of a heart, which is tender, even to a
degree of weakness. This delicacy of feeling or soreness of mind, makes him timorous and
fearful; but then he is afraid of nothing so much as dishonor; and although he is exceedingly
cautious of giving offence, he will fire at the least hint of insolence or ill-breeding” (26-27).
Bramble here sets up two defenses: he creates a prickly exterior to save him from his sensitivity
to others’ pain and he fights for honor as his own interest. Neither of these defenses are the
product of reason, but each makes the exchange of hospitality more difficult. Indeed, Bramble’s
defense creates a problem similar to Cecilia’s liminal position between action and passivity,
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Ronald Paulson explores Jery’s role in Humphry Clinker and argues that Bramble’s nephew is a “detached
omniscience” in the epistolary novel who does not act but observes his uncle’s journey (54). In this novel, the
observational status aligned with reason is given to an additional character rather than held by the protagonist.
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interest and disinterest. Evan Gottlieb describes this problem as one of “physical and social
distance” that disrupts Bramble’s ability to act on his benevolent intentions (93). Bramble needs
protection from the demands he feels as a potential host; he finds some relief in the guest
position but must now learn how to limit his response and benevolent impulses to his host in
order to preserve himself and regain some ability to act on benevolence.
David Simple, on the other hand, refuses to protect himself or use reason to judge others;
he strives to maintain the ideal of benevolence and so remains vulnerable to the interested plots
of others. His solution, while virtuous, fails to preserve his own well-being and leaves him open
to harm. David begins life protected by his brother Daniel, who perceives the interested motives
of others because of his own selfish intentions. Indeed, Daniel’s own suspicions, as Gordon
points out, are predicated on his own immorality. David, in contrast, is unable to see the signs of
an interested act, having “never had any ill Designs on others, [had] never thought of their
having any upon him” (8). Despite his efforts to gain experience and knowledge to judge the
others’ interests himself, David never does learn to reason through this experience to protect
himself. Instead, he argues against reason and associates it with self-interest. David agrees with a
companion that “what is generally called Sense, has very little to do with what a Man thinks;
where Self is at all concerned, Inclination steps in, and will not give the Judgement fair play, but
forces it to wrest and torture the Meaning of every thing to its own purposes” (67). Reason is a
source of self-preservation and, as such, cannot be entirely disconnected from self-interest; for
David, this necessary connection makes reason immoral. David’s only hope for preservation,
then, is to meet with a host who will treat him benevolently, understand his moral code, and
replicate his behavior.

Husbands as Hosts
The positive portrayals of hospitality in these eighteenth-century novels are those exhibited
between two guest characters. These portrayals involve an exchange with a character who shares,
or comes to share, the protagonist’s perspective on benevolence and who also embraces the
passive position. These two participants, then, create an exchange of hospitality that exemplifies
the ideal of disinterested return. To reach this ideal, however, each actor must overcome his or
her own interests; only when this is done is the possibility for a deep relationship possible. In
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many ways, this hospitable exchange resembles those with more active hosts, involving welcome
and the sharing of food and resources. In many others, however, this exchange is more
personalized and emphasizes conversation. Moreover, this exchange is limited by the guests’
status; these guests remain vulnerable because neither can protect against the influences of the
outside world. Likewise, this positive hospitality exchange is unstable, as neither guest can offer
a consistent place to enact the exchange. These weaknesses result in the hospitable relationship
morphing into familial ones through marriage. In each of the novels discussed here, a guest
becomes a husband—a position with authority to offer protection and with stability as the guests
can build a home.118
In Lennox’s Sophia, this ideal exchange is ultimately enacted between Sir Charles and
Sophia. Despite Charles’ early identification as a bad host, he is inspired to reform by Sophia’s
example. Sir Charles must overcome his lust for Sophia and the self-interested intention to make
her his mistress in order to become an ideal guest himself. To do so, he must abandon his
previous efforts at hosting, which designed to hold Sophia captive. Indeed, Sir Charles original
motives were to seduce Sophia’s sister, Harriot; attracted to Sophia’s virtues, he later turns his
attentions to Sophia whom he hopes to convince to be his mistress. He uses a host position,
introducing his intentions by showering gifts on the sisters and their mother and hoping that their
gratitude will lead to sexual reciprocation. He particularly targets Mrs. Darnley, Sophia’s mother,
for his gifts in the hope of hiding the real intentions behind his generosity. His indirection
garners the admiration of Sophia, who “construed all this munificence into proofs of the sincerity
of his affections for her” (82). His gifts escalate until he offers the family a house and thus
extends his gift-giving to becoming a literal host. Kept in check by his technical status as a guest
in the Darnley’s apartment, Sir Charles would gain more control over the family by having them
stay in a house he owns. The magnitude of this gift gives Sophia pause, and she complains that
“her notions of this manner [were] confused and uncertain” (87). Sophia then reasons through Sir
Charles’ offer with the help of her mentor, Mr. Herbert; the two suspect Sir Charles’s motives
and find a means to remove Sophia from his presence and turn down his gift. Sir Charles,
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According to Paula Backscheider, courtship is of interest to narrative because of its liminal status “between
childhood and adulthood, between dependency and responsibility, between autonomy and relationship, and invested
private and public concerns” (21). Hospitality, like courtship, remains between two states; this liminal state perhaps
affects the trajectory towards marriage in these texts as both courtship and hospitality gain stability in marriage.
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surprised and humiliated at his rebuff, spends the rest of the novel striving to rule his passions
and reach a passive position himself. The very desire that led Charles to act as a bad host—his
desire for Sophia—ultimately inspires him to reform; this reform includes denying this passion
and seeking to act disinterestedly.
Sir Charles does eventually achieve some success overcoming his passions and acting on
disinterested motives. He gives without expecting a return: he shows Mr. Herbert a will he drew
up without Sophia’s knowledge that left much of his property to her. Indeed, Lennox reveals Sir
Charles’ continued reformation and shows how Sophia’s benevolence inspires his own, while at
the same time revealing the limits and difficulties of setting aside self-interest. In one scene, Sir
Charles meets a woman who has received charity from Sophia and follows Sophia’s example,
giving the woman two guineas. His motivations, though certainly more charitable than earlier in
the narrative, were not entirely disinterested but derived from the “gratitude she expressed for
her young benefactress” (190). Sir Charles aids this woman in her distress, but he is still thinking
of his love for Sophia and not the woman’s need. Sir Charles is forced to confront this interested
motivation when he believes Sophia is in love with the young farmer, William. Thinking Sophia
only requires money to allow a marriage with William to go forward, Sir Charles resolves a
“generous design of removing this obstacle to her union with the person whom she preferred to
him, and, by making her happy, entitle himself to her esteem, since he had unfortunately lost her
heart” (186). The narrator makes clear, however, that Sir Charles, “applaud[s] himself for the
uncommon disinterestedness of his conduct” too soon; rather, “Sir Charles either did not or
would not perceive the latent hope that lurked within his bosom, and which, perhaps, suggested
the designs he had formed” to inspire Sophia to love him (187). Though still interested in Sophia,
his motives are much less selfish than before and reveal a potential to act in response to others’
needs; thinking first of Sophia’s desires, Sir Charles begins to take on a passive position.
The novel concludes when Sir Charles again offers his home to Sophia, but now in the
position of his wife rather than mistress, a position of more equality for Sophia. In pursuing this
more equal relationship, Sir Charles takes on more passive qualities. Now vulnerable, he now
worries that Sophia might be acting for selfish interests in accepting his hand: “he was afraid,
that dazzled with the splendor of his fortune, she would sacrifice her inclination to her interest,
and give him her hand without her heart;… he trembled lest, mistaking gratitude for love, she
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should be deceived by her own generosity and nice sense of obligation, and imagine it was the
lover she preferred, when the benefactor only touched her heart” (150). Sir Charles, now more
passive, worries about protecting himself in that new position; at the same time, he remains true
to his new intentions that require reading Sophia’s intentions. Because their passivity and desire
to please one another is now equal, Sophia and Sir Charles create a new hospitable relationship.
The two are married, creating a union wherein both are protected from their anxieties; Sir
Charles is now assured of Sophia’s intentions, and Sophia is no longer vulnerable to Sir Charles’
lust. This more stable relationship is idealized as a supposed continuation of positive hospitality.
Yet to allow this relationship to survive, Sir Charles is no longer a host or a guest but a husband
working to build a version of marriage of two partners in similar passive positions.
Burney’s Cecilia also ends in an ideal marriage between two equal, passive partners.
Mortimer, the only son of the Delviles, is introduced in the story as a hospitable host, able to
protect Cecilia from unwanted advances at a masquerade. Dressed as a white domino, Mortimer
rescues Cecilia from a “confinement” wherein her “mind seemed almost as little at liberty as my
person” (112). Unlike her literal hosts, the Harrels, Mortimer offers Cecilia freedom from the
interests of others, repeatedly offering her a means of protection from her many unwanted
suitors. Mortimer appears himself so capable of protection because he acts the part of the guest.
He lacks self-interest and exhibits passive receptivity to Cecilia’s needs.119 His motives are not
entirely disinterested, however: Mortimer later reveals that his hospitality towards Cecilia is
motivated by his admiration for her, coupled with his belief that she was engaged to Sir Robert
Floyer. Mortimer is able to act receptively to Cecilia when he was “bound in honour to forbear
all efforts at supplanting a man, to whom I though you almost united, I considered you already as
married, and eagerly as I sought your society, I sought it not with more pleasure than innocence”
(511). Imagining he cannot act on those self-interested motives, he is able to remain passive.
Mortimer’s innocent intentions to serve Cecilia as she becomes the wife of another are disrupted
only when his passions are given a vent by learning that Cecilia is not engaged. When faced with
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Margaret Doody notes that Mortimer is himself a compromised character because “made into an idol and image”
to his parents (136). Unable to make decisions for himself or escape the care of his parents, Mortimer is certainly an
odd choice for a masculine hero; however, his compromised position also makes him a guest, able to join Cecilia in
a passive, disinterested, and thus hospitable state.
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the strength of his self-interest, Mortimer’s only recourse is bursts of passion followed by distant,
cold behavior; so focused on keeping his passions in check, Mortimer is no longer hospitable.
Two interests thus disrupt this ideal exchange of disinterested benevolence. Mortimer’s
love for Cecilia disrupts the passive exchange as does Cecilia’s attraction to Mortimer. Indeed,
both parties’ love for the other creates strong passions that each party attempts to overcome;
disinterest, however, becomes more difficult. An additional, and perhaps more complex, interest
threatens their ideal exchange. Mortimer’s family pride also threatens to halt the turn towards
familial connection similar to the turn taken in Sophia. Instead, Mortimer’s refusal to relinquish
his family name and adhere to his parents’ wishes makes impossible any love relationship that
could continue the exchange of hospitable intentions. Mortimer’s hospitality is only restored
after he has set aside the latter passion and made himself a passive party, willing to take Cecilia’s
name. Then his behavior once again becomes focused on serving Cecilia; both lovers, however,
find that their desire to aid one another is necessarily in conflict with their desire to be guest
figures to the elder Mr. and Mrs. Delvile. Cecilia, as guest to Mrs. Delvile, struggles to set aside
her responsibility to such a skilled hostess; Mortimer, as their son, struggles to set aside his filial
duties. Thus, Burney creates a scenario in which a perfect exchange of hospitality is impossible;
unable to be passive to multiple hosts, and struggling to overcome self-interested passions,
Mortimer and Cecilia’s own exchange is repeatedly thwarted, a conflict which will be discussed
in chapter four. Ultimately, however, this couple is also united in marriage.
David Simple’s relationship with Valentine and Camilla, siblings he saves from
destitution, creates a hospitality exchange that also ends in matrimony. In this relationship,
however, there is no interest to be overcome, only a shared benevolence to be discovered. This
relationship begins with David’s act of charity; David rescues Camilla and a sick Valentine from
hunger and homelessness and receives the intense gratitude of Camilla for doing so (117). Taken
into David’s home and nursed to health, the brother and sister have difficulty believing David’s
benevolence and must overcome their own pride in order to accept his aid: originally from a
place of privilege, the siblings are “ashamed to be such a Burthen to [David]” (120). David does
not see the pair as a burden but instead hopes he has found fellow guests with a similar passivity
and benevolence to himself. The narrator confirms Valentine and Camilla’s own benevolence,
affirming that “such an open Simplicity in their Manner, and such a Goodness of Heart appeared
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in their Love to each other, as would have made any one less credulous than Mr. Simple have a
good Opinion of them; and they had both such a Strength of Understanding, as made them the
most delightful Companions in the World” (120). The siblings thus possess the proper good will
and the necessary reason to control their passions and so are portrayed as ideal guests. Their
demeanor leads to good hospitality when coupled with David’s equal disinterestedness. Indeed,
the only interest David is able to pursue in this relationship is his interest in helping others; he
feels “Raptures” when he thinks “that he was the Cause” for Camilla’s happiness (155). Though
in David’s home, his approach to hosting the siblings and their reaction to it allows for an equal
exchange of hospitality as a passive interaction.
If anything disrupts this exchange and eventual matrimonial union, it is the disinterested
passivity of both Camilla and David as they restrain their passions for one another. David is
reluctant to mention his attraction for fear that Camilla and her brother would think he expected
“a Compliance from them both, on account of the Obligations they owed him” (254). Camilla, on
the other hand, fulfills expectations that a woman would not pursue a man and remains quietly
worrying about David’s intentions. Their mutual passivity threatens to stall the relationship until
Camilla and Valentine’s father arrives; a figure of authority, their father is able to easily settle
two marriages among the friends, uniting Camilla and David as well as Cynthia and Valentine.
The two couples proceed to create a perfectly mutual society. They fulfill the ideal and “exert
their own Faculties for the common Good, neither envying those who in any respect have a
Superiority over them, nor despising such as they think their Inferiors” and so live in “Harmony”
(281). As Mika Suzuki describes it, this “society” creates “a world of perfect communication and
familiarity where every moral value is shared. They do not feel the need to confess their
emotions as they can correctly anticipate the others’ reactions. They only exchange ideas about
the world seen from the spectator’s viewpoint, so as to confirm their moral ideas and beliefs”
(211). These marriages, then, confirm the benevolence of hospitality and seal the relationships
between them all.120 Moreover, they make the hospitality exchange permanent and, as the two
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Gautier notes that the larger, social moral quandaries addressed in David’s quest are “deflected rather than
resolved” when David forms his small circle of friends. Their retirement and “the deflection of the vulnerability
issue marks a central contradiction within the culture of sensibility” (207).
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couples form a community together, seek to offer protection to its members from the outside
world.
In a different format, Humphry Clinker presents a positive portrayal of hospitality that
does not result in marriage for the protagonist but does for his immediate family. Matthew
Bramble’s relationship with the Scottish ex-soldier Lismahago ends in a marriage between the
Scotsman and Bramble’s sister Tabitha. The two men’s first exchange requires Bramble to
readjust his hospitality; used to providing charity to those in need, Bramble attempts the same for
Lismahago who appears to be in want. Lismahago, however, takes offense to this treatment and
insists that he is not a dependent but an equal.121 He insists, “I am a gentleman; and entered the
service as other gentlemen do, with such hopes and sentiments as honourable ambition
inspires—If I have not been lucky in the lottery of life, so neither do I think myself unfortunate”
(178). Declaring himself capable of taking care of his needs, Lismahago demands that Bramble
not see him with sympathy and therefore not from a superior position. Bramble accepts this
demand and the two men proceed to interact as equals in a balanced hospitable exchange. Jery
observes that the two literally balance one another’s moods and passions, creating a passive
exchange: in their conversation, “sometimes they were warmed into such altercation as seemed
to threaten an abrupt dissolution of their society; but Mr. Bramble set guard over his own
irascibility, the more vigilantly as the officer was his guest; and when, in spite of all his efforts,
he began to wax warm, the other prudently cooled in the same proportion” (179). Though this
exchange certainly differs from the previous examples of disinterested, passive exchange, these
two men’s example does display ideal hospitality. As equals in the exchange, both men look to
the needs of others; because they care about the other’s desires, their own passions are put in
check. Thus, the receptivity of both guests functions because of their understanding of
hospitality.122
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Charlotte Sussman argues that Lismahago is a symbol of an expanding world and a new sense of identity. This
identity, however, is based on “adoptability” and “mobility” and exposes a greater need for hospitality in a world
where “communities are no longer able to anchor” society and culture is less stable (604).
122
Evan Gottlieb considers this new relationship to be based on Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy. Contrasting
this sympathy as more interested in self-preservation and requiring more “concerted efforts from the people
involved” (98) than the earlier Humean model, Gottlieb finds that Lismahago pushes to be “an active agent rather
than merely…the passive object of another’s sympathies.” As such Lismahago “effectively alters the terms upon
which sympathy can be utilized as a mode of social unification” (100). This more active position makes Lismahago
a participant in the exchange, but still a participant who is passively open to the needs of another.
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Marriage also stabilizes and lengthens this exchange. Bramble and Lismahago’s ideal
relationship initially appears to be transitory; Lismahago joins the family on their journey briefly
and then parts ways. However, when Lismahago again happens to become a member of their
traveling party, he and Bramble’s sister, Tabitha, decide to marry. The strange and comical
marriage of these two “originals” certainly adds to the humor of the story and contrasts the more
conventional, youthful marriage of Lydia, Bramble’s niece, and Dennison, the son of the
narrative’s most praised host. Lismahago and Tabitha’s wedding also serves to continue the
hospitality exchange between Lismahago and Bramble. Lismahago joins the family back on their
Welsh estate, thus adding a guest to the family rather than taking his bride away. This marriage,
even if less ideal then the unions of the younger couples traditionally joined in narratives, still
serves the same purpose of prolonging hospitality.123 Husbands, in these novels, are presented as
the means to create and extend positive hospitality exchanges.

Positive representations of hospitality in eighteenth-century novels are thus stabilized into
filial relationships as one member of the exchange becomes a husband. The hospitable
disposition of disinterested passivity that helped form these filial relationships remains
important. Indeed, the transfer of the hospitable relationship to one of family relation is not a
simple shift to kinship bonds as a better or more ethical relation. Rather, hospitality remains an
integral foundation to these relationships; as hospitality is based on intentional ethics, so too are
these family connections determined by a shared sense of virtue and reciprocity. These ties are
thus made according to choice and not to traditional family definitions. Yet, in changing its
dynamics, hospitality between guests raises questions about the continued viability of hospitality
as an ethical relationship between strangers. As the next chapter will discuss, the eighteenthcentury novel suggests that hospitality may not be able to escape the vulnerability and instability
that marriage promises to eradicate.124
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Gottlieb argues that the new filial connection replaces not just a benevolent exchange of hospitality but also
sympathetic national unity between Bramble’s Wales and Lismahago’s Scotland (105).
124
Mireille Rosello argues that friction and discomfort are necessary to good hospitality and “might signify that
other inhospitalities (such as the usurpation of the land by colonizers, for example, have instituted a Pax Romana in
which hosts are always hosts, where guests are always guests.” She continues, arguing that “it is the paradoxical
nature of conditional and unconditional hospitality alike to be a practice that cannot tolerate perfection, that is
inherently perverse, always and eminently corruptible. It constantly tests the host’s and the guest’s thresholds of
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fear, and their willingness to live with that fear, and with their malaise” (176). In other words, if hospitality depends
on equality between guest and host, conflict is a sign that the relationship is remaining in flux.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LIMITING HOSPITALITY

Charlotte Lennox’s Sophia ends conventionally with the marriage of Sophia to Sir
Charles, her social superior and now her moral equal. The ideal union of this hospitable pair is
troubled only by Sophia’s continued relation to her self-interested sister. Clearly lacking the
disinterested disposition necessary for hospitality, Harriot is banished not only from the Sophia’s
household but also from the country. Sir Charles and Sophia offer a dowry of two thousand
pounds to help Harriot, now a cast-off mistress, find a husband. This fortune encourages the
courtship of an army captain and the two are soon wed. In a selfishly motivated action, Sir
Charles “procured [Harriot’s] husband a better commission; but designedly in one of the
colonies, whither he insisted upon his wife’s accompanying him” (198). Separated from “the
delights of London” and thus any chance for fulfilling her greed (198), Harriot is thoroughly
punished in this new life for her former behavior. Her banishment, however, helps preserve the
happy union of Sophia and Charles; once her sister has been removed from the country, Sophia
is no longer disturbed by Harriot’s “ill-conduct” and is capable of embracing her new life and
“tast[ing] the good fortune which heaven had bestowed on her” now that “these domestic storms
[had] blown over” (199). Sophia’s happy marriage is thus dependent on Harriot’s exclusion from
Sophia’s circle of acquaintance.
This exclusion, however, is not presented as a flaw in hospitality or as a problem in the
new filial relationship. Rather, distance from Harriot is necessary to preserve the filial union and
to allow for the disinterested intentions on which Sophia’s and Sir Charles’ union relies. Before
the marriage, the greed and self-interest of Sophia’s family had consistently threatened any
hospitality exchange. In fact, Sir Charles claims that the selfish intentions of Sophia’s mother
and sister had directly led to his own inappropriate desires for Sophia; we learn from the narrator
that Sir Charles “had always loved [Sophia] with the most ardent passion, and had not the light
character of her mother and sister concurred with those prejudices of his youth, his fortune, and
his converse with the gay world led him into,” he would have earlier sought marriage to her
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(149). Seeking to protect their ideal union, Sophia and Sir Charles must exclude Sophia’s sister
and the lifestyle of immorality and luxury she represents. Such a limitation on their welcome
contradicts the ideals of hospitality, which call for openness, benevolence, and passivity. Yet, to
protect these very traits, they must be violated. Herein lays the central paradox of hospitality: its
ability to be enacted depends on a violation of its ideal principles.
This chapter will argue that the paradox found in Sophia’s conclusion is evident in many
other eighteenth-century novels’ resolutions. These novels encounter the paradox in the
descriptions of hospitable practice that ultimately must be resolved on one side of the paradox.
Comedies, such as Sophia, praise the ideal characteristics of benevolence and disinterest;
however, these novels tend to embrace the limits that allow for a happy union to be continued.
Willing to overlook the moral inconsistencies of such a position, these novels, here represented
by Humphry Clinker, suggest that the preservation of positive hospitality is worth the restrictions
placed on welcome. Tragedies emphasize the opposite side of the paradox, suggesting the
impossibility of the ideal of hospitality to be enacted in practice. Detailing how worldly forces
cannot be controlled or easily limited, these texts, including the tragic sequel to David Simple,
argue that pure hospitality cannot be practiced in such a flawed world. The chapter will end by
examining Burney’s illustrations of the hospitality paradox in Cecilia. Though the novel ends in
a marriage between virtuous characters, the limitations necessary for such a happy union are not
enforced; rather, elements of tragic perspectives pervade the text, mitigating the happy ending
but emphasizing a more realistic practice. Ultimately, none of these texts are able to yoke ideal
and practice together; rather, they indicate the fragile and unstable nature of hospitality and the
relationships it creates.

Limitations at the Threshold
All of these novels acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling the hospitable ideal with the
practice of hospitality. While the ideal calls for openness and unlimited benevolence, practice
requires boundaries and rules. Even when problems of perception and association discussed in
chapters one and two are overcome in positive exchanges of hospitality, new problems of
limitations arise. These limitations require the benevolent guest to temper good intentions with
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worries of self-preservation.125 As the previous chapter discussed, the guest works to exclude
hosts and create a community of like-minded guests as a means of self-preservation. In doing so,
these guest communities risk retiring from the hospitality exchange all together as they seek to
separate themselves from selfish hosts. In the case of Sophia, for example, Sir Charles and
Sophia have matched their benevolent intentions to their actions towards one another; yet, to
preserve this balanced state, they must stop opening their home to all others. Their hospitable
relationship thus leaves less room for new connections and in many ways separates the couple
from any larger exchange of hospitality. Like Sophia, other eighteenth-century novels sought to
determine how best to limit hospitality. This question is particularly difficult for literary texts
because of their emphasis on the guest position. The balance between limits and openness, then,
is particularly fraught in these novels and, in many cases, not completely resolved.
The practice of limiting hospitality was not new in the eighteenth-century. Limitations
had long been an accepted part of earlier systems of hospitality. Felicity Heal relates how early
modern hospitality was primarily limited to family members and only occasionally opened to
others who were often of the same socio-economic class.126 In each case, these exchanges, like
the positive hospitality in the eighteenth-century novel, are limited according to similarities
shared between the host and the guest. However, earlier forms of limitation looked primarily to
outward markers of family and class while hospitality based on intentional ethics seeks to limit
according to internal attributes of virtue. These older versions of limitation were thus easier to
reconcile into an ethical code, often drawn from Saint Ambrose’s theories proposed in the fourth
century. He outlined an ethics of hospitality based on a “series of concentric circles, the
innermost one consisting of the household, since a man’s first duty was to his family, and then
extending outwards to comprehend spiritual and other kin, neighbours, friends, and finally
strangers and enemies” (Heal 19). This system, which privileged family, was used as a guide for
conduct throughout the medieval and early modern eras and worked to reconcile an ideal with a
practice. The ideal was to include more and more “circles” into the hospitality exchange but also
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The host balances his needs and duties by hosting some and excluding others. Derrida refers to this exclusion as a
type of violence and thus at odds with hospitality ethics: “No hospitality in the classic sense, without sovereignty of
oneself over one’s home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by
filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence” (55).
126
See Heal, 394-96.
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condoned limiting welcome to those guests most similar to the host. In the eighteenth century,
the growing importance of intentions complicated this practice. Though these novels still draw
their circles around family members, families are now defined not by blood but by dispositions
as like-minded couples are united in matrimony. Sophia literalized this shift; Sophia’s new
relationship with Charles based on shared dispositions allows her to sever old ties with her blood
relations. Her sister, in the new hospitality system, receives less welcome than a like-minded,
chosen guest, especially those like Charles who are still marked as family. A new model of
concentric circles based on intentions and dispositions is developed, and novels attempt to adapt
these new markers of similarity into an old model of hospitable practice.
Philosophy attempted to reconcile old methods of limitation with new intentional criteria
to better conceive hospitable ideals into practice. Many such theories allow for a “natural”
impulse which limits openness while simultaneously encouraging a broader benevolence. These
works uphold the ideal of intentional ethics and the importance of disposition and openness but
also includes a family first model as an aside. For example, Richard Cumberland first proposes a
“Benevolence…towards all” but then adds that “a more particular Regard and Kindness toward
chosen Friends” is to be expected and encouraged (311). Adapting a theory of limitations,
Cumberland here replaces the family with a group of chosen friends. While he acknowledges a
need to limit hospitality, he does so according to choice rather than blood. Though vague in how
he would construct such limitations, Cumberland suggests that they do have a place in the
practice of hospitality. Francis Hutcheson creates a more complex pattern of limitation in his
version of intentional ethics. He allows that hospitality and benevolence is first extended to those
most like us before being offered more universally. He notes that some limitation is good
because it keeps us from being “distracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues
would equally recommend them to our regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to
the Multitudes at vast distances”; and to combat this problem “Nature has more powerfully
determined us to admire, and love the morally Qualitys of others which affect our selves, and has
given us more powerful Impressions of Goodwill toward those who are beneficent to our selves”
(148-9). For Hutcheson, hospitality is an open benevolence to others but, to remain possible in
the world, must be limited to those individuals more closely connected to the host. He believes
that shared interest helps hospitality to be distributed, and argues that “For the strengthening
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therefore our Motives to Industry, we have the strongest Attractions of Blood, of Friendship, of
Gratitude, and the additional Motives of Honour, and even of external interest” (186). Hutcheson
acknowledges that an entirely open benevolence would exhaust hosts and guests. Limited
hospitality here helps encourage good intentions to practice or to inspire intention to “Motives to
Industry.” In this case, these motives can be used to develop hospitality among smaller, limited
groups of people and then developed to inspire more extensive hospitality.127 What these
acknowledgements of limitation begin to show is both a need for limits and a more flexible idea
of how limitations might be applied.
Flexibility in these limiting factors creates new problems for the practice of hospitality. It
is useful to think of these problems as problems at the threshold of hospitality or problems that
plague hospitality as it attempts to move from ideal to practice or from intention to action. The
threshold is he place of initiation but also of limitation and marks the moment of decision
between opening the door and closing it. The threshold also symbolically stands for the moment
when identities, and thus responsibilities, of host and guest are accepted. Using Saint Ambrose’s
theory of concentric circles helped to define more clearly the liminal space of the threshold;
helping to determine whom to open the door to, this system made identities and obligations more
clear cut. In the new intentional system, the threshold is harder to navigate. First, judgments to
determine similar disposition take time and perception; as discussed earlier, such judgment
struggles to determine the proper connections between the actions seen and the intentions
motivating them. Second, the guest has more difficulty regulating the threshold than the host; the
host has the power to open or close the door, while the guest can only make his case for being
allowed entrance. In many ways, the guest position that the novel uses places the protagonists on
the wrong side of the door to be able to implement any sort of limitation. Third, as these guests
found a means to limit by seeking hospitality from other guests, their ability to maintain their
obligations and to remain disinterested and passive become more difficult.128 In putting up these
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Hume does not modify St. Ambrose’s limitations as much as his peers. He argues that “whoever is united to us
by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportion’d to the connexion, without enquiring into his
other qualities. Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to
their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens” (qtd. in Gottlieb 352). For Hume,
blood relation trumps that of disposition.
128
Though their studies take very different approaches to the eighteenth-century novel, both Spacks and Gordon
conclude that these texts seek a balance between self-interest and disinterest. Gordon argues that “the discourse of
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barriers, these guests work counter to the responsibilities of the guest. These factors suggest that
reconciling the paradox of hospitality is impossible. Jacques Derrida inherits this paradox in his
modern theories and also looks to the threshold as the place for limitations. He finds in
hospitality an “axiom of self-limitation or self-contradiction…from the outset, hospitality limits
itself at its very beginning, it remains forever on the threshold of itself, it governs the threshold—
and hence it forbids in some way even what it seems to allow to cross the threshold to pass
across it” (Hostipitality 14). This hesitation—the unfulfilled possibility of hospitality—marks the
ends of these novels. Surrounded by others capable of ideal hospitality as these novels have
defined it, the narratives stop short of calling it hospitality, instead transforming these
relationships into filial ones that threaten hospitality in their imposition of limits. In these novels’
conclusions, the authors show some hesitation in their ability to define hospitality—as though
they too “do not know what it is.”129

Humphry Clinker and the Development of Limits
Different literary genres approach limitations and their resulting ethical quandaries
according to their specific conventions. Comedic ending underscore the return to stability found
in new hospitable unions; in doing so, comedies tend to praise limitations and the happy unions
they preserve. Generally terminating in nuptial scenes, examples of this genre rarely
acknowledge the ethical paradoxes found in these limitations or explore how positive hospitality
can continue following the marriage. The lack of ethical consistency in comedic endings is
particularly noteworthy in the eighteenth century when many of these texts claim a didactic
purpose. John Mullan finds these inconsistencies frustrating in novels of sensibility, which are
particularly concerned with depicting characters’ benevolent intentions. Mullan argues that the
“benevolence depicted in novels of sentiment fails to live up to this model of a ‘universal’
self-interest” helped structure modern conceptions of social interaction, while “the discourse of disinterestedness”
offered “a more palatable self-image” that encouraged social progress (Passive 10). Similarly, Spacks contends that
philosophies of the day suggested “all virtue and happiness depend on selflessness” while acknowledging that “only
the self can experience happiness.” This apparent contradiction, Spacks claims, helped structure the novel’s ethical
conflicts (“Sisters” 126).
129
Derrida then goes on to discuss the impossible—what can come “despite of” the threshold. A despite I don’t see
in the eighteenth century novels. Derrida sees hospitality “only tak[ing] place beyond hospitality, in deciding to let it
come, overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold which it is…In this sense, hospitality is
always to come, but a ‘to come’ that does not and will never present itself as such, in the present” (Hostipitality 14).
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capacity, to a general bond” because this benevolence fails to inspire reform in the system and is
often characterized as “anomalous” and “fleeting” (144-45). He claims that the ethical standards
presented in many eighteenth-century novels are not durable and are too limiting of the recipients
of hospitality to inspire anything but superficial change; the acts, he complains, are far too
personal to promote larger political change. In limiting the recipients of hospitality to those with
similar dispositions, the ethical exchange of hospitality is removed from the larger world. The
happy marriages signal the reward for virtuous characters but also the end to the hospitality
search. To preserve their hospitable relationships, these benevolent guests abandon larger
attempts to find and promote hospitality in the world. The comedic ending of Humphry Clinker
reveals the abandonment of the hospitality journey and the embrace of regulation. Because it
follows a less conventional protagonist and ending than its more romantic counterparts,
including Sophia, Humphry Clinker exposes more fully hospitality’s need for limitations as well
as the narrative’s abandonment of larger social reform.
Matthew Bramble is no damsel in distress but rather an older man in questionable health
seeking relief for his physical ailments. His journey, rather than one that continually opens to
new hospitality relationships, gradually limits Bramble’s interactions with society to help
manage his physical ailments and social distress. Hospitality is still highly valuable to Bramble
and offers some relief to his mind and body. For example, Bramble finds some relief when
among his old naval friends, who also suffer health problems; they find that good company and
hospitality “seemed to triumph over the wreck of their constitutions” that trouble them when in
private (52). The opposite is true of the larger crowds found in Bath; Bramble’s nephew observes
that his uncle finds “the general mixture of all degrees assembled in our public rooms…[to be] a
monstrous jumble of heterogeneous principles; a vile mob of noise and impertinence, without
decency or subordination” (45-6). For his own comfort, then, Bramble requires limiting
invitation and interaction.130 As the novel progresses, Bramble defines these limitations
according to internal dispositions rather than external markers. He writes to his friend, Dr. Lewis,
that he is willing to “put up with many inconveniences for the sake of agreeable society” but then
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This concern has been noted by Lance Bertelsen, who has argued that the novel progressively imposes
limitations, noting that as the family moves north, Bramble limits his interactions with “crowds—and thus the
number of ‘connexions’ to which his mind and body most respond” (127). Rather than remain open to large groups
of people, Bramble instead restricts his interaction to his family and a few friends.
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qualifies that he is only willing to do so for society of a certain disposition; he wishes to exclude
many of those he has met in Bath and London because they are “too much engrossed by schemes
of interest or ambition, to have any room left for sentiment or friendship” (116). Such a
statement suggests that it is not the “mixing of all degrees” that causes Bramble’s health fits but
the mixing, indeed prevalence, of self-interested individuals into his society of disinterested
friends.
These limitations by disposition, however, generally take the form of more classical
limitations. Like Saint Ambrose’s model, Bramble generally limits according to family and then
social class. Indeed, Charlotte Sussman argues that these worthy and unworthy dispositions are
defined according to conservative definitions of class. Sussman claims that what threatens
Bramble’s constitution are “innovative forms of consumption” displayed by those who selfishly
and ostentatiously display their wealth and are represented as members of a rising middle class.
Sussman connects luxury to a very classist disposition to keep out “socio-economic disruptions,”
and argues that Bramble’s rejection of these forces calls for a reestablishment of an old order
wherein family relationships were part of the social hierarchy (610). However, such limitations
also work to keep out those with different dispositions. Because a proper hospitable disposition
rejects economic notions of relationship, these limitations are often along such class lines.131
Though certainly using older lines of limitation, Smollett adapts these older, accepted versions of
exclusion to promote limitations based on a newer, internalized criterion. Bramble’s class
exclusions, like the marriages of Lydia to Dennison and Lismahago to Tabitha, circumscribe a
new circle based on disposition in the old form of family relationship. Smollett, unsure how to
define the limitations this new group of hospitable friends will require, returns to an old formula
that allowed for exclusions of those less similar.
The novel culminates in an example of stable limitations. George Dennison, an
industrious farmer in northern England, serves as an example to Bramble and his family.
Following Bramble’s near drowning and its associated traveling impediments, Dennison extends
an invitation to the entire ensemble to join his family at their farm rather than stay at a local inn.
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David M. Weed adds that similar limitations are made for women, who are excluded from Smollett’s ideal of
hospitable friendship between men. This exclusion underscores the narcissism of such exclusions: only those of the
same sentiment and same position can be included. See Weed, 633. Evan Gottlieb sees the excluded party as the
Highland Scots, who are rejected in the national definition of a Briton. See Gottlieb, 106.
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Following all etiquette of good hosting, Dennison takes in the entire entourage, at whose house
Bramble finds a picture of hospitality: Bramble writes that, upon arrival, “the tea ready prepared
by his lady, an amiable matron, who received us with all the benevolence of hospitality—The
house is old fashioned and irregular, but lodgeable and commodious” (293). The secret to
Dennison’s hospitality, Bramble learns, is frugality and limiting guests. Though Dennison’s
house is open to distressed strangers (of a certain sort), it is not open to many of his neighbors.
He tells his guests that
when a gay equipage came to my gates, I was never at home; those who visited me in a
modest way, I received; and according to the remarks I made on their characters and
conversation, either rejected their advances, or returned their civility.—I was in general
despised among the fashionable company, as a low fellow, both in breeding and
circumstances; nevertheless, I found a few individuals of moderate fortune, who gladly
adopted my style of living; and many others would have acceded to our society, had they
not been prevented by the pride, envy, and ambition of their wives and daughters. (300)
Dennison here clearly excludes those of his neighbors without the proper disposition to enter his
circle of guests. He “rejected the advances” of those who pursued luxurious lifestyles or showed
characters driven by self-interest. He accepted into his company only those who resembled
himself or “adopted my style of living.” All who fail to conform to this rather narcissistic model
were excluded from Dennison’s company. These stringent limitations, Dennison suggests, are
what allow for his ideal hospitality to Bramble and his travelling companions.132
However, Dennison’s limitations reveal how limitations also challenge the ability to
perform hospitality. In preserving his house for only those like himself, Dennison acts
inhospitably to all others: he lies to his neighbors and refuses to allow them to cross his
threshold, he judges his neighbors for their worth, and he conceitedly speaks of his society as so
clearly above that of his less worthy neighbors, they can only hope to “accede” to his group. The
perfect hospitality Bramble so admires in Dennison is thus predicated on inhospitality. Yet,
Bramble clearly embraces Dennison’s lifestyle and methods for limitation. He eagerly tours the
132

Finding virtue in such limitations, Weed refers to Mr. Dennison as “the last stronghold of masculine control in
Humphry Clinker” and argues that Dennison’s limitations are routed in his renunciation of “commerce and public
life” for “private land” (621). This distinction, however, reveals that hospitable openness is replaced with a privacy
suspect for its connections to self-interest.

113

farm and enlists Dennison in the reform of his friend Baynard. Their connection is also co-opted
into a filial relationship as Lydia, Bramble’s niece, marries Dennison’s son. United in disposition
and family, the novel ends when Bramble takes leave of the Dennisons to return to his own estate
in Wales. The novel suggests that Bramble will attempt to recreate Dennison’s domestic
happiness when he is once again instated as host but the comedy ends before this aftermath is
fully investigated.133 However, some indications of future difficulty are present. First, Bramble,
though capable of hosting, continually seeks the guest position in the narrative; as such, it is
difficult to imagine him denying his neighbors entrance into his home or refusing to accept an
invitation. Indeed, his passive character seems ill-adapted for Dennison’s aggressive, active form
of hospitality. Second, Bramble’s sister Tabitha remains a self-interested character. Her marriage
to Lismahago suggests the continuation of his and Bramble’s positive hospitality; however, the
marriage itself hardly promises to be one of uninterrupted happiness. Bramble will certainly
continue to associate with, and even feel affection for, his self-interested sister. This one instance
of inability to regulate the intentions of others or exclude such company suggests a larger
problem in implementing such limitations in practice. Humphry Clinker and other comedic
narratives thus argue for the importance of limitations to hospitality but raise unanswered
questions about the ethical responsibilities of hospitality.

David Simple and the Intruding World
Sarah Fielding’s David Simple also ends with a comedic dual marriage of David and
Camilla and Valentine and Cynthia, an ending which restores stability and creates a circle of
like-minded guests to preserve the continued exchange of hospitality. United as family and living
in perfect equality together, the group retires to the country to live off David’s fortune. Unlike
other families, this family is united not by blood but by their hospitable dispositions; they are, as
David’s description of a friend outlines, people “who could be trusted...whose every Action
proceeded either from obedience to the Divine Will, or from the Delight he took in doing good;
who could not see another’s suffering without Pain, nor his Pleasures without sharing them” (68133

Jeffrey L. Duncan finds Dennison’s well-ordered farm to be a triumph of “reason and labor” in the novel and
contends that this “process of realizing a possibility” will be taken to Wales with Bramble and his family (522).
Applied to the hospitable exchange, this process suggests that the limitations created through reason can be used to
realize a more positive hospitality.
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69). Having found one another, the group has no further need for larger society and no longer
seeks or offers hospitality. As in Humphry Clinker, this happy union is based on the exclusion of
other company. Yet, this comedic ending also raises questions as to the ethical message of the
text and the practice of hospitality. As Scott Paul Gordon puts it, the balance of disinterested
hospitality is never shown “working outside the safety of the ‘laboratory’” and thus the larger
practice of positive hospitality is questioned; the only way to preserve the happy community
“seems to be withdrawal from the world” (Quixote 77). Such retirement, however, counters the
David’s disinterested desire to learn of the sufferings of others; indeed, his disinterested nature is
hard to imagine limited to only his family. Moreover, the ending of the novel shows David’s
completed quest—he has found a true friend—but the problem of society that the text points out
is not resolved.134 Without a means to actively combat these problems, the family will certainly
still remain susceptible to the interests of others. The novel, then, offers a happy ending only in
so far as the characters are able to detach themselves from the vice-filled world around them but
does not show how this exclusionary hospitality would be practiced.
Unlike Smollett, however, Fielding returns to this hospitable community and explores
these ethical inconsistencies. Dissatisfied with the impracticality of the comedic ending, Fielding
returned to the text nine years later to add a sequel, Volume the Last.135 This volume changes the
narrative from a comedy to a tragedy as the family experiences a series of hardships, illnesses,
separations and deaths as David’s fortune dwindles away.136 Unable to maintain their happy
isolation because of physical necessity, the family abandons the boundaries set around their
happy community and once again seeks hospitality from the outside world. The reversal of
fortune Fielding depicts illustrates tragedy’s different approach to the paradox of hospitality.
Whereas comedic endings support imposing limitations on hospitality in order to preserve ideal
relationships, tragedy emphasizes how difficult these limitations are in practice, particularly for
134

Linda Bree finds the moral message at the end of the original novel “modest,” and points out that “David has
converted no one from vice to virtue; in fact, he has made no attempt to change the society he has found so alien to
his own ideals” (45).
135
Sarah Fielding’s life had been quite tragic in these nine years; she lost three siblings between 1750 and 1754 and
became financially strained.
136
According to Linda Bree, the crucial difference between the original novel and its sequel is the state of David’s
fortune. As he David loses his wealth, he “crosses the single most important dividing line in that society: that
between self-sufficient and suppliant” (83). Without this fortune and with a family to care for, David is unable to
walk away from hospitality that he suspects or even recognizes as deceitful as he was in the first novel.
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the passive guest. Indeed, Fielding’s happy union of disinterested guests is never able to offer the
protection of a true host, and the family spends most of the sequel searching for such a protector.
Ultimately, Fielding’s additions refute any ability to safely or permanently limit hospitality even
as the need for such limits in an inhospitable world escalates.
The prelude to the sequel, authored by a “friend of the author,” suggests that Fielding is
preoccupied with the paradox of hospitality. Here, Fielding is described to be struggling to
deliver a version of positive hospitality that can be practiced in the context of an intruding,
selfish world. The prelude claims that Fielding wishes to “illustrate that well-known
Observation, that ‘The Attainment of our Wishes is but too often the Beginning of our Sorrows’”
(285). This conventional saying marks the shift from comedy to tragedy but also suggests that
the attainment of ideal hospitality is impossible to protect; the impulse to extend this hospitality
found in a comedic ending must always come to an end. The prelude suggests that the sequel
does not abandon hospitality as an ethic but no longer offers hospitality as a safe haven from the
pressures of an inhospitable world; rather, the positive hospitality enacted by the Simple family
will show that “every Evil may be lessened and alleviated” but the prelude does not suggest that
such evils can be avoided (285). Fielding herself offers a more pessimistic version of this moral
and questions the possibility for hospitality to exist in the world. She writes that her sequel
illustrates the “Truth of the Observation… ‘That solid and lasting Happiness is not to be attained
in this World,’ adding only that “a frequent Repetition of this Observation is necessary, in order
to remind People of its Truth” (291-292). Here, hospitality is seen as a vulnerable condition and
as an ethic that cannot be practiced in an inhospitable world. Clearly, Fielding wishes to revise
her original message; limitations are deemed impossible, and hospitality is impossible without
limits. As unsatisfactory as the closed group was to a hospitable ethic of openness, a return to
that openness appears even more damaging. Thus, Fielding pursues the paradox of hospitality: in
order to enact hospitality, it must be limited; at the same time, hospitality must remain open to
the untrusted stranger.
Fielding’s sequel reiterates the need for limitations found in her original text. As in
David’s original quest for a true friend, the potential hosts in Volume the Last are too selfinterested to offer hospitality. Fielding highlights the difference between these bad hosts to the
hospitality of the Simple family, whose disinterested community is difficult to relate to those
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outside their positive exchange of hospitality. For example, Mrs. Orgueil repeatedly estimates
Cynthia and Camilla’s relationship according to her own interested motives.137 Taking an
extreme disliking to Cynthia, she attempts to usurp her enemy in Camilla’s affection through
tactics meant to divide their self interests. Because both Camilla and Cynthia practice a
disinterested hospitality, attempts to arouse jealousy or offers of social promotion have little
affect on their relationship. Mrs. Orgueil’s lack of success, and her decision to even attempt such
an usurpation, illustrates her misunderstanding of their shared hospitality. In another instance,
David attempts to explain his family’s disinterested relationship in order to beg for aid for his
family; the loan shark he seeks aid from, however, is incapable of understanding such shared
hospitality. David asks for a loan to support his family, offering Valentine’s promise to send
money as collateral. Because Valentine is not legally obliged to share this money with David, the
loan shark refuses the collateral, mystifying David who can only complain that “the Word
Obligation was never one thought of by either of us, from our first Acquaintance” (345).
Because the loan shark sees the world from a more selfish viewpoint, he fails to trust in such
generosity. In a world that is not united or disinterested, the Simple family finds their hospitable
circle continually at odds with those outside their circle. For protection from such a world,
limitations are necessary for the practice of hospitality.
However, the guest in need of hospitality cannot enact these necessary limitations but
instead must remain vulnerable. David and his family find themselves in the position of a
supplicating guest as David’s fortune gradually diminishes. This change in financial position
affects their ability to remain segregated from the rest of society; they must open their circle in
order to ask for external aid. The volume is introduced, then, not by a change in the characters,
but by a “strange and unexpected change of Fortune” that they face (349). Though their
hospitable dispositions experience “no Alteration” (349), this lack of self-interest ultimately
leads them once again into need; had David taken a more active, assertive role in managing his
wealth, such a change in situation might not have occurred. Passively hospitable, the family’s
luck fails passively as well; their fortune slowly diminishes not because of luxury but because of
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Mrs. Orgueil thoroughly misjudges the women’s relationship. Indeed, Mika Suzuki argues that the ideal of this
circle of friends is perhaps best represented by the two women; Camilia and Cynthia share a “tacit understanding”
wherein “they can feel assured in comprehending the sentiments of each other” (Suzuki 210).
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the family’s passive acceptance of Mr. Ratcliffe’s, a beneficiary later discovered to be selfinterested, financial advice. The family discovers that, as their need for hospitality increases,
their ability to act on their good will once again decreases; the world thus returns the family to
their former precarious station and out into the open system of hospitality that they had
attempted to escape. The family members cannot separate themselves from society or protect
themselves from subsequent threats of intruding inhospitable forces. The sequel thus once again
follows the plight of the guest who must remain passive to the host.
Fielding escalates the moral complexities of this position in her sequel. While the original
text outlines how David misread hospitality exchanges because of his own disinterested nature
and position as a guest, the sequel complicates this perspective further by David’s financial
distress. His family’s need and the general threat of want make disinterest nearly impossible for
David; though not concerned for himself, he is rarely thinking of the needs of potential hosts he
approaches for help. This mindset further obscures David’s ability to see the intentions behind
the hospitality he does receive. Indeed, the story enumerates how the very unity, morality, and
filial love the group shares only makes them more vulnerable to negative forms of hospitality.
David is found repeating his earlier errors in judgment because his love for his family clouds his
ability to see deception. The narrator, in hyperbolic detail, reveals that Mr. Ratcliff and Mr.
Orgueil
got an Ascendancy over the Mind of David Simple, that no Creature on Earth could ever
have obtained, had SELF alone been his Consideration. Not even if they had found him
in a sick Bed, loaded with Poverty and Pain, no human Arm extended for his Assistance,
his only Support a Conscience void of Offence, and Hope in another Life. But he was
entangled in the snare of Love for others, and his Inclination blinded his Judgment, till he
in a manner forced himself to fancy he believed that Ratcliff and Orgueil would be his
Friends, against that almost infallible Proof to the contrary, that the true Words of
Kindness never fell from their Lips. (326-327)
Here, Fielding drives home that it is the connection made with the rest of his family that causes
David to make mistakes. His poor judgment is no longer the product of his guest position or
benevolence but a result of his own interested desire to provide for his family. While his
disinterest was unmitigated in the original novel, David struggles to balance the interests of his
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closest hospitality circle in the larger system of exchange.138 Indeed, this dependence is far
different from David’s earlier search for a friend; during that search, David easily severed ties
with anyone once he found them unsuitable to be called his friend. Moreover, David had before
been seeking benevolent individuals for his hospitable group but now only needs a more material
hospitality. Desperate for assistance, David no longer uses the same criteria to choose his
acquaintance and appears less hospitable himself as he seeks out society members with influence
and money and thus the capacity to assist him. Armed with a desire to see only good intentions
in others and an interest in gaining material assistance, David reenters the system of hospitality
ill-equipped to properly manage it.
The family’s need not only obscures David’s ability to properly perceive hospitality
exchanges, it also limits his ability to act when inconsistencies between a host’s declared
intentions and actions are found. In this way, the entire Simple family find themselves in the
situation of a toad-eater. Dependent on the hospitality of Orguiel and Ratcliff, the family must
remain grateful for the inhospitable aid they do receive, must flatter their hosts to continue the
relationship, and continually find themselves made hopeful by promises of hospitality that are
never realized. Such inconsistencies determine the Simple family’s relationship with the
Orguiels; the family expresses gratitude for hospitality received to bolster the reputation of the
Orgueil family and remain hopeful that vague promises of further aid will materialize. Indeed,
like the mountebank’s boy, the family is repeatedly asked to “swallow a toad” but then
supplicated when given “something to expel it again, that they may be ready to swallow the next
[the mountebanks] think proper to prepare for them” (103). In one such moment, the Simples are
convinced to remain in close connection to the Orguiels when they agree to pay for the burial of
Camilla and Valentine’s father, an act which “again enslaved [David’s] Mind to Orgueil, and
fixed his Chain as strong as ever” (336). The narrator is quick to remind the reader that David’s
“Blindness” is not caused by “Flattery” or the “Prospect of Favour” but by “Fears and
Apprehensions of our Friends Miseries, and ardent Wishes for their Happiness” (336). David’s
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As Richard Terry points out, the specific “sentimentally intensified form” of friendship the Simple family
practices makes them particularly susceptible to being undermined (537). Their family thus depends on being
“cloistered from reality” (532). David’s previously lauded sensibility now helps him make unwise decisions and, as
Terry points out, David’s sensitivity becomes a liability to his friends rather than moral guide. Because David cannot
stand back and observe, he is girded into bad situations and pushed into the company of inhospitable men.
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interest in preserving his family here motivates his acceptance of hospitality from unworthy
hosts. The family’s moral disposition does not save them from inhospitality, then, but forces
them to suffer more; indeed, interest in preserving this union only further limits David’s ability
to act in exchanges of hospitality.
David’s efforts at preservation, however, are not enough and the hospitable community
slowly dissolves under the pressure of the family’s need and dependency on others. Valentine
and Cynthia are convinced to move to Jamaica in hopes of making money and again establishing
the community’s self-sufficiency. Their separation marks the beginning of a long bout of worries
about hunger, housing and health for the rest of the family and culminates in the deaths of
Valentine, Camilla, their father, and all but one of their collective children. The novel ends with
David’s death and his death bed realization of the paradox of hospitality; David relates to
Cynthia how the finding of positive hospitality imposed needs for impossible limits that
ultimately threatened both the practice and ideal of hospitality. He tells Cynthia, “little did I
imagine, that the greatest Misery, and sharpest Sting of my Life, was to arise from a Woman’s
permitting me to love and esteem her…that the attaining a faithful and tender Friend, that strong
Pursuit of my Life, and which I thought the Height of Happiness, should lead to its very contrary,
and by that Means shew me the short sightedness of all Human Wisdom” (401). The delights of
friendship and hospitality, David claims, are “more than weigh[ed] down” by the sadness it also
ushers in. The creation of the ideal hospitality community makes David more vulnerable to
unhappiness and replaced his disinterested disposition with an interest in his family’s well-being.
Moreover, his concern for those closest to him—those that he hoped to live with in happy
solitude—create a new dependency on and vulnerability to inhospitable hosts. He recounts to
Cynthia that “ in obtaining my Wishes, I had multiplied my Cares; … when Poverty broke in
upon us, I found, that to bear the Poverty of many, was almost insupportable. –Then, indeed, my
Mind began to be seized with Fear—I was no longer my former Self—Pictures of the Distress of
my Family began to succeed each other in my Mind, and Terror and Timidity conquered my
better Judgment” (401-402). David is certainly still benevolent and his concerns for the suffering
of his family indicate his continued passive disinterest; however, David confines this disinterest
into the closest circle of hospitality and no longer approaches the larger world with benevolent
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disinterest. Because David relinquishes his disinterested passivity to more actively advocate for
the interests of his family, the ideal of hospitality is revealed as an impossible standard.
Moreover, David’s interests for his family harm his judgment and made the family more
vulnerable to negative hospitality. In finding a community of hospitable guests, David did not
escape the problems of hospitality found in the original novel but actually increases his
vulnerability to bad hosts and also questions the ability for positive hospitality to be practiced.
Desperate for his family, David admits into his circle “Persons more properly called Persecutors”
than friends. These “fancied Friends became my Plagues, and my real ones, by their sufferings,
tore up my Heart by the Roots, and frightened me into bearing the insolent Persecutions of the
others—I found my Mind in such Chains as are much worse than any Slavery of the Body”
(402). David finds he must accept the inhospitable to maintain his hospitable circle of friends. To
keep his close friends happy and healthy, he must admit those less worthy into his circle. It is
only with the death of Camilla that David again seeks to cut off his family from the rest of
society. Following her death, he tells Cynthia, “my Eyes were forced wide open, to discover the
Fallacy of fancying any real or lasting Happiness can arise from an Attachment to Objects
subject to Infirmities, Diseases, and to certain Death: and I would not, for any Thing this World
can give, lead over again the last Twelve-month of my Life” (402). No longer attached to much
or many in the world, David again returns to a policy of exclusions, though now his isolation is
from all worldly objects. David here finds hospitality a paradox: when it is on the threshold of
reality, it disappears. Hospitality needs more prudence, foresight, and caution, David Simple
argues, than are possible. Even with a group of perfectly reciprocal individuals, hospitality
cannot quite exist in the world but must continue to be pursued.
Fielding ends her sequel not only acknowledging the impossibility for hospitality in the
world but also suggesting a necessary belief in hospitality. Cynthia promises David that she and
his one remaining daughter will remain safe after his death because of an unnamed man’s
hospitality. She speaks highly of her new host as “one whose Power assisted his Inclination to
confer the highest Benefits. Then she related the Manner and the Kindness with which she was
received, and the Joy with which it inspired her, till she made his Pleasure and Gratitude equal
with her own” (400). Cynthia hopes for hospitality and her relation of her host seems promising.
Yet, as the reader remembers the family’s prior distresses and Cynthia’s own position as a toad121

eater, the future looks less promising. Cynthia needs hospitality and, as a guest, cannot suspect
the motives of her host. The reader is left wondering if this is another instance of bad judgment
but also knowing that Cynthia has no other choice. Hospitality, Fielding suggests, may be
unattainable and unsustainable but is still worthy of pursuit.

Cecilia and the Problem of Society
Frances Burney’s Cecilia also questions the possibility of attaining positive hospitality
but makes more palatable flawed versions of hospitality. Burney balances the hospitality paradox
by showing the contradiction between limitations and an ideal of openness. However, unlike her
comedic counterparts, Burney rejects the instatement of limitations and instead promotes a
continued openness and passivity despite the vulnerability associated with this state. In fact, this
ethical stance mitigates Burney’s conclusion of the novel. Her comedy is not conventional;
though the virtuous couple is united at the end of the novel, their happiness is moderated by their
continued involvement with the outside world and the larger system of hospitality. Indeed, in
many ways, this marriage is less than ideal; the union requires Cecila to relinquish her sizable
fortune to allow the proud Delviles to continue their family line with name intact. To
accommodate the Delvile family torment, the couple part immediately following the wedding
ceremony; as a result, Cecilia is forced to leave her house, and eventually experiences a mental
breakdown while attempting to find her husband in London. Even when happily restored to her
friends and even some fortune, the book ends with Cecilia’s measured happiness; she has
all the happiness human life seems capable of receiving:--yet human it was, and as such
imperfect! She knew that, at times, the whole family must murmur at her loss of fortune,
and at times she murmured herself to be thus portionless, tho’ and HEIRESS. Rationally,
however, she surveyed the world at large, and finding that of the few who had any
happiness, there were none without some misery, she checked the rising sigh of repining
mortality, and, grateful with general felicity, bore partial evil with chearfullest
resignation. (941)
These final sentences of the novel are certainly not in the style of a “happily-ever-after” marriage
ending. Rather this happy ending is tempered with the same sense of lack of control that Cecilia
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experiences throughout the novel, a move which readers and critics alike found puzzling.139 Yet,
in this style of conclusion, Burney’s novel does what Sophia and Humphry Clinker did not—
namely, it does not forget the novel’s earlier lessons and so cannot paint a picture of perfect
hospitality. Cecilia’s end refuses to limit hospitality even as it acknowledges a need to do so. The
ending, dissatisfying as it may be, refers back to two trends of hospitality explored earlier in the
novel: Cecilia attempts to set limits and exclude others from her hospitable circle as a guest and
as a host. Her lessons on the necessity but impossibility of such limits inform the less classically
happy ending.
Cecilia first attempts to close her hospitality circle while a guest in the Harrel’s house are
ultimately unsuccessful. As a guest in someone else’s home, she is unable to regulate her
company or her time. She attempts to anyway, formulating a “scheme of happiness” that would
allow her “to drop all idle and uninteresting acquaintance, who while they contribute neither to
use nor pleasure, make so large a part of the community…[and] to select such only as by their
piety could elevate her mind, by their knowledge improve her understanding, or by their
accomplishments and manners delight her affections” (55). This decision would certainly offer
Cecilia some control over her environment but would also seriously limit her interactions.
Indeed, such a plan would force her to ignore her own hosts. As such, the plan is impossible to
set in motion and Cecilia must structure the plan as a future goal; she acknowledges that “the
society she meant to form could not be selected in the house of another, where, though to some
she might show a preference, there were none she could reject” (56). Cecilia’s ideal plan would
be to limit her company and close her circle; as a guest, however, such behavior would go
against her duties as a guest. Indeed, such limitations work against the demands of hospitality to
be open.
Even Cecilia’s modified plan proves to be too narrow for her role as a guest. Though she
decides to structure her own time and limit her visits to others, Cecilia soon finds even these
limits are beyond her abilities. Only days after forming her resolution, she finds herself visiting
Miss Larolles—a woman whose company she does not wish to include in her ideal circle of
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For a more complete list of reader and critic reactions to Cecilia, see Doody, 144-148. Doody herself finds
finesse in this ending. The ending is more in keeping with the sense throughout the novel that the characters are
“affected by social circumstances more profound than he or she can grasp, and it is often the circumstances, not just
the individual, that the novelist wishes us to focus upon” (118).
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hospitality. Yet, she finds that she must visit to placate Mrs. Harrel and rectify her perceived
inhospitality. This event teaches Cecilia that “the impracticability of beginning at present the
alteration of her way of life she had projected, and therefore thought it most expedient to assume
no singularity till her independency should enable her to support it with consistency” (70). In
other words, Cecilia learns that she has little control over her company and her time while a
guest. Moreover, Cecilia finds that her plan to limit her company is far too strict to be practical
or pleasurable. She finds herself too fully alone and completely outside any exchange of
hospitality; she reasons that “a rigid seclusion from company was productive of a lassitude as
little favourable to active virtue as dissipation itself, she resolved to soften her plan, and by
mingling amusement with benevolence, to try, at least, to approach that golden mean” (131). Her
limitations isolate her and affect her ability to function in a community; Cecilia must interact
with others, including those less ideal for her closed community.
Though this experience causes Cecilia to look expectantly towards her future autonomy,
she finds that this form of limitation does not work as a host either. She had imagined her plan
would be easier to enact when she was a host and in her own home, but she finds new difficulties
enacting her plan then as well. She resolves to structure her time as a host as well and live
“without regard to unmeaning wonder or selfish remonstrances” (792). This plan includes
limiting her guests and excluding members of society from her company. Cecilia again designs
to surround herself only with those who share her disposition. She begins to enact “the plan she
had early formed at Mrs. Harrel’s” but finds “that part by which the useless or frivolous were to
be excluded from her house, she found could only be supported by driving from her half her
acquaintance” (792). To enact such a plan would place her in the inhospitable situation of the
Delvile castle. There, no neighbors visited because Lord Delvile’s pride excluded them; here,
Cecilia finds that her own determination to limit her company would threaten to do the same. In
order to remain connected to the community and involved at all in hospitality, she must allow
some whom she might wish to exclude from her company.
Moreover, Cecilia finds that she cannot control her guests. She first learns this lesson
when she invites Mrs. Harrel to be her guest, a duty she feels compelled to do in gratitude for her
previous hosting and because of Mrs. Harrel’s obvious need. But Cecilia finds that, as a host, she
cannot force her version of hospitality on her guest. Mrs. Harrel “proved to her nothing more
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than a trouble and incumbrance; with no inherent resources, she was continually in search of
occasional supplies; she fatigued Cecilia with wonder at the privacy of her life, and tormented
her with proposals of parties and entertainments” (792). Mrs. Harrel’s widowed state has not
made her more inclined towards Cecilia’s lifestyle, and Cecilia’s guest finds her house
inhospitable as Cecilia formerly found hers. Moreover, those whom Cecilia might wish to
cultivate relationships with are also uncontrollable. She finds that the “wise, good, and
intelligent” were only “with difficulty attainable.” Because of these valuable traits, “all who
possessed at once both talents and wealth, were so generally courted they were rarely to be
procured; and all who to talents alone owed their consequence, demanded, if worth acquiring,
time and delicacy to be obtained” (793). Thus, Cecilia finds enacting her plans of exclusion to be
more difficult than she had imagined and, on a certain level, virtually impossible to enact.
Though these limits sound prudent and desirable—indeed, they should allow hospitality to be
performed well—Cecilia is not able to control her environment enough to enact them. She
requires a connection to society to pursue her plans of benevolence, and limitations would
counter this project.
In other words, Cecilia requires society to build hospitality but that very requirement
implies a lack of control. To remain hospitable, Cecilia must also remain vulnerable to the
interests of others and open to other configurations of hospitality. The inability to limit
hospitality is found in her marriage with Mortimer. The ideal couple will continue their positive
exchange of disinterested hospitality with one another but do not segregate themselves from less
worthy society. Instead, Cecilia acknowledges with self-interest the sacrifice of her name and
fortune for the marriage, and does not censor the perspective of the more interested world but
rather “murmurs” along with them. Though she concludes that her hospitable marriage was
worth the sacrifice, Cecilia does not reject all self-interest from her own perspective or from
those of her guests. Indeed, her sacrifice allows for the continued self-interest of the Delviles;
their family name in tact, the Delviles have asserted their interest on the hospitable union of
Mortimer and Cecilia. Thus, remaining open to the interests of others and maintaining
relationships with her new self-interested blood relations, the hospitable union in Cecilia
suggests that hospitality must make room for dissimilar dispositions and seek to accommodate
others despite the vulnerabilities and “lesser evils” these accommodations require.
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Though each of the texts explored here offers a different means to balance hospitality
with self-preservation, they all grapple with the same paradox of hospitality. The ideal of
hospitality calls for openness while the practice requires limitations. This paradox is complicated
by the ethical responsibilities inherent in hospitality exchanges. These novels each emphasize a
different ethical perspective, arguing for the ethical necessity to limit or for the necessity to
remain open. Yet, each author qualifies the positive hospitality relationships created in the texts.
These novels thus suggest that hospitality is never able to reach its ideal. As intentions are both
hard to control and hard to know, so too is hospitality riddled with the complexities of the
individuals who create them. Though the benevolent guest can choose how to respond to this
reality, hospitality, the eighteenth century reminds us, must always be qualified.
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CONCLUSION
I began this study with a discussion of Vicemius Knox’s opinions on the ethical
implications of traditional forms of hospitality. It is now appropriate to reconsider the passage
that I quoted at the outset:
The days of Elizabeth have been extolled as the days of genuine hospitality. The doors
were thrown open, and, at the sound of the dinner-bell, all the neighbouring country
crowded to the smoking table. These were happy times, indeed, says the railer against
modern refinement. Yet it has been justly doubted, whether this indiscriminate hospitality
was laudable. There was something generous and magnificent in the idea, and it gave the
nobles of the land the influence of kings over their neighbourhood. Yet if its motive and
its moral effects are considered, it will appear to be justly exploded. It proceeded from
the love of power and from ostentation, and it produced gluttony, drunkenness, and all
their consequent vices. (231)
It is perhaps easy to see the eighteenth-century “railer” might look nostalgically on a depiction of
hospitality based on action. Easier to enact, this idea of Elizabethan hospitality offers an escape
from the exhaustion of moral questioning eighteenth-century novels suggest was associated with
hospitality. At the same time, Knox’s distrust of such markers of hospitality indicates that
hospitality cannot return to an active definition; intention has become too important to the moral
landscape to eradicate the “just doubt” of “indiscriminate hospitality.” Hospitality is in ethical
crisis and, as this project attempts to show, this crisis is only multiplied when examined closely.
If anything, the nuances of the crisis muddy the larger picture of hospitality.
In many ways this project ends where it begins: hospitality in ethical crisis because illdefined and difficult to enact. Beginning with the task to imagine a hospitable system based on
intentional ideals, eighteenth-century novels end still seeking this image. The task to imagine
hospitality differently continued after the eighteenth century and persists today. However, there
is no single image of hospitality that can encompass all of its forms and meanings; hospitality is
an ethic that, admirably, draws no conclusions and, frustratingly, draws to no conclusions. Peter
Melville, studying hospitality in the Romantic era embraces the eighteenth-century’s bequeathal
of a still unresolved ethical standard for hospitality. Instead, he astutely argues that “If a
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structural impossibility is what makes hospitality meaningful, then it is the historical or
contextual singularity of particular instances of such failure that are the meaning” (18). This
project hopes to illuminate the “singularity” of the eighteenth-century moment and the meaning
that literary texts created from the failures of hospitality at that time.
In doing so, I endeavored to show that an era of British narrative literature often
dismissed as merely didactic is, in fact, intimately intertwined in the ethical quandaries that
define the modern era. Intimately engaged in philosophical discussions that helped define
individuals by their intentions, these texts do not merely apply a new system of ethics but instead
question an action’s foundations and consequences. These texts do not follow a tidy revelation to
illuminate the modern subject through personal interiority but examine interiority’s interaction
with the external world. As the depictions of hospitality show, the relation between interior
desire and exterior world is not easily balanced. By taking the guest perspective, these narratives
humanize rational theories, exposing the vulnerabilities, conflicts of interests, and lack of
authority that riddle the practice of these new ethical standards. In so doing, these novels also
question the ideals that create such uncomfortable positions. The readers are left with a variety of
answers from these narratives as a whole but also from any one narrative in its singularity;
neither version of hospitality that Knox outlines is adequate but the fluctuation between poles
does offer some hope for respite in the company of others.
These lessons are worth recalling in our own time, when hospitality is once again being
redefined. The eighteenth century reminds us that hospitality does little good as an ethic if it is
unable to be practiced; the impossibility of hospitality can only be celebrated if worldly solutions
are also explored. In the absence of such practice, narrative shows us, guests are the ones who
suffer and bad hosts are rarely punished. It is also worth noting that the suffering found in these
eighteenth-century novels are lessened by limitations; though hospitality is ideally an ethic of
openness to difference, its practice asks us to search for similarity in a society where openness to
others poses dangers to self-preservation. The eighteenth-century novel shows us how the very
definition of similarity can be redefined; rejecting the sameness of family, class or gender, these
novels define sameness by an elective relation rather than a filial relation. As we encounter new
differences in our hospitable circumstances, it is worth remembering the eighteenth century’s
explorations of identity and difference.
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